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WHEN President Wilson towards the end of his second inaugural pleaded for coöperation in the words: "For myself I beg your tolerance, your countenance and your united aid," he was asking for something to which as long as the existing emergency lasts, he is entitled from every lover of our common country. In saying this we are not urging any citizen to surrender or compromise his convictions. Neither are we underestimating the deep differences of moral and political values which are dividing American public opinion to-day and depriving the nation of the will to action. It is precisely because the nation is so deeply divided that the President needs and deserves for the time being the tolerance and the countenance of his fellow citizens. These divisions concern the essential nature of the nation's foreign policy, the ideals which should mould its behavior with respect to other nations. Upon the action which is eventually taken will depend for many of us some portion of the value we attach to American citizenship. In short, it is our moral integrity as a nation which is at stake. The full perplexity and anguish of this situation falls upon President Wilson. Better than any other man in the country he knows how deep the division is between those who are willing to take sides in the present war and those who are not, how profoundly reluctant plain Americans are to allow the American national banquet to be disturbed by the ghost of the European international tragedy. He is moving slowly because when the final choice has to be made he wishes to have behind him a more nearly united nation. It may be that another man, who understood better than he does the educational value of positive action in times of hesitation, might already be leading a more nearly united country. But such speculations do not grind corn to supply any of our present needs. Mr. Wilson is our officially selected national leader and will remain so throughout four years. He is a man of courage and vision, who is profoundly solicitous for the wellbeing and the national integrity of his country. He may not succeed in leading the nation through its period of enervation without a substantial loss of collective self-respect, but there is still a good chance that we shall eventually emerge on a high road. In any event he alone can succeed or fail, and during the progress of the affair he has a right to ask, as he did ask in his inaugural, if not for complete countenance at least for patience and tolerance. Considering all the circumstances of the crisis there is nothing which would so quickly precipitate the disintegration with which the nation is threatened as hasty, intolerant or ill tempered criticism of the President.

MR. WILSON'S inaugural address was delivered at a time when the extraordinary confusion had puzzled the nation and left it uncertain as to how to act or where to turn its energy. The address has done nothing to clear up that confusion. Promising as many of the ideas undoubtedly are, it very obviously fails to fuse and direct the nation's thinking. It is like a map which shows the peaks of a few mountains and omits the slopes and approaches and valleys which join the peaks.


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Mr. Wilson, for example, speaks of domestic reform, comes to what is practically a full stop, and then turns to the war. He omits entirely the really pressing question of the relation between domestic reform and the new international situation. Yet just that relationship is what one could expect to see explained in an address which is necessarily devoted not to a specific program but to general ideas. In the discussion of the war itself there appears the same failure to relate ideas, in themselves excellent, one to another or to the facts of the immediate situation. Thus Mr. Wilson says that we could not be indifferent to the war or independent of it, that nevertheless we have been conscious that we were not part of it, and that the aim we put ourselves was " to vindicate and fortify peace," that we stand now for an "armed neutrality," that we may be more actively drawn into the war, but that we shall not forget our real purpose, which is the organization of peace. We venture to say that these propositions, though they are assented to individually, will not be seen as a policy by most people. They will bewilder rather than clarify. They stick out, reach high, but their deeper connection is obscure.

MR. WILSON'S policy in the war will never be understood until one fundamental fact is revealed and expressed. That fact is that we have practised a differential neutrality, a neutrality benevolent to the western Allies. That is where we have ceased to be independent of the war. That is where we have all along been playing a great part in its decision. It is because we pursued this policy that we find ourselves where we now are. The justification is that by partiality to the western Allies we believed ourselves to be vindicating and fortifying peace. The justification of our unwillingness to throw in our lot completely with the Allies, even though we enter the war, is that the Allies have purely national aims in mind, mixed with their international purposes. We share their aims in so far as they aim at security based on a scientific settlement, but for the rest we hold ourselves aloof and reserve freedom of action. Just as our neutrality has attempted to discriminate, so would our warfare. War waged with this kind of discrimination could in truth be called a war to vindicate and fortify peace.

THE key then is the discrimination we are exercising. Without that key it is impossible to explain our conflict with Germany or our interest in the organization of peace. Mr. Wilson's plan for a league of peace instead of an armed balance of power would have all the unreality his critics say it has, if it weren't for the fact that this nation has been acting informally on the principles of such a league. We have discriminated against Germany because we judged her to be the disturber of the peace. And the league Mr. Wilson and all of us hope for will be at first nothing more than a formal agreement to discriminate still more sharply in the future against the aggressor. The reason Mr. Wilson is misunderstood here and abroad is that he will not avow this truth. He will not proclaim openly the discrimination which is the essence of his policy. We realize the cost and danger of such an avowal. But as a matter of fact most of the cost has already been paid, for Germany has not failed to see our discrimination against her; the submarine and the widespread intrigue against us are Germany's reply. The only people who don't understand America's discrimination are the mass of the Allied peoples and practically all those Americans who are not pro-German. A frank statement of the real policy would win immense support and alienate only those who are already hostile. After the Zimmermann note Mr. Wilson need not be afraid to avow his discrimination against the present government of the German Empire.

IF we had to choose between being governed by the western Republican Senators who conducted the filibuster and the ruffians who shouted down Mr. Bush at Carnegie Hall in New York City the other night or the would-be lynchers who call these Senators " traitor " we should unhesitatingly choose the pacifists. It is hardly necessary to say that we think Senator LaFollette profoundly wrong and that his filibuster was the culminating disgrace of a disgraceful Congressional system. But he is not a traitor in any sense of that word, and in any democracy that loved liberty his power to obstruct indefinitely would be ended while his right to be heard and be tolerated would never be questioned.

THE parallel of the United States Senate, with rules empowering any minority, however small, to block the passage of any measure, however urgent, is not to be found in any contemporary constitution. It is to be found, however, in the constitution of the ill fated Polish kingdom. Under that constitution every member of the Diet, like every United States senator, had an absolute veto upon all measures. In one point the Polish constitution represented a higher stage in the development of the principle of minority absolutism. All the deputy had to do was to shout *" nie pozwalam "* and the measure was dead: the Diet could proceed to other business. A United States senator in pursuit of the same end has to talk himself and everybody in his reach nearly to death, and in the meantime other business lapses. The Polish consti-

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tution excited the greatest admiration among the enemies of Poland, and more than one invasion was undertaken to nullify attempts to reform it. Under it any opinionative, stupid, corrupt or traitorous deputy could veto every measure designed to secure adequate revenues for the kingdom, or to place its army on a footing commensurate with the requirements of a state surrounded by greedy enemies. With so impotent an instrument of government Polish politics naturally became the free field of all manner of foreign intrigues. There was a French, a Russian, an Austrian, a Prussian, at times even also a Turkish party. The consequences the world knows: a Polish nation dying on the cross through a hundred years. Luckily for us we are not bordered by ambitious nations seeking to employ our governmental inefficiency as an instrument for our dismemberment. We may play our game of legislative anarchy behind the shelter of broad seas—but seas not so broad as once they were.

THE obstacle to the arming of our merchant ships does not consist in any generally accepted provision of international law. It does not consist in an American interpretation of international law. In permitting armed merchant vessels of the belligerents to clear from our ports we have recognized in principle the legitimacy of defensive armament. The obstacle does not consist in the aversion of our national legislature, since but for the employment of obstructionist Senate rules an act expressly authorizing the President to arm ships would have been passed by an overwhelming majority. The obstacle consists solely in a law enacted almost a century ago to meet an emergency unlike any that could now arise. Until the Senate Committee discovered it, the existence of this law was unknown to any one except perhaps a few legal antiquarians, and to our best legal minds it is an open question whether the law is applicable to the present situation. It is impossible to believe that the President will permit such a worm-eaten barrier to remain long across the path of our vital national interest. He will arm our merchant shipping and restore our flag to the seas. And if private shipowners are reluctant to risk their property at sea, even when protected by guns, the government has the power under the shipping law to buy or charter the ships and send them out on its own responsibility.

OUR government's desire not to break with Austria is fully justified by the facts. The quarrel with the Central Powers about maritime rights involves a mass of technical distinctions about which reasonable and humane men might well not take the American side. The quarrel with Germany is much deeper and much more important than a dispute of lawyers. It is Germany's aggression on the communications of the Atlantic Powers in behalf of a victory against western nations which is the real ground of American hostility. Now Austria is not capable of any such aggression. Neither her interests nor her ambitions carry her into conflict with us. What is more, she has not the naval power to do much damage if she wanted to. Her support of Germany's campaign is due to the alliance in which she is entangled. Her desire to write herself out of the consequences is only too obvious. It follows that if Vienna wishes to distinguish herself from Berlin it is sound diplomacy for us to assist her. The more independence of Germany that Austria can be induced to display, the better it will be for us and for Europe. A good, hot struggle between Vienna and Berlin would be a very healthy thing for the world, and the more Prusso-Germany can be isolated the better. And so, if our government can keep open the avenues to Vienna, Sofia, and Constantinople, it should do this. It is not only good strategy in our conflict with Germany, but a humane thing to do in view of the vast numbers of helpless people in Southeastern Europe and Russia for whom we are acting now as a partial protector. The thread between Austria and America is the last bond which keeps the great Powers from being divided absolutely in two.

THE name of Columbia University is known throughout the country. In various connections the name of its president is almost as widely known. Many of its staff have a national or international reputation. But it is doubtful if fifty persons in New York City can give the names of a third of its Board of Trustees, and it is doubtful if any one outside of the city can name a single trustee. These facts give point to the announced determination of the trustees to inquire whether officers of the University are teaching doctrines subversive of our government or disseminating doctrines contrary to the "principles upon which it is founded." In one aspect such action is only food for laughter; it belongs in the comic opera division of our intellectual life. But unfortunately it is also of serious significance. Much of the talk about academic freedom and censorship in universities disguises the real issue. The simple fact is that men of science and scholarship in this country do not have intellectual independence because they do not have intellectual control of the educational interests of the institutions in which they do their work. No matter how competent or how distinguished they may be

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they find themselves subject to an academic absentee landlordism and hence exposed to such humiliating inquisitory crusades as the one in which the practically anonymous trustees of Columbia University are now engaged. Until representative scholars and men of science secure intellectual autonomy, the attempt to lift the United States from a plane of intellectual mediocrity to one of intellectual distinction will continue to suffer from an artificial and unnecessary handicap.

OF all American newspapers which have been pro-German in sympathy there has been none comparable in ability to the New York Evening Mail. It has not been "hyphenated" in any sense of the word. It has argued as earnestly as it could the merits of German civilization. It has stood for German-American friendship on the ground of American interest. Whatever could be said for such a policy the Mail has said, and always in a way that commanded respect. We have disagreed radically with the Mail, believing that our interests lie with the western Democracies, and against Germany as at present governed. The Mail has been wrong, but not wrong-headed, and when it says that "the Zimmermann note has taught a terrible lesson to German-Americans and one they will never forget," it gives a striking indication of the really disastrous quality of German diplomacy. It indicates also that an ounce of fact is often worth a ton of sympathy.

IT is with an odd resentment that the average citizen who cares for music surveys the perennial performance we are soon to witness in New York and many other cities, the spring scuttling of grand opera and symphony concerts. The waywardness of spring might seem a normal provocation to satisfy with music an emotional need. If the arias of Aida or the mighty rhythms of Tristan have potency in November, does that vanish with the May touch of the warm south? Of course the end of the "season" is now happily timed to coincide with the migration period of the rich to the sea or the mountains or the rural feudalism of Long Island. Before the war—as will be the case after it—the wealthy did not have to deny themselves. They could go to London in time for the June Covent Garden opera "season"; there were the German Summer festivals; there was the early fall Paris period or even Rio Janeiro. With gold and alertness the lover of music could always find satisfaction. But most of us have to stay in the city all but a few weeks. Either we are slaves of a convention which says that for seven months of the year we shall extirpate one aesthetic impulse, or else there is no real democratic desire for good music in New York. Both interpretations are partly true. But our pathetic attempts at musical satisfaction by public concerts in the parks to the accompaniment of cracking peanuts, our increasingly pretentious movie orchestras, our summer "concerts" suggest that good music, like clean water, will have become a recognized public utility—some day.

WE publish as Part Two of this issue a pamphlet which aims to describe the organic development of an American policy in the war. It is made up of quotations from The New Republic because it was less trouble to lay our hands on comment we ourselves had published. It is frankly a rationalization of the facts as they developed. It defines relationships which were by no means clear when many of the citations were written. Its object is to show that the end of American isolation has not been entirely haphazard, and that a real policy of national action does emerge from the mass of the facts.

## And Congress

THIS last session of Congress has been an ominous exhibition. From first to last it was calculated to destroy all confidence in the machinery of representative government, and the filibuster at the end was only the spectacular climax of a session which will cause the soberest man to fear for the safety of the Republic.

It showed the legislature of a supposedly democratic people degraded to that level from which violent convulsions ensue. There is no magic in the forms of democracy. Like all other instruments of life they have to face the test of experience. If they cannot perform the business of a nation, if they cannot meet its needs and deal energetically with its perils, nothing will save them. The shibboleths and the shells may exist as they did in Mexico under Diaz; the reality of representative government will disappear. The fact is the Congress of the United States has ceased to work. Were we a people without a measure of political stability, were the danger we are in as acute as that of France or Britain, representative government would be swept away at this moment. In the most deadly peril of fifty years the machinery of free government has broken down.

This last session was the final stage in a process of decay. It was garrulous, wasteful, amorphous, frivolous and foolish. It wasted money like a drunken sailor and time like a babbling idiot. It could not think, it would not imagine, it could not organize, it could not act. It squabbled over trifles, grunted and squealed and rooted, and left the

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country in chaos. It spoiled whatever it touched, obstructed everything it was asked to assist, attended to everybody's business but its own. It conducted raiding parties against the treasury, against administration, it died with the curses of a nation upon it, a soiled and debauched thing. The spirit of the Congress was incarnate in the chairman of its committee on Foreign Relations. To have permitted a man like "Gum-shoe Bill" to head its most important committee was to call down the contempt of a people. Stone is the type of senile and slinking politician whose rise to power is sheer disaster. He is the kind of man who should not be trusted in any important relationship. He is the leader of the committee which deals with America's destiny in the world.

He is only a product, to be sure. He is the kind of thing which the basic evils of our congressional system throw up. He is a product of that false separation of powers which has made Congress irresponsible and left it without leadership, of that absurd mechanical arrangement of the session which fixes the time of Congress by the clock instead of by the work it has to do, of that malignant usurpation of administrative functions which has made Congress primarily a market of patronage and pork and petty favors and sheer dishonesties, of that system of rules which kills debate on policies and opens it wide to rant and irrelevancies, which makes seniority the test of power, which puts a premium on the art of staying in office, and divests Congress of interest and responsibility in the nation's affairs.

Among Americans who have watched Congress closely, who have dealings with it on any public matter, the legislature of this nation is cordially despised. There isn't a decent public servant in Washington who doesn't breathe a sigh of relief when Congress adjourns. There isn't an official interested in his work who can't work better when Congress is gone. It is regarded by the best officials we have, not as a coördinate and coöperating branch of the government, but as an illimitable nuisance to be evaded and avoided wherever possible. So deep has this gone that the President has uttered publicly his derision of the methods of an institution which ought to be his constant partner.

His real feeling was displayed even before his statement after the adjournment. It was revealed in his unwillingness to have Congress on his hands in the trials which lie ahead. The long delay in going to Congress for authority to act against Germany was dictated undoubtedly by a desire to have Congress out of the way, to secure the necessary power at a minimum of indiscreet and meddlesome talk. He waited till the last week, he fought against a special session because he feared he could not sustain the dignity and interest of the nation while Congress was in session. He miscalculated time. Perhaps if he had gone sooner, the filibuster would have been broken, but the fact that he did not trust Congress remains. No one is better acquainted than Mr. Wilson with the real nature of Congress, no one is more deeply anxious to face the prospect of war with Germany relying on the full strength of representative government. He has been forced in this last month to show by his acts that he considers the Congress of the United States as composed and organized to-day an incompetent adviser and assistant.

No mere reform which introduces cloture into the Senate rules will make Congress a decent instrument of democracy. The evil is far deeper, arising in the last analysis from the Constitution itself. We have tried to construct a government in which leadership is divorced from responsibility, a government in which those who make the laws have no organic relation to those who execute them, a government in which head, heart, and limbs are separate bodies without internal connection. And because no government is workable on that principle we have seen the growth behind the legal government of a party system which lives as a parasite upon the government, is fed by pork, held together by patronage, which has created out of the separation of powers a perilous confusion of powers. The thing has broken down at last, as all observers knew it would, and we are now in a situation where only the most revolutionary changes in the congressional system can save representative government in America.

## A Lesson in Diplomacy

THE reception by Congress and American opinion of the Zimmermann note to the Mexican government is characteristic of the unreality of the prevailing public attitude towards the problem of American foreign policy. Its publication was received first with amazement and incredulity and then with a consternation, which was mitigated only by a semi-humorous sense of the apparently abysmal stupidity of the proposal. To offer to the almost bankrupt Carranza government, whose army consisted of a few thousand ill equipped and ill trained peons as payment for Mexican assistance against the United States three sovereign American states, whose able-bodied men, if properly armed, could easily have overrun the whole of Mexico—diplomacy of this kind was saved from being monstrous chiefly by being so utterly absurd. This sense of its being absurd has prevented the ordinary American from taking the incident seriously. It was classified as an example

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of the kind of diplomacy which is characteristically Teuton, and which arouses against Germany the justifiable resentment and hostility of other nations. But if it involved in American eyes the existence of any serious and lasting danger to the inherited soil or the living ideals of the American democracy, if it implied the need of a change in the attitude of Americans towards their own foreign policy, no evidence of these implications has as yet been allowed to transpire.

Probably the indications of American feeling up to date are in some measure deceptive. No doubt the proposal of the German Foreign Secretary to make New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas into an Alsace-Lorraine of the West and to include their cession to Mexico among the territorial readjustments which were to form a part of the just and enduring peace, ostensibly desired by Germany—no doubt the acid of this news will in the long run resist all attempts at assimilation by American optimism and will produce its appropriate and inevitable effect on American policy. For the moment, however, such is apparently not the case. At the time the news was published the Congress of the United States was considering a bill to arm American merchant ships for the purpose of authorizing their crews to protect themselves against the consequences of the declared intention of the Germans to shoot torpedoes at them without warning. How far Congress would agree to protect American citizens in the enjoyment of well established and extremely precious legal rights was doubtful. It was afraid as a consequence of giving to American citizens armed protection that the nation would become involved in what was in their opinion an irrelevant and calamitous European war. President Wilson, anticipating the failure or the weakening of the bill to arm American merchantmen, pulled the Zimmermann note on the reluctant Congressmen and at once, as he thought, had them at his mercy. By so doing he did assure himself of the support of an overwhelming majority of both houses in providing for the protection of American life and property. But the extraordinary thing is that as a result of his exposure of the sinister character of German diplomacy, he neither expected to produce nor did produce consequences of a more serious nature. He neither produced nor apparently expected to produce a demand on the part of Congress and public opinion for some more drastic action against a foreign government which was deliberately seeking to form alliances in America and Asia for the purpose of conquering and appropriating American territory.

The mere arming of American merchantmen is a pitifully inadequate answer to such a revelation of the objects of German diplomacy. Americans have been trying to isolate their controversy with Germany from any connection with the war. Many of them hoped to treat each act of violence by a German submarine commander as that of a marauder which might possibly be resisted, but which if resisted should not be considered as evidence of a malign intention on the part of the German government towards this country. The violence toward Americans was merely an innocent and incidental result of the quarrel with Great Britain. The publication of the Zimmermann note destroys these illusions. The German Foreign Office does not relieve the United States from the full responsibility of being an enemy of Germany, because our government has only been affording protection to the legal rights of its citizens. It puts the Americans in the same class as any other people whose behavior has been injuring the German chances of success. It seeks to organize alliances against the United States just as it does against France, and it is willing to purchase a very small amount of assistance with at least the promise of a large amount of American soil. Thus it is seeking to introduce into the Americas a kind of diplomacy and a kind of international agreement, which was supposed to be confined to Europe. It is deliberately challenging the essential principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet our only retort is to try to arm American merchant ships and almost to fail. Our own laws may prevent us from extending the protection of our laws to our own citizens.

The effective answer to this attempt to domesticate in America the European system of alliances should be as aggressive, if not as cynical, as that of the Germans. They were perfectly justified in going behind the subterfuge of American neutrality and classifying this country as one among others whose power was being exerted to prevent them from winning the war. They were justified in making any reasonable diplomatic arrangement to embarrass a government which they classed among their enemies. But they were wrong even from their own point of view in giving to American public opinion such a startling object lesson of the danger of an isolated Pan-Americanism—one which was exposed to the enmity of some European Powers but not regarded with benevolence by others. A safe American system can no longer stand alone. If the kind of diplomacy represented by the Zimmermann note continues to prevail, it will compromise the privacy and security of all nations in all continents. It will deny to Americans the privilege of which Pan-Americanism is the political expression, of continuing to live their own life in their own way with a minimum of outside interference. Pan-Americanism must seek support in two directions. It must secure itself against the manifest dangers of German enmity by winning

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the friendship of the Allies; while at the same time it must guard itself against doing to Germany what Germany sought to do to the United States. That part of Europe whose support is needed by Pan-Americanism must be willing to be infected by the spirit of the system which it agrees to support.

## A Project for Breaking the Submarine Blockade

[NOTE: All data of a technical character relating to motor ships have been supplied by Mr. Fred Huntington Clark, E.M. The New Republic acknowledges its deep obligation to Mr. Clark for permitting it to share in the results of his inquiries in engineering, marine and naval circles as to the technical feasibility and the probable success of the plan here set forth. —THE EDITORS.]

POSSIBLY the submarine can be eliminated. The British navy is one of the most efficient organizations in the world, and often before this generation has achieved what seemed impossible. It may be that the British can sink submarines faster than the Germans can launch them. No one can certainly say. So much we know: for two years there has been unwonted activity in German shipbuilding. Neutrals have been given to understand that the Germans were building commercial ships to take part in the great business revival after the war. What foresight, what coolness of judgment, to divert men and materials from the pressing needs of war to the equipment of a peace that might be disastrous to German commercial ambitions! But who has seen these new trading vessels, or knows for certain what kind of trade they are designed for? Perhaps they are submarines in all stages of construction, now at last dropping into the water faster than England can sink them.

Whether the submarine can be eliminated or not, it can certainly be baffled, and ours is the nation that can baffle the submarine, if it wills. The problem is one of moving the transatlantic freight, not in huge, slow-moving, unwieldy units any one of which is worth all a U-boat's torpedoes or even the U-boat itself, but in small, swiftly moving, quick-turning units, difficult to intercept, hard to hit, and scarcely worth the waste of a torpedo.

Suppose that we shipped our freight to England in one-thousand ton motor ships instead of in five-thousand ton freighters. The smaller boat would naturally have the advantage of far lower visibility. If the smoke of the freight steamship can be perceived by the submarine at a distance of thirty miles, the low, smokeless motor ship could hardly be perceived over ten miles. For the large ships, a cordon of submarines spaced at fifty miles would be sufficient practically to close a stretch of water. Three times as many submarines would be required to block the movement of the motor ships.

Assume that the U-boat has sighted a typical freight steamer. Few freighters have a speed above ten knots, while the surface speed of the submarine may be fourteen or more. There is no difficulty in running down the freighter. If the freighter carries guns, the U-boat must submerge out of range and move to its final position under water, at a speed of perhaps eight knots. Naturally, before submerging the U-boat has taken a position in advance of the freighter, otherwise it would never reach a point from which it could launch a torpedo with any effect. A quick change of course on the part of the freighter might force the U-boat to emerge and continue the chase on the surface. A thousand-ton motor ship could be made to develop a speed equal to the surface speed of the submarine. If not disposed of upon the first submergence, it will not be overtaken at all. With its capacity for quickly changing its course, the motor ship would far more easily escape a torpedo launched against it. It is of course assumed that the motor ship is armed to repel gunfire attack from the submarine.

A submarine not giving chase but lying in wait for whatever might chance to fall into its maw could of course dispose of some unlucky motor ships. Still, the chance of missing the small target presented by the motor ship would be vastly greater than the chance of missing the colossal side of an ordinary freighter. The larger type of German submarine carries from twelve to fifteen torpedoes. It would be a miracle if it made as many hits in the chase of thousand-ton ships. Grant the miracle; the submarine has sent fifteen thousand tons to the bottom and is then temporarily exhausted. It must make the long and perilous journey to its base. In the present campaign of war upon freights in large units we hear repeatedly the boast that a submarine has returned after accounting for fifty thousand tons. With ocean-shipping in small, gun-protected units it would be a lucky submarine commander who could report ten thousand tons sunk. For a given effect on trade, if the small unit were substituted for the large, the Germans would have to multiply their submarines five-fold, at least, even if the small unit were no speedier nor quicker of helm than the large.

But it may be said, tonnage in small units is frightfully expensive. Disregarding the financial outlay, the tax on the labor and material is quite disproportionate to the result in carrying capacity. To be sure, and that is one reason why England, with her productive power under a breaking strain,

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can not adopt the plan of building small ships. It is also sufficient reason why our existing shipyards can not be diverted to such use. All our shipyards are working overtime, turning out bottoms which, if vulnerable, yet represent great carrying capacity. Our rolling mills are taxed to the utmost in producing plates for the conventional types of carriers. If anything is to be achieved in this direction, it must be by the United States, and through the mobilization of resources not now devoted to shipbuilding.

The saving fact is that thousand-ton motor ships adapted to the present need can be built of wood. We are now turning out wooden motor ships of 1,000 to 3,600 tons on the Pacific Coast, and it is estimated that some 200,000 tons yearly could be launched from Pacific Coast yards. With absolute standardization, one lumber company can turn out one set of parts, another a different set, in quantities practically unlimited. To a very great extent ordinary mechanics' labor can be used instead of the highly trained technical labor necessary for the construction of steel ships. There are technical problems still to be solved in providing internal combustion motors capable of developing the requisite power without too great weight. No one doubts, however, that the motor problem can be solved if enough energy is concentrated on it. The Diesel motor would answer the purpose perfectly, and if we are not yet successful in building motors equally good, we have still no reason for despairing of the ability of our mechanical engineers to rise to a real emergency. Shipyards for assembling the parts and launching the ships could be got ready, near the sources of lumber supply, by the time that their facilities were required. If we set about it immediately, in six months we could begin to launch ships, and thereafter put them out in steadily increasing number up to any maximum we might require.

There is no technical reason why we should not produce shipping enough of this kind to thwart the submarine campaign. Even at the present rate of sinking, the British can still stave off anything like serious lack of the necessaries of life for a year; perhaps for two years, but hardly for three. Shipping is going down at the rate of 500,000 tons a month. Our yards will launch some 350,000 tons this spring and summer, the British yards somewhat over twice as much. At this rate the shipping available for supplying England would be reduced by at least three millions of tons in a year. It is a drain that obviously could not be endured indefinitely. But in a year we could be turning out motor tonnage, largely immune to the submarine, at a rate making the final success of the submarine warfare impossible.

But what of the expense? A staggering question. Assuming that the business were undertaken on a colossal scale, with a tithe of the organizing effort the British were forced to make in putting their munitions industry on a war basis, we could launch a million tons for one hundred million dollars, more or less. At the present rate of chartering, a thousand-ton ship making ten knots can earn from $10,000 a month to twice that sum. Its operating charges, interest, insurance and depreciation, would amount to $4,000 a month. The training and pay of gun crews would increase the figure, but not inordinately. Constructed and operated to make fourteen knots—and unless this speed can be attained many of the advantages of the type disappear—the monthly charges will greatly increase, though earnings, at the high rates in prospect, might increase in proportion. But even if only ten knots were aimed at, the project is obviously not attractive to private capital. Net earnings at present rates would be much more than sufficient to make the venture pay, and in the course of the submarine campaign rates of charter are likely to go much higher. But either an early peace or the elimination of the submarine would make it impossible for such ships to operate long with profit, except perhaps in various inter-island and coastwise trades, where freights are light and unattractive to bigger ships.

Part of the capital invested in small motor ships might be lost, although this is by no means certain. The venture is probably not worth while for private capital. Is it worth while for the United States? Five million tons would mean half a billion dollars. Suppose we write it all off as loss, is it too much to pay to insure ourselves against the possible success of Germany's submarine campaign? If the campaign succeeds, Germany will win the war and dictate her terms of peace. She will hold the undisputed hegemony of the Old World, and she will brook no interference in what she may choose to do in the New World, unless we put ourselves in full armor. We should get off cheaply if all that German victory cost us was ten times half a billion invested in armaments.

Nationally, not only can we afford a half billion insurance against German world power; we can't afford to go uninsured. The chances of submarine success are safely estimated at more than one in ten. The question that confronts us is not whether it is worth while to balk the submarine campaign but whether we have, in our government, an instrument capable of reacting intelligently and effectively to the national need. Under the shipping law enacted not many months ago, our government has power to own or charter ships. This power was conferred upon it in order that our trading interests might be better protected. Is it not conceivable that this power might be extended

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and employed in the present case? What is at stake now is something more than a trading interest. It is the right to live in a world-system in which we may base our national policy upon the premises of peace.

## Food Control

THE steadying effect which a few carloads of hominy, rice, Pacific smelts and Brazilian beans have had upon the New York market shows what can be done to control the food supply when a community has the will to take vigorous action. For years New York has been trifling with its food problem. It has muddled along through interminable investigations without the will to formulate a food policy as it has formulated a health policy, although the two are essentially inseparable. Had the authorities prepared against a possible food shortage as effectively as they prepared against possible tampering with bridges and aqueducts the city need not have been disgraced by rioting mobs and riotous speculation.

New York has escaped the consequences of its unpreparedness more easily than it deserved. It was rare luck that there were men on the Mayor's Food Committee who knew where smelts and beans could be reached by telephone and who had money to buy them without waiting for a public appropriation. The federal government is not so fortunate. In appealing to Congress to finance a food investigation the United States Secretary of Agriculture said on March second: "Where the food supply is located, who owns it, what may be the difficulties of securing it, whether the local market conditions are due to car shortage, whether there is artificial manipulation or control, no one can state with certainty." To formulate a national food policy on the basis of such complete ignorance is manifestly impossible. A food census should be taken at once. And since Congress has denied a special appropriation, the Secretary of Agriculture should proceed immediately with the help of volunteer agencies such as local chambers of commerce, state departments of agriculture and state agricultural colleges to find out where our food reserves are. But if our food supply is to play an effective part in this year's campaign, action, even on present imperfect information, is more important than further investigation.

The experience of Germany and Belgium, where the patriotic appeal to self-sacrifice is exceptional, has shown that individual farmers cannot be forced to give up their supplies until they and their families have satisfied their normal appetites. In this respect nations behave like individuals. In 1915 the German asparagus crop was large. Because asparagus brings a high price and because its nutritive value is small, the German government permitted its export to Holland and Denmark as a means of maintaining the value of the mark in foreign exchange. But when this became known, popular indignation compelled the withdrawal of the export privilege. War or no war, we may be certain that any marked interference with the customary domestic supply in America will cause local food riots and demands for an embargo on export. In the event of war with Germany our manifest duty will be to assure an adequate food supply to France, England and Italy, but the deliberate organization of export will meet with insuperable opposition unless the domestic demand is first satisfied.

The federal government should make it possible for all non-agricultural communities to do what private wealth has done in New York. Surplus supplies should be gathered at strategic points for release at critical moments. This would check undue speculation, steady local markets, and prevent riots.

The next step beyond this preliminary precaution has been advised by the farmers of the Non-Partisan League of Dakota and the Northwest. They propose that the government prepare to take over terminal grain elevators, flour mills, packing houses and cold storage plants precisely as it has prepared to take over factories producing munitions for the army and navy. To locate the major centers of food storage and distribution would not call for a protracted investigation. Neither would their control require a large bureaucratic army. As in the case of munitions, the government could rely upon volunteer committees of experts and local volunteer organizations.

These two steps, if vigorously taken as part of a national policy, would provide the best immediate incentives to increased production. Guaranteed against undue profiteering by the middleman and assured a steady market at good prices, our farmers would make up for the shortage in man power by the increased use of labor-saving machinery upon the land. The federal government could further stimulate production by telling the farmers what the world demand for food is and what it will be during the coming year. In view of the failure of the wheat crops of Australia and Argentina and the known requirements of Europe, it should not be difficult to make reasonably accurate estimates. Our farmers are exceedingly wary of over-production. In the West particularly they have a vivid memory of the years when it was cheaper to burn corn in the kitchen stove than to ship it to market. But if the farmers knew that the government would absorb the surplus above the ordinary commercial demand for regulating

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local markets, provisioning the army and navy, and for systematic export, it is certain that, barring pestilence or drought, they would surpass all previous records of production.

It is upon such general economic incentives to increased production that the government will have to rely in this crisis. Spring planting is on; in some southern sections crops are already ripening. What the farmers and the country have a right to ask is an authoritative statement of what the demand for commodities is and the assurance of a clear-cut program of government action.

But what if these general measures fail to yield a sufficient surplus to enable us to feed France, England and Italy without serious interference with our domestic habits of consumption? In anticipation of such a contingency a man of the exceptional experience of Mr. Herbert C. Hoover believes that we should begin at once to apply a policy of partial repression. Our normal abundance has bred in us wasteful habits of consumption. The dietetic minimum necessary to maintain health is approximately 2,400 calories—varying from 800 for infants to 3,500 for hard manual workers. But the customary food consumption in the United States averages 4,000 calories. We scorn substitutes for the things we habitually eat. We have a superstitious prejudice against oleomargarine and vegetable fats although many of them are superior to animal products. The cry of the East Side women that what they wanted was not smelts or hominy but their customary measure of onions, cabbages and potatoes is an illustration of the rigidity of habits. But our set habits create a psychological problem that cannot be solved by ruthlessness—they must be met by a sustained campaign of education. In this matter many of our local health boards are already doing good work. As a result of his experience in Belgium and France Mr. Hoover believes that it is possible "to make the terms *calories, fats, proteins, carbohydrates,* understood and appreciated by every person who reads." A further aid to the solution of the psychological problem would be to advise the public exactly what monthly supply of a given commodity is available and what this means in daily calories per capita. "Two very important reactions," says Mr. Hoover, "follow such publicity. The patriotic, well thinking population responds at once. And a curious psychological effect is induced toward economy by directing attention to the specific shortage even if the maximum food available is actually up to normal consumption."

But it is the part of wisdom, in a country with food to export, to interfere as little as possible with the habits of the individual consumer. The most effective measures of repression are those directed against conspicuous waste. A vast, though incalculable amount of food is wasted in the United States in such luxurious consumption as after-theatre suppers and the like. Restrictions upon hotels and restaurants would meet with a minimum of public opposition. But possibly the largest single item of wasteful consumption is the hundred million bushels of grain that every year go into the production of beer and whisky. Last year, according to the Tribune, American distilleries turned out 185,000,000 gallons of spirits and breweries 60,000,000 barrels of beer, as compared with 42,700,000 barrels of beer in England, 26,300,000 barrels in Germany and 12,000,000 in France. Apart from the injurious physical effects of alcohol it is estimated that brewing reduces the food value of grain by seventy-five per cent. Billions of fourteen-ounce loaves of bread could be baked from the waste involved in manufacturing beer.

These are but rough indications of what might readily be done to control our American food supply if the will to control it were present. But the problem is a psychological one as much as a problem of mechanical production and distribution. The will to economize must be in the people as well as in their official representatives. No program can be effective that is not planned on a national scale and inspired by a national purpose. The present muddle at Washington is the most serious obstacle to the development of a rational program of food conservation. If the government continues to drift, if it fails to announce a definite purpose until the planting season is passed, we shall have our hands full with our own domestic food problems before the year is at an end. With the food reserves of the world practically exhausted, our ability as a nation to influence the outcome of the war grows increasingly problematical with every day of indecision.

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# Labor's Unpreparedness

IN any survey of the state of the nation as a prospective belligerent, no fact comes with more force to the informed liberal than the unpreparedness of the American labor movement. The country has a right to demand two things of organized labor in this time of crisis—first that it serve as an agency for organizing the main body of wage earners for willing national service, and second, that it shall render American labor alert, articulate and efficient as a great liberal force standing guard over the people's political liberties and economic wellbeing, protecting them from the encroachments and assaults of executives too intent on the job in hand to be entrusted with the preservation of these spiritual and material treasures.

Mr. Gompers and the Federation of Labor must be credited with an influence at Washington far out of proportion to the number of those who pay dues to the Federation and follow its leadership. But that influence is not enough. It may force through an immigration bill over the President's veto and procure the enactment of a legislative fiat exempting labor from prosecution under the Sherman act. But it cannot reach out over the country and enlist the great body of wage-earners for policies of service and accommodation to which its leaders will have subscribed. Nor can it marshal more than a fraction of labor's potential power for the purpose of opposing policies which the leaders regard as threatening vital rights and advantages.

The membership of the Federation as reported to the Baltimore convention by Secretary Morrison was 2,072,000, an increase of 52,000 or 2½ per cent in the two years since November, 1914. To-day, as in the years before the war stopped immigration, stimulated industry and thereby gave the Federation its greatest opportunity, Mr. Gompers's organization is practically without representation or influence in the great basic industries that would be the first to undergo mobilization in time of war. Outside of government yards, nothing the Federation could do or say would either enlist American steel workers for national service or give leadership and direction to protest and resistance, where these were demanded by an informed liberalism. Working class coöperation would have to be secured either by high wages, unorganized and fortuitous patriotism in the individual, or, these failing, the most rigorous use of force. As for resistance to improper demands, Mr. Gompers's voice, sturdily though it might be raised, would carry an authority easily challenged in the light of his utter lack of any commission to speak for the men whose rights or privileges were involved.

The prospect of war only gives emphasis to a challenge that has long been in order for liberals outside of the labor movement. Apparently the challenge must come from without, for at the Baltimore convention no single delegate made protest against the failure of the Federation to expand and extend its influence during the past two years so rich in opportunity. Now, every liberal has the right to demand of the labor movement that it serve as a great Americanizing force and as one of the strongest allies in every contest between democracy and its enemies. Mr. Gompers and his associates would be the last to disavow this obligation. It is because they have assumed it and professed to meet it that they cannot escape a reckoning for their failure. And they have failed. The Federation is still composed of unions, most of which owe their success to their control of the labor supply in highly specialized trades employing relatively small numbers of men. The Federation still clings to the edges of American industry. A typical industrial community in the United States still consists of thousands or tens of thousands of inarticulate, unorganized workmen, and a handful of trade unionists who have little in common with the great masses of wage earners and who hold aloof from them. Particularly is this so in our great basic industries, such as steel making, meat packing, oil refining and textile manufacture. The typical factory hand, if there be a type in America, remains not only outside of and indifferent to the Federation, he is often prejudiced against it and its leaders. Wage movements in these industries have been influenced little or not at all by the Federation. Spontaneous unorganized strikes, and even the influence of wandering I. W W. agitators, have been more important factors, and the relation between supply and demand more important still.

Nor is the Federation's political influence impressive. Its achievements at Washington have been those of a closely organized and wisely directed group of Congressmen, eighteen in number, making the most of a log-rolling and back-scratching system under which even so small a group as that controlled by Mr. Gompers can sometimes impose their wishes on the majority. But the Federation's attempts to influence opinion and votes in the mass have produced some lament-

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able failures. It is true that Governor Johnson is willing to concede that nine in ten of the hundred thousand unionists in California voted for Wilson. But California unionists are not typical, and a result in California that expressed merely local conditions would lose all importance if the Federation's leadership had not failed so completely in the industrial centers of the East and Middle West.

But the measure of the Federation's failure cannot be taken by reviewing its record in any political campaign or the result of its efforts to secure specific advantage in hours, wages and conditions of labor. Its failure can only be measured by considering to what extent the great mass of wage earners in America are enlisted as an articulate, informed, purposeful force in the nation's life. We have a criterion here in the success of our one great industrial union—the United Mine Workers—in organizing unskilled or partly skilled foreign-born workmen and transforming them, in the words of a great operator, Mr. Peabody, "from something like brutes to intelligent, distinct, argumentative American citizens." In the soft coal fields, it is true, there existed no great central corporate control to oppose barriers to the work of organizing. But this does not hold good of the anthracite field, where 170,000 men are members of the union.

Looking backward, no student of the labor movement could say that Mr. Gompers has failed. His long years of leadership have been crowded with solid achievement. It is precisely because Mr. Gompers and his associates have reached the age when they do look backward that they are content with hugging to themselves what they now possess, and at anniversary banquets complacently toast their successes with no thought of the millions who remain dumb and unheeded except on those rare occasions—how rare, one wonders, in the future?—when their blind strikings-out give us a Youngstown or a Bayonne.

It is rather to the younger men who remained silent at Baltimore than to Mr. Gompers and the other elders surrounding him that our challenge should be directed. It requires a hard heart to deny Mr. Gompers the right to nurse his pride in achievement. Yet, Mr. Gompers cannot escape on the theory that his work is done. For there is convincing disproof of senility in the amazing vigor and shrewdness with which he continues to domineer the labor movement and to discourage the rise of younger, more forward-looking men. And so no easy task awaits the man or group that accepts our challenge and sets forth for the task of democratizing American industry. Of the obstacles other than Mr. Gompers's leadership, two must be set down in fairness to the men who have failed. In no other country are labor leaders confronted with a working class so divided by race, language and the prejudices incidental to these divisions. And in no other country are the basic industries under the centralized control of corporations possessing anything like the power of effectual resistance to democratic organization that has been developed by our great industrial corporations. But the challenge stands. For neither of these obstacles has yet spurred organized labor to zeal or ingenuity in combatting or circumventing it.

GEORGE P. WEST.

# James Joyce

AN eminent novelist was asked recently by some troublesome newspaper what he thought of the literature of 1916. He answered publicly and loudly that he had heard of no literature in 1916; for his own part he had been reading "science." This was kind neither to our literary nor our scientific activities. It was not intelligent to make an opposition between literature and science. It is no more legitimate than an opposition between literature and "classics" or between literature and history. Good writing about the actualities of the war too has been abundant, that was only to be expected; it is an ungracious thing in the home critic to sit at a confused feast and bewail its poverty when he ought to be sorting out his discoveries. Criticism may analyze, it may appraise and attack, but when it comes to the mere grumbling of veterans no longer capable of novel perceptions, away with it! There is indeed small justification for grumbling at the writing of the present time. Quite apart from the books and stories about the war, a brilliant literature in itself, from that artless assured immortal Arthur Green (the Story of a Prisoner of War) up to the already active historians, there is a great amount of fresh and experimental writing that cannot be ignored by anyone still alive to literary interests. There are, for instance, Miss Richardson's Pointed Roofs, and Backwater, amusing experiments to write as the Futurists paint, and Mr. Caradoc Evan's invention in My People, and Capel Sion, of a new method of grimness, a pseudo-Welsh idiom that is as pleasing in its grotesque force to the intelligent story-reader as it must be maddening to every sensitive Welsh patriot. Nowhere have I seen anything like adequate praise for the romantic force and beauty of Mr. Thomas Burke's Limehouse Nights. In the earlier 'nineties when Henley was alive and discovering was in fashion that book would have made a very big reputation

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indeed. Even more considerable is A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, by James Joyce. It is a book to buy and read and lock up, but it is not a book to miss. Its claim to be literature is as good as the claim of the last book of Gulliver's Travels.

It is no good trying to minimize a characteristic that seems to be deliberately obtruded. Like Swift and another living Irish writer, Mr. Joyce has a cloacal obsession. He would bring back into the general picture of life aspects which modern drainage and modern decorum have taken out of ordinary intercourse and conversation. Coarse, unfamiliar words are scattered about the book unpleasantly, and it may seem to many, needlessly. If the reader is squeamish upon these matters, then there is nothing for it but to shun this book, but if he will pick his way, as one has to do at times on the outskirts of some picturesque Italian village with a view and a church and all sorts of things of that sort to tempt one, then it is quite worth while. And even upon this unsavory aspect of Swift and himself, Mr. Joyce is suddenly illuminating. He tells at several points how his hero Stephen is swayed and shocked and disgusted by harsh and loud *sounds,* and how he is stirred to intense emotion by music and the rhythms of beautiful words. But no sort of smell offends him like that. He finds olfactory sensations interesting or aesthetically displeasing, but they do not make him sick or excited as sounds do. This is a quite understandable turn over from the more normal state of affairs. Long ago I remember pointing out in a review the difference in the sensory basis of the stories of Robert Louis Stevenson and Sir J. M. Barrie; the former visualized and saw his story primarily as picture, the latter mainly heard it. We shall do Mr. Joyce an injustice if we attribute a normal sensory basis to him and then accuse him of deliberate offense.

But that is by the way. The value of Mr. Joyce's book has little to do with its incidental insanitary condition. Like some of the best novels in the world it is the story of an education; it is by far the most living and convincing picture that exists of an Irish Catholic upbringing. It is a mosaic of jagged fragments that does altogether render with extreme completeness the growth of a rather secretive, imaginative boy in Dublin. The technique is startling, but on the whole it succeeds. Like so many Irish writers from Sterne to Shaw Mr. Joyce is a bold experimentalist with paragraph and punctuation. He breaks away from scene to scene without a hint of the change of time and place; at the end he passes suddenly from the third person to the first; he uses no inverted commas to mark off his speeches. The first trick I found sometimes tiresome here and there, but then my own disposition, perhaps acquired at the blackboard, is to mark off and underline rather fussily, and I do not know whether I was so much put off the thing myself as anxious, which after all is not my business, about its effect on those others; the second trick, I will admit, seems entirely justified in this particular instance by its success; the third reduces Mr. Joyce to a free use of dashes. One conversation in this book is a superb success, the one in which Mr. Dedalus carves the Christmas turkey; I write with all due deliberation that Sterne himself could not have done it better; but most of the talk flickers blindingly with these dashes, one has the same wincing feeling of being flicked at that one used to have in the early cinema shows. I think Mr. Joyce has failed to discredit the inverted comma.

The interest of the book depends entirely upon its quintessential and unfailing reality. One believes in Stephen Dedalus as one believes in few characters in fiction. And the peculiar lie of the interest for the intelligent reader is the convincing revelation it makes of the limitations of a great mass of Irishmen. Mr. Joyce tells us unsparingly of the adolescence of this youngster under conditions that have passed almost altogether out of English life. There is an immense shyness, a profound secrecy, about matters of sex, with its inevitable accompaniment of nightmare revelations and furtive scribblings in unpleasant places, and there is a living belief in a real hell. The description of Stephen listening without a doubt to two fiery sermons on that tremendous theme, his agonies of fear, not disgust at dirtiness such as unorthodox children feel but just fear, his terror-inspired confession of his sins of impurity to a strange priest in a distant part of the city, is like nothing in any boy's experience who has been trained under modern conditions. Compare its stuffy horror with Conrad's account of how under analogous circumstances Lord Jim wept. And a second thing of immense significance is the fact that everyone in this Dublin story, every human being, accepts as a matter of course, as a thing in nature like the sky and the sea, that the English are to be hated. There is no discrimination in that hatred, there is no gleam of recognition that a considerable number of Englishmen have displayed a very earnest disposition to put matters right with Ireland, there is an absolute absence of any idea of a discussed settlement, any notion of helping the slow-witted Englishman in his three-cornered puzzle between North and South. It is just hate, a cant cultivated to the pitch of monomania, an ungenerous violent direction of the mind. That is the political atmosphere in which Stephen Dedalus

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grows up, and in which his essentially responsive mind orients itself. I am afraid it is only too true an account of the atmosphere in which a number of brilliant young Irishmen have grown up. What is the good of pretending that the extreme Irish "patriot" is an equivalent and parallel of the English or American liberal? He is narrower and intenser than any English Tory. He will be the natural ally of the Tory in delaying British social and economic reconstruction after the war. He will play into the hands of the Tories by threatening an outbreak and providing the excuse for a militarist reaction in England. It is time the American observer faced the truth of that. No reason in that why England should not do justice to Ireland, but excellent reason for bearing in mind that these bright-green young people across the Channel are something quite different from the liberal English in training and tradition, and absolutely set against helping them. No single book has ever shown how different they are, as completely as this most memorable novel.

H. G. WELLS.

# The Tragedy of Alan Seeger

THE publication by an important American book-maker of a posthumous volume of verses by Alan Seeger may justify some account of the life of this sympathetic adventurer and poet; the work itself is not of great moment, scarcely surpassing a certain easy talent found in a considerable number of young poets here and in England. There are a few excellent bits here and there, but they represent no improvement upon the models of which they were imitations, and if they had been done first, early in the nineteenth century, they would not have had the force to found a tradition. Nor did the author's death at twenty-eight decrease the total measure of his power; he had given no promise of a really significant intellectual development. Indeed his last months appeared to have carried him still further in his weary search for dead forms to revive. He had shown nothing of the exceptional poet or of the great man in literature. He had facility and a formal education, so that if he had lived he might have become a famous mediocre or bad poet, for he was already no worse off than the run of accepted poets, made known by the accidents of publication. His career is of purely literary interest, for he represented no tendencies.

The point about Seeger, for an American concerned with the first appearances of a native literature on this continent, was that he illustrated admirably one of the exasperating elements in our cultural situation, the tragedy of an American working in an European art. He had been well brought up on imported genius, had explored widely the American sources which had limited Whitman, and had gone to Paris at twenty-four to find the centuries which he had missed. The accident of his absolute poverty took him to the desolate center of the real Latin Quarter, inhabited by penniless foreign students. A rapid mastery of French secured for him an almost immediate introduction to the chief spirits of what one may call experimental international literature. Within six months after his arrival in Paris he had fallen under the influence of such various examples of contemporary Parisian creation as Guillaume Apollinaire, a Polish Italian writing somewhat in Whitman's tradition in French, F. T. Marinetti, an Egyptian Italian writing, speaking, and playing politics in Italian and French before the whole world in the service of his Futurist social movement, Blaise Cendrars, a Swiss Russian exponent of a curiously free lyricism, writing in French and German, Pablo Picasso, the Spanish Cubist master, Paul Fort, the French champion of the tradition of Verlaine, and Henri Bergson, the legitimate philosopher. At the same time Seeger was cultivating the eighteenth century formally at Sorbonne lectures.

The effect of these influences upon a Tennysonian mind was rather brutal and produced a certain revolt against the modernism which the dazed American poet had gone to Paris to seek. By way of protest he kept in touch with Swinburne and escaped from time to time into the Puritan salons maintained by the American spinsters who stand guard over the French past. Perhaps Seeger's most acute agony came from his concern for this very flouted past, which he had come to learn about so confidently. That the entire generation of poetic genius should almost make a career out of maligning it, while at the same time unquestionably possessing it in a fashion to which his poor Harvard pretensions could never aspire, was disquieting. He had been driven out of America because it was too young a place for such an aged creature as a poet to live in; in Paris he found the race of poets in love with the future out of dissatisfaction with the present and bound upon the total destruction of even the immediate past. He could not decide about the past for himself because he knew so little about it; it was difficult to carry out his program of learning, too, because the only agents of knowledge were professors, who bore an annoying resemblance to American professors, and who had no intellectual credit with poets of his generation. Sometimes he thought he had come to the wrong place, that Paris had gone mad, and that he might have found the proper balance between learning and creation in a more orderly if

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less brilliant civilization, in Germany, for example.

Another, and an even more baffling, source of pain was the confusion which he found everywhere concerning his own carefully learned categories in the literary order. For example, the new international poetry struck him as being pretty thoroughly a matter of almost political opinion and not at all a matter of form, which was the only consideration that had given him trouble in America. When the new literature deigned to examine form at all it was for its destruction! Marinetti had actually eliminated most of the parts of speech, had mutilated Italian grammar, and was on his way to the creation out of whole cloth of a contemporary vocabulary to replace the traditional one. Apollinaire employed mechanical symbols and pictures of objects in exquisite lyrics. Astonishing epics whose power staggered Seeger began with lines copied from the devices which railway companies paint on the sides of express train,—"Paris Berne Löchberg Milano Napoli." How could his poor sweet rhymes and dainty cadences stand against formidable doctrines—"the religion of velocity," "wireless imagination," "words in liberty"?

In the midst of this confusion Seeger finished off the prudent volume which we know, sent it to Bruges, in Belgium, for publication at the expense of some anonymous and secret admirer, and went to London alone to clear up his opinions. His only other European travels, walking trips in the country about Paris and in Switzerland, had been in the company of Parisian acquaintances. He was in London when the war broke out. He had no copy of his manuscript at Bruges, so he crossed the Channel immediately, worked his way down through partially occupied Belgium, and found himself turned away from Bruges at the last moment by the invaders. He got to Paris along with the hordes of Belgian refugees, became infatuated with the mobilization, enlisted in the Foreign Legion, trained a few weeks at Rouen and Toulouse, served a dull winter in the trenches outside Rheims, went through the Champagne attack unwounded, and was wounded twice between the lines in the attack of July 4th, 1916, on Belloy-en-Santerre in the Somme. He died of his wounds on the spot before he could be reached. The ground was lost to the Germans for the time being and his body was not found. The Bruges manuscript had been secured some weeks before through the courtesy of the American Embassy at Berlin, which had a man sent down to Bruges from Brussels to get it.

A note of Seeger's admirable soldierly quality is indicated in his last letter, written in the trenches from which the great Somme offensive set out, a few days before his death:

> Dear ————:
>
> We go up to the attack to-morrow. This will probably be the biggest thing yet. We are to have the honor of marching in first wave. No sacks, but two musettes, toile de tente slung over shoulder, plenty of cartridges, grenades, and baïonnette au canon.
>
> I will write you soon if I get through all right. If not, my only earthly care is for my poems. These are in the possession of Mr. ————, all except the ode I sent you, and three sonnets which are chez Mme. ————. Add these to my last volume and you will have opera omnia quae existant.
>
> I am glad to be going in first wave. If you are in this thing at all, it is best to be in to the limit. And this is the supreme experience. Await news. So-Long! Love!
>
> ALAN.

The perfection, according to the older tradition, of Seeger's career as a professional poet was enhanced by his appearance, which had all of the beauty, "carelessness," and poverty which circumstances have made us associate with men of letters who die young and unknown. The Futurist fondness for monocles, spats, and racing automobiles was far from his taste. Although born of the commercial bourgeoisie of New York and accustomed to the luxury of American school and university Seeger was desperately poor throughout his professional career, from the time he left the university until he accepted a soldier's lot. The poorest American, they called him in Paris. It was his distinction to have never had nor sought a job and to have never earned a cent. By his personal charm, which was of a fine distinction, he acquired a large number of friends among distinguished Frenchmen. Americans seldom appreciated his personal quality. His writings in French, in the Mercure de France, the Soirées de Paris, and in several journals of the "jeunes," showed that he had accomplished the considerable task of mastering the French language and of feeling it as an instrument of style. He often attempted to write his verses in French and if he had lived he might have become another notable expatriated poet, with Stewart Merril and Viellé-Griffin.

His life was one of those poignant tragedies such as one sees in the great centers of the spirit, like Paris, where the ills of the mere body are so completely obscured by the sorrows of the indomitable will to create. He had this of a great man about him, that creation was the only thing which interested him; but he almost felt that he was barred from it by the limitations which his tradition and his nationality had imposed upon him in his choiceless youth. It cannot be said that he sought death in the ranks of his stronger European comrades—for the generation in French literature and art has been extinguished—but it is certain that he could not have remained and ac-

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cepted the inglorious rôle of the neutral spectator. Politically he had no preference about sides—he was of recent German origin—and fought with the French because he had lived in France, as he would doubtless have fought with the Germans had he been living in Germany. In a youthful poem he had selected his circumstances of death with an ear to alliteration as on a mountain in the Caspian Caucasus. His last letters, however, show that the glories of a great attack contented his poetic heart, and the stretcher-bearers who spoke with him from behind the shattered ramparts as he lay dying during that long day on the Somme confirmed in their rude idiom the impression that everyone who knew him had, that he died with a sense of a life which was sublimely finished. When he spoke of his death—for in talk he always assumed that he would be killed before the end of the war—it was as of the least tragic episode of his later life.

He had a profound contempt for what he felt was the weakness of the American spirit in art. He could not quite exclude himself and his own works from this charge. He felt that he had not the force to create a new thing. He despised all that was not superlatively great, strong, and new. His grudge against America was that he felt that the accident of his birth and education there had stunted his creative power. In Europe he felt that he was a child. His noble contempt for success saved him from worldly despair. The intelligence with which he saw himself made of his life a supreme tragedy.

HARRISON REEVES.

# *CORRESPONDENCE*

## Does Not Favor Allies

SIR: Your article in the February 17th issue entitled The Defense of the Atlantic World, and others along the same line which have preceded it, are extremely useful in helping to make the issue clear on which war, if any, with Germany must be waged.

I am one of those Americans who are opposed to war with Germany even should an "overt act," so called, be committed. I believe that the principles laid down by Washington and Jefferson and Adams during the trying years from 1793 to 1800 were sound then and are just as sound now and just as applicable to the present crisis. If America is ever to enter a League of Nations to enforce peace, it must be along the lines laid down in President Wilson's splendid peace address to the Senate and after a "peace without victory." To follow the course which you advocate, and to abandon the position which we should occupy as the impartial upholder of neutral rights in order to align ourselves with one of the belligerent groups, would, in my judgment, be contrary not only to the tradition and spirit of our government, but would cause us to forfeit the great position of leadership along the lines of peace and humanity which it should be our sublime mission to assume.

Your articles are helpful, from my viewpoint, however, because I believe that if the American people understood that a war with Germany now would be a war not in defense of neutral rights—since those rights have been equally violated by both belligerents—but a war to assist the Entente powers to triumph over Germany, the sentiment of the country would not permit such a war to be fought. Do you believe for a single instant that the American people could be induced to fight with Germany if they understood, as you so clearly point out, that "We have clothed the most unneutral purposes in the language of neutrality. But we have never had any right to expect that we could go on forever without facing the consequences. Having started on the road of assistance to the Allies, we have to follow it through. . . . We have chosen to render the Allies definite assistance, negatively by allowing them to close the seas to Germany, positively by insisting that the seas be kept open to them"?

It is because persons believing as I do that this is not sound American policy, do not believe that the American people would support it if they understood the issue, that we look with the gravest concern on the fact that the United States is on the verge of war without the public as a whole understanding the issue. You are therefore rendering a great public service in assisting to make the issue plain. Up to that point your argument is sound and logical. But when you reach your conclusion that we ought not to be neutral, but that on the contrary our interests lie in assisting the cause of the Entente Allies, I cease to follow your argument.

You state that "The safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight." But who controls and has for years controlled the Atlantic highway with her two-Power naval standard, if not Great Britain? The principal aim which Germany is seeking in this war is the "freedom of the seas" and President Wilson has stated that "the freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace." Has Great Britain ever acquiesced in that view?

Lloyd George himself recognized before the outbreak of the present war that it was England's navalism, coupled with the alliance which she had made with Russia and France, which was responsible for Germany's militarism. He said in a speech in Queen's Hall, London, delivered on July 28th, 1908:

> I want to put two considerations to you from the German point of view. Every misunderstanding and quarrel is largely a matter of lack of imagination. Men have not got the imagination to project themselves into the position of the other party.
>
> Now just consider for a moment. You say, "Why should Germany be frightened of us? Why should she build because of us?" Let me put two considerations to you. We started; it is not they who have started. We had an overwhelming preponderance at sea which would have secured us against any conceivable enemy. We were not satisfied. We said, "Let there be Dreadnoughts." What for? We did not require them. Nobody was building them; and

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if anybody had built them we could easily have outbuilt them.

We have more shipbuilding resources than any country in the world, and more than every country in the world put together; so really there was no need for it. Well, let me put another consideration before you which I don't think is sufficiently pointed out. We always say we must have what we call a "two-Power standard." What does that mean? You must have a navy large enough to oppose a combination of any two naval Powers. So, if we had Russia and France, Germany and France, Germany and Italy, we should always have a fleet large enough to defend our shores against any combination of the two greatest naval Powers in Europe. This has been our standard.

Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to her what our navy is to us—her sole defense against invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers who in combination could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has.

Don't forget that when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press, and hints in The Times and the Daily Mail (Lord Northcliffe's papers).

I remember motoring on a Sunday morning in Germany, and I picked up a German newspaper, and the only words I could read were Observer and Daily Mail; so I asked a friend what it meant, and he said it was an extract full of menaces to Germany, and the German paper had copied it. All that means something to Germany.

Here is Germany, in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Russia or Germany and Austria, had fleets which in combination would be stronger than ours.

Would not we be frightened, would not we build, would not we arm? Of course we should. I want our friends, who think that because Germany is a little frightened she really means mischief to us, to remember that she is frightened for a reason which would frighten us under the same circumstances.

That was sound talk—much sounder than most of the British Premier's recent utterances.

But you would have us fight against Germany and on the side of Russia and Japan since at some time in the future forsooth Germany may be allied with Russia and Japan. You say, "A victory on the high seas would be a triumph of that class which aims to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader ultimately of a German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic World. It is no paradox and no sentimentality to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her, but to force her and lure her back to the civilization in which she belongs. She is a rebel nation as long as she wages offensive war against the western world." Where now is your logic? Germany is the only one of the western belligerent Powers which is not a rebel nation in the sense which you indicate. It was Great Britain and France which became traitors to the western world when they allied themselves with the great eastern Powers and it is primarily for the interests of those Powers that this war is now being fought. Japan is quietly being allowed to have her way in China, while Austria must be dismembered for the benefit of Russia, and Constantinople must be given to Russia. These latter are among the announced aims of the Entente Powers! It will be the continuance of this war and the real possibility of such a result being brought about, if anything, which will force Germany into an alliance with the eastern Powers which she has so far avoided. The most casual study of the diplomatic correspondence leading up to this war will convince the impartial reader that Germany wanted to avoid fighting the western Powers. She tried to induce England and France to keep out while she fought the seemingly inevitable war of western civilization against Russian absolutism and despotism. Russia had prepared for that war. Her troops were fully mobilized. Within three days after war was declared the Russian army had overrun East Prussia, although Russia cannot mobilize under three months. But England and France had become what you call "rebel nations" by an alliance with Russia which caused them to support her.

I abhor this whole war and the system which produced it, but I for one can see no sense or justice in our fighting with England and France on the side of Russia and Japan because at some future time Germany may be allied with Russia and Japan. Nor would the American people fight on such an issue if they understood the issue.

Therefore, in helping to make it clear, I repeat that I believe that you are rendering a great public service.

R. W. FRANCE.

New York City.

## In Defense of Armed Neutrality

SIR: In his communication entitled Democratic Control of History, printed in The New Republic's issue of February 24th, Mr. Charles Downer Hazen scoffs, in a vein of jovian contempt, at the proposal of the Committee for Democratic Control that in case of further aggressions on Germany's part, the United States should adopt a policy of armed neutrality instead of going to war.

Though Mr. Hazen's manner of treating the subject suggests that the objections to armed neutrality are so many and obvious as to make it unnecessary to mention them to intelligent persons, he does state two. His first is that there is no difference between armed neutrality and war. He maintains that, if the armed neutrality between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800 was not war, then, if we will allow him to select his dates and inferences, he "can assert with equal emphasis, for example, that Napoleon never took part in any war," and he backs this opinion up with the authority of John Bassett Moore, to the effect that a state of "limited war" did exist between this country and France during the period in question. I think this is a fair statement of Mr. Hazen's first objection.

To the writer it seems that the technical side of the question has obscured Mr. Hazen's vision of the practical side. If we have armed neutrality with Germany, it will mean that our sea forces will be used to convoy ships and generally take care of our interests affected by the German submarine campaign. If, as in the case of the United States and France, it goes no further than armed neutrality, neither nation will be dedicated to the

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task of general and mutual destruction. Neither will necessarily be plunged into passion and hatred that may take years to obliterate. If, on the other hand, we have war, not only will it become the serious business of each nation to seek out the other for purposes of destruction; not only will the friendly relations between them be destroyed for years to come, but the whole psychology and organization of this country will, in all probability, undergo an immediate and sinister change. By this I mean that democracy here, as in all countries at war, will shrink into insignificance; and absolutism will largely take its place. Even before the mobilizations, censorships and abrogations of civil rights and liberties are complete, the United States will temporarily, at all events, be well back toward the middle ages.

Mr. Hazen's second point is that the armed neutrality of 1798 to 1800 was a fizzle. He says it did not prevent war. "But at the risk of being indelicate," says Mr. Hazen," may I point out that the history of the United States did not stop at 1800, but went right on; also that terrific struggle continued, with one slight intermission, until the battle of Waterloo, fifteen years later; and that we did go to war, not with France—notice the unerring adroitness of the Committee in riveting the attention of the reader on France—but with England, and we went to war because of injuries done us which were incidental to the terrific struggle of Europe."

To the writer Mr. Hazen's criticism seems to be on a peculiar ground. If he reads it aright, Mr. Hazen denounces armed neutrality because our use of it in regard to France in 1798 did not keep us out of war with England in 1812, when we did not resort to this policy. It seems to the writer that this is a little hard on armed neutrality. The Committee does not make any claim that when a nation has once taken armed neutrality, a single bottle as it were, it will thenceforth be war-immune. Our more modest assertion is that, inasmuch as Washington and Adams averted war through a policy of armed neutrality, in a situation very similar to our own to-day, we might in case of need resort to the same policy rather than plunge the country into war.

AMOS PINCHOT.

New York City.

## The Law and Benevolent Neutrality

SIR: It is refreshing to find at least one journal which frankly recognizes our "benevolent neutrality" toward the Allies and which does not endeavor to find its justification in breaches of international law by either belligerent or in respect by either for the rights of other nations. Those, however, who take their views on international law from the notes of the British Foreign Office seem somewhat astounded, and a little resentful, that The New Republic should receive its guidance from the legal position taken by our government.

In a letter by L. A. Crosby which appeared in your issue of February 17th, he claims that the writer of the article entitled Justification (in the issue of February 10th) "has twisted facts by presenting a picture of the naval war from August, 1914 to March, 1915, which is chronologically false." He states that the writer conveys to the reader two false impressions: "First, that the Declaration of London is part of international law binding on Great Britain." . . . "Second, that German submarine warfare was from the outset justified as a measure of reprisal or retaliation for Britain's illegal blockade."

As to the first, the writer merely said that this country might have insisted "upon a reading of sea-law such as the Declaration of London." Mr. Crosby points out that the Declaration of London was not ratified; but the claim is that the Declaration of London is binding, not through ratification, but because it was substantially a statement of the fundamentals of international law. It is true that on some matters nations had differed as to what the law actually was. On these questions some general agreement was necessary, but the agreement was as to what should be regarded as the better view.

In 1908 Sir Edward Grey instructed the British delegates to the London Conference to attempt to arrive "by common agreement at a uniform definition of the main principles of the *existing* law." In their report to Sir Edward Grey on the Declaration (March 1st, 1909) the British delegates stated: "As a body, those rules do amount practically to a statement of *what is the essence of the law of nations.* . . ."

In a book by Earl Loreburn entitled Capture at Sea (published 1913) the following appears (page 86): "The British delegates, explaining the results of the Conference, congratulated themselves with justice upon having secured full recognition of the principles advocated by the British government." And Earl Loreburn stated that any "blockade" like the present one was preposterous, for it would "almost certainly" provoke neutrals to join the enemy.

If these views, expressed at a time when there was no reason to color the facts, are correct, then the Declaration of London was binding to the extent that it expressed the law, and this it did on practically every issue involved.

As to the second proposition, Mr. Crosby states that the British "blockade" did not go into effect until March, 1915; that it was a reprisal in answer to the German submarine campaign announced February 6th, and he proves this by naïvely stating that "it was *announced* expressly as a reprisal for the German submarine policy. . . ." It was so "announced" by the British.

The title to the note of February 6th of the German government on the submarine blockade reads: "Memorial of the Imperial German Government respecting the retaliatory measures rendered necessary by the means employed by England contrary to international law in intercepting neutral maritime trade with Germany."

If the question of whose act was a reprisal depends upon who called "names" first, the Germans would seem to have the better of the controversy, but, of course, the German position is also sustained by the American note of December, 1914, which pointed out that England was illegally interfering with shipments, not to Germany, but to neutrals. Prior to this war it has been established international law that shipments of conditional contraband, such as foodstuffs, on neutral vessels to neutral ports, were free from seizure whatever might be the ulterior destination. Undoubtedly, the British did seize foodstuffs bound for neutral countries on neutral vessels. These seizures antedated the German decrees of February, 1915.

In the note of December 26th, 1914, our government characterized the "course of action" of Great Britain as one "which denied to neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations." If this statement was true, the German claim of retaliation against England is not so surprising.

In the light of these views, it is very doubtful whether the article in The New Republic conveyed "to the reader two impressions quite false."

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I might add that the German regulations did not hand over the control of all food supplies to the military authorities, as Mr. Crosby seems to think, but controlled the distribution of grain (not all food) by private corporate agencies. If the military authorities needed grain, they had to buy it from these agencies in the same way as the wholesaler who wished to sell to private individuals. While the difference is conventional, rather than logical, yet the same is true of the age-long distinction between food for civilians and for the army.

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS.

New York City.

## An Absence of Law

SIR: Law and that part of reason which is accepted by man is the result of experience. No law which is not founded upon experience can stand. At the present time we know very little about submarine warfare, since only one nation has ever used it extensively, and only then for one war. If submarines are really found to be useful every nation in time of war will use them when in a tight place, no matter what the law may be. Our experience in regard to submarine warfare has been so very meagre up to date that we believe no one is qualified to make any very accurate statements about what the future law should be. It seems to us that the application of cruiser blockade laws to submarine blockades is about as nice an application as street car laws to automobiles.

O. T. HAMILTON.
M. L. THOMPSON.

New York City.

## Still Unconvinced of Danger

SIR: It seems to me you are having a pretty uncomfortable time intellectually in seeking a justification for urging the entry of this country into the war without abandoning all of those reasonable habits of thought which your readers have come to expect of you. You are far too wise, of course, to adopt the President's absolutist position that since our right to use the seas is a peaceful and proper right therefore it must be defended at all cost. You are careful to point out that as far as "rights" are concerned, our case against England is as strong as it is against Germany, and that the only reason England's action has not resulted in loss of American life has been because our neutrality has been "benevolent" ("hypocritical" is the term you formerly employed, before you unhitched your wagon from Mr. Roosevelt and hitched it to Mr. Wilson). Having acquitted yourself of absolutism and of legalism by this argument, your reader is in a position to say, "Here is an argument for entering the war which is based on pragmatic grounds; I can now join the popular clamor without violence to my intellectual conscience and without swallowing the absurd talk about 'rights,' 'honor,' and the rest." He need not examine too closely the nature of your argument; it is not absolutist and it leads to a comfortable compliance with the prevailing clamor. Indeed, if he were to examine it, he would find great difficulty in ascertaining precisely what it is. At one time it takes the form of defending English "despotism" of the seas as against German "anarchy" with the purpose of modifying that "despotism"; but if the German contention should prevail, why would not the Germans cease to be the "anarchists"? At another time it appears we must fight to send our mail to England; but by your own showing the same argument would require us to fight England as well as Germany. The latest argument is that it would be better for us if England were to seize the German colonies than if Germany were to take the British, because the British follow a free trade policy; we, a protectionist country, are to go to war to establish free trade in other countries!

Now I am far from denying that an Allied victory, even to the extent of dismembering the German and Austrian Empires and dividing the spoils, may conceivably benefit the world more than would a German victory which went to a similar extreme in dismembering the Allies. But that fact requires considerably more demonstration than a few words about despotism versus anarchy on the seas, or about England's liberal colonial policy. Meanwhile, the real evils of embarking on a war, with the attendant diversion of constructive reform efforts into destructive channels and with the dogmatic habit of thought engendered by war, require no demonstration. But it is pleasanter sometimes to float with the stream. You seem to have taken to heart the advice Morris R. Cohen puts into the mouth of Mark Twain in addressing Elihu Root in your last number: "Throw in something about evolutionary philosophy, social psychology, and social uplift and progress. Men of wealth and power can play the new tunes as well as the old, and have the additional comfort of not being laughed at by their own young fellows who have had a little more schooling."

ROBERT L. HALE.

New York City.

## For the Disabled Soldiers of Belgium

SIR: Placed by chance in the path of aggression, mutilated in the defense of their country, invaded in flagrant violation of an international treaty, these Belgian soldiers have the clearest claim to our aid and sympathy. To them it is mainly due that a far larger part of France, with its supreme monuments of Gothic art, its towns, villages and fields, is not now in utter ruin.

All of these sufferers can and will be taught to do some useful work, but their pensions will be very small, and with their so terribly impaired efficiency they can never be wholly self-supporting. To house these maimed men after the war a society has been formed of well known Belgians, headed by Monsieur Henri de Schoonen, Honorary Vice-Consul of Belgium, which proposes to build homes and workshops, to be provided free of rent or sold on generous terms, and which will be, as far as possible, in the native villages of the invalided men.

This work urgently calls for our support, and all gifts, however small, will be a real help and a proof of sympathy. To assist in the raising of funds a series of pictorial postal cards and letter paper with wood-cut designs, chiefly by Belgian artists, have been printed and will, it is hoped, be soon on sale throughout the United States. All contributions may be sent direct to Monsieur Henri de Schoonen, 79 Mark Lane, London, E. C., or to the Editor of The New Republic, 421 West Twenty-first Street, New York.

HENRY WINSLOW,
American Member of the Committee of Relief for Belgian Artists.

London, England.

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# Back Your Train Up to My Pony

*William S. Hart in Truthful Tulliver, Triangle-Kay Bee film. Thomas H. Ince producer. Scenario by J. G. Hawks.*

J. G. HAWKS wrote the good scenario for The Bride of Hate, in which Frank Keenan and Margery Wilson have done such sound work of late. Every detail shows the distinction between the spirit and devices of this new form, the photoplay, and the makings of any similar stage drama. It is as wide as the difference between music and painting. The same may be said of Hawks's scenario for Truthful Tulliver. Hawks knows the technique. But that is about all on the aesthetic theme to-day. We have weightier matters to reveal.

When Tulliver, the bold man of letters, rode into Glory Hole, Arizona, adventuring from Texas, he knew his own. He would have been president of Princeton, with eastern opportunities. Here he took charge of the empty printing office. Silver Lode Thompson, his Secretary of State, had come with him from Texas. Thompson proceeded to set type at once. A little down Main Street (the only street) the Forty Rod pleasure hall shook and thundered. Men were dancing with bottles on their heads, or riding away with squalling Cleopatras across their saddle-bows. The Forty Rod had once been a decent livery stable. Note this.

The Glory Hole Nugget was soon on the street, with a little essay on The New Freedom on the inside page, no doubt. "Ain't she one stem-winder of a town?" said Truthful, as he looked out.

Two delicate ladies, that is, innocent young frumps, were sailing down Main Street as serenely as young ships on a calm sea, when they were annoyed, elaborately, by the manager of the Forty Rod, "Deacon" Doyle.

Tulliver consulted his secretary. The two went out. Tulliver twisted up "Deacon" Doyle till he knelt to the ladies, while Silver Lode Thompson kept his eye on the growling crowd. It turned out that these two girls were gentle orphans, with a turn for writing "poetry." Tulliver soon posted his note, all along Main Street. "'Deacon' Doyle Must Go." Doyle tacked up an answer implying that Tulliver was a literary doctrinaire and a piffling idealist. He put it in this way: "Doyle will be in the Forty Rod To-morrow Morning at Ten o'clock, and There is Not a Pen Pusher in Arizona who Can Run Him out of Town."

Doyle was merely a rough-neck and shooter. Trust the bold note-writer to bring the secret powers to light. The real master of Glory Hole was York Cantrall. He had posed around Tulliver as a gentleman. He now entered the printing office in his true colors, and received proper defiance. In spite of him, Tulliver organized a League to Enforce Peace. Pious neutrals joined from all corners of the town. And there was talk, talk, talk; while, no doubt, pious jealous men of action sneered and foamed at Tulliver. But Truthful was patient.

At ten o'clock, while Deacon Doyle and an unwholesome half-breed were mobilized, with their guns pointing at the little front door of the Forty Rod that they expected Tulliver to open, Tulliver in masterful strategy, drove a-horseback through the double back door. Note that he had shot no man so far. Nor did he shoot. He lassoed those two while their backs were turned. As the crowd blocked his retreat, he jumped his horse through the closed window with much crashing of glass. He dragged the pair after him, producing an acute example of the type of tableau I call Sculpture-in-motion.

Doyle and his half-breed could scarcely climb up on the stage coach of banishment after being dragged down the street to the feet of the League to Enforce Peace. The bad half of the town were forced to mount all the spare stage coaches. They were hauled to nowhere in particular. One thought of the Outcasts of Poker Flat.

Most of the cleaning up of Glory Hole was done at the point of the gun, with little shooting. And the Man Higher Up, always the last to take his medicine, was disciplined. York Cantrall, who had harbored Doyle, Tulliver ordered out of town. He went in a hurry. Glory Hole was as pure as Cromwell's Parliament after Pride's Purge, or Europe will be after Prussian Militarism is annihilated.

Just as I was on the point of nominating Tulliver for Editor and Mayor of the World, I discovered he had made a mistake. It is hard to believe this of a man who can speak the truth, write a note, and rope a villain too.

On the sly, York Cantrall had won the heart and shining body of one of those innocent dowdy little crafts whose passage Tulliver had cleared to the Nugget office. No secret alliances are to be tolerated in Arizona. It was the business of Tulliver, who ran this man out of town at the point of a gun, to bring him back by the same means, and, no matter what he deserved, marry him to this weeping orphan girl.

Our hero, his bosom torn with a tempest, made a race after the express train. The pony did not trip. Our hero jumped from his back to the rear platform of the observation Pullman. The pony now stood without hitching, nosing the track. I myself tried catching the rear end of a passing caboose once, when I was afoot, with no stirrup complications. I jerked my right shoulder well nigh out of joint, and was thrown skallyhooting into the ditch. So I admire Truthful for making that train. At his suggestion all the people in the car held up their hands. He told the conductor he did not want money. He was after a man. It was Truthful's luck that the man was right there, not four coaches ahead. And the conductor delivered the man unto him. Here comes the great photoplay episode. Our hero said, "Back your train up to my pony." And the conductor pulled the rope, and it was done, even as Truthful had commanded.

My friend Epes Winthrop Sargent of the Moving Picture World is puzzled by one of my pet phrases in the classification of the photoplay elements. The phrase is Architecture-in-motion. Most politely and fraternally I draw Mr. Sargent's attention to the statement that when this train backs up to this pony it is an example of Architecture-in-motion. When the pony is chasing the train, and the pony is nearest to the camera, it is, in a primitive way, Sculpture-in-motion. But when the end of the train fills the screen, we have architecture. It has a roof, walls, a floor, windows, door, chairs and inhabitants, and it is certainly in motion. Above all, it is the leading actor in this episode. We see the principle of Architecture-in-motion illustrated in a more epic way throughout Intolerance. For instance, when the great gates of Bel open, or when the titanic siege towers go forward or fall, these elements are the leading actors. And they are certainly architecture, in motion.

York Cantrall submitted to his stern providence, who bound his arms and took him home. Cantrall was not averse

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to kissing the frowsy little innocent, whom we will call Civilization. No doubt he said he did not want to leave her in the first place, that the row was forced upon him. He settled down to becoming a leading citizen again, and, more to the point, a married man with responsibilities.

Truthful Tulliver, the one mistake of his executive career rectified, took into his arms the dowdy but deserving elder sister, a typical sage-brush belle, whom we will call Idealism, and all was merry as the next Hague Conference will be. The story is in strict accord with the best Arizona traditions and the best international expectations. No doubt Tulliver will discover some other outcasts it will be better to bring back to town soon, for various reasons. The West is for Truthful Tulliver! The South and the West nominate him for Editor and Mayor of the World! If it is not our hero it is York Cantrall who will run things. Tulliver or Cantrall! Choose!

VACHEL LINDSAY.

# Invicta

*Susan Lenox: Her Fall and Rise, by David Graham Phillips. Two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $2.50.*

IT is a deep experience to read Susan Lenox. Not every one can give time to a novel so prodigiously long, especially by a writer who never ceased to be boyishly melodramatic, but for all its thousand pages and for all its imperfections Susan Lenox is one story in a myriad. It is a study that one feels impelled to criticize. To see it aright one must go to it with compensatory glasses, though the glare of it does not at all destroy the interest which Phillips arouses about his Susan Lenox, or the sense he creates of a character valuable and stimulating, or of an adventure plausible and grim. The flaws of David Graham Phillips appear in this book. They affect his work in such a manner that it seems merely loose-mouthed to call him great. But these defects simply impair the confidence and response necessary to a free enjoyment of any artist. It is only in youthfulness that creative half-gods, like Phillips, are treated harshly, that spirits struggling with the clay are easily and glibly disdained.

David Graham Phillips was a man of strong imagination and exceedingly vigorous sympathies, who undertook not merely to depict life but to determine the interpretation that one should put on it. He so far stepped beyond his function as an artist in imposing his interpretation that to read him is to be constantly aware of thumping philosophy and sophomoric excursions and alarums. One feels how tremendously in this instance he was seized by the reality of Susan Lenox, how her personality wrapt him, how her vividness and character and mystery became a personal epic on which he was rejoiced to lavish his powers. One also feels, however, a natural tendency in him to suppose that because he could imagine a thing vividly and "document" it, it must therefore have substance. He was capable of becoming quite possessed by anything that sprang out of his own so-called inner consciousness, and of inventing without regard for genuine ratification a swiftly moving drama that had everything but psychological specific gravity. He lacked, in short, the corrective of cool sense. He was not a complacent romancer. He was an intensely serious romancer, either vehemently asserting that people ought to be entirely different or that people cannot be expected to be different at all. But his imagination carried him off his feet so easily that he had no idea he was often railing against a world which was not really living according to his indictment. Nothing could have saved him but a sense of comedy which he probably would have deemed meanly disloyal to his own heroical expectations of life.

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The narrative of Susan Lenox must be reported if one is to grasp the bearing of any criticism. The author knew Indiana extremely well and he is at his happiest in opening the story at Sutherland, where Susan lives when the tale begins. Susan does not know she is an illegitimate child. She is being brought up in the bourgeois

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home of her aunt and uncle and has the same life as her cousin Ruth, both of them about seventeen. Susan is the beauty of the town, clear, direct, spirited, unspoiled. Her charm of mind and character is instantly conveyed. A youth makes love to her, her aunt and cousin are envious, the truth as to her illegitimacy is broken to her brutally, the youth's attitude is crass and disillusioning, she takes her fate bravely in her hands and strikes out to Cincinnati. She is dragged back next day to "Uncle Zeke's," on his remote farm, and is forced to marry an oaf of a farmer. On her bridal night she escapes. Thus within two days she is outraged in folkways that Phillips makes at once heartrending and credible.

On her escape she is aided by a newspaper man on vacation, Spenser, but by accident she loses him and the money he gave her and is forced to appeal to a river theatrical troupe. The kindly manager takes her on to sing ballads, and nothing worse than ordinary vagabondage befalls her until their theatre-barge is sunk in a collision and she and the elderly protective manager are stranded in Cincinnati. He becomes ill before he has placed her as a singer and to provide for him she tries the Cincinnati theatrical agents. The first is a repulsive, lecherous old man. He makes indecent advances to her. She then tries to get work in a department store, hopelessly fails, wanders to a park, is picked up by a friendly youth, goes to lunch with him, makes up her benumbed and desperate mind that she is an "outcast," and to get money for her benefactor goes to a "first-class quiet place" with the youth. With the money she has earned in the spirit of Monna Vanna she flies to the hospital, to find that her guide and philosopher is dead.

She is to meet the youth at the rendezvous-house again. "Free to soar or sink," she chooses the hard route, obtains work at a paper-box factory at $3 a week. Phillips indicates that her only alternative to slaving in the factory is slave-driving there, and emphasizes the sordid misery and helplessness of her detached position. She lives with a kind family in a loathsome tenement and stands it with her usual incommunicative calm until their house is burned out and the father and mother killed. The stolid son proposes to make her his mistress, but she decides instead, after a pitiless struggle, to go on the street with Etta, the sister. Her first man on the freezing night she starts is drunken. She earns $5. Then she and Etta meet two affluent college youths and spend a week with them. With a margin left after she has had the food and clothes she craved in the hideous tenement-life, she seeks her creditor, Spenser. Pride, which did not keep her from becoming a prostitute, restrained her from seeking him previously. Before their evening is over they plan to strike hands and risk their fortunes in New York.

Spenser wants to be a playwright and Susan wants to be an actress, but her love for him is darkened by his attitude toward her past. Her persuasion that she is dragging him down leads her to go away in search of work. She finds it as a cloak model. The first evening of her employment she is taken out to dinner by an important western buyer, and, fortified by champagne, acquiesces to his terms as a bargainer. Her disgust at this condition to her success as a cloak model causes her to accept factory work once more. She becomes a hat trimmer at $4 a week. After six months of this she is desperate and reckless. Her vision of the filth and drudgery of the future is too black to endure. She gets all her resources together and goes up town to try her fortune again. She picks up a man who takes her to Martin's. Later, at a dance, she

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acquires a new man, and as a result with $43 capital starts in the Tenderloin. Unable to go through with it, until all her reserve is gone, she is eventually taken in hand by a superb young Italian, who has an arrangement with the police; and on whisky, after he has beaten her up, she goes to work on the street. After five months of it she and he quarrel. He tries to beat her again, but she is more than his match in nerve and in the struggle she nearly kills him. She flees for safety to the Bowery. There she looks for a job as a singer in a café, is offered a try-out, is drugged that evening, imprisoned, and barely escapes. Her work as singer is not remunerative and now she becomes a Grand street prostitute. Her accumulation of $31 is stolen by a lobby gow. She sinks to opium. In a dreadful joint she comes across Spenser, now a bum through drink, and at last she has something to live for. He develops typhoid. To take care of him she has to earn $50 a week on the streets, but an introduction Spenser gives her throws her across the path of a great playwright, called Brent, who, for the first time in her twenty-one years of life, gives her a chance to earn an honest living wage.

Brent is interested in Susan as a human being. He wants to train her for the stage, and her self-reliance and practical imagination at last come into play. It is only the misfortune of his abrupt departure for Europe and Spenser's utter inadequacy that fling her back on sex as a source of income—this time as the cool and reasoning mistress of the Italian, who was once her "partner" and has become respectable and wants her as running mate. With his fortune to live up to they go to Paris together. They fall in with Brent eventually, and the climax of the story is her emergence as a deep, candid, firm, self-possessed individual, in her relations with these two exceptional men.

There is only one deadly charge to make against this story—it is an epic of feminine courage that required for its plausibility a consistent exaggeration of the difficulties of women in industry and a humorlessly romantic view of prostitution. It is easy to sympathize with David Graham Phillips in his desire to show what the filthy exigencies of a sub-minimum wage can be, and it is impossible not to join him at times in feeling to the limit a greater horror at economic prostitution than at any other. But is Phillips realistic about sexual prostitution in general, or in particular about Susan Lenox's supposedly insulated experience of it? Prostitution, says Abraham Flexner, is "everywhere purely mercenary, everywhere rapacious, everywhere perverse, diseased, sordid, vulgar, and almost always filthy. In her bloom the Parisian cocotte possesses a bit of Gallic grace and verbal cleverness that is perhaps denied to English, German or Scandinavian women of the same class. But it is soon brushed away by excess, drink and perversion. The refined courtesan of the books is practically as rare in Paris as in London and Berlin." Mr. Flexner asks: "Why do we object to prostitution at all? Obviously, it is repugnant for one or more of several reasons: in the first place, because of the personal demoralization it entails; in the second, because of economic waste; again, because it is by far the main factor in the spread of venereal disease; finally, because of its intimate association with disorder or crime. . . . Part-time prostitution, occasional prostitution, pretentious prostitution—all the various kinds and grades above enumerated naturally and inevitably conduce to similar results." It is the complete omission of several of these ungrateful considerations that marks the "fall" of Susan Lenox as a romanticism. Phil-


## Hamilton to Washington

March 10, 1917.

Dear Sir:

Your Excellency's friendly and obliging letter of the 28th ultimo came safely to hand. I thank you for it and for the book with which you accompanied it. It is always a gratification to peruse a work which shows clear thinking, and I am grateful to you for the opportunity to know Mr. Laski's work on "The Problem of Sovereignty." [1]

Since you have been so gracious as to share with me your discovery in books, I need offer no apology for writing you of a matter to which I have given much consideration. As a citizen zealous for the true happiness of this country, I cannot but regret that our people read so little of what concerns its welfare.

Relative to the high food prices caused by freight embargoes, our business men show an inertness regarding causes and remedies which I detest. I hold them inexcusable not to have acquainted themselves with the subject from such books as "The Port of Boston," [2] wherein they will find set forth plans to forestall such congestion.

Then, too, I am sensible of the need of careful reading to offset much undigested socialism, which is in part a consequence of the war. I should advocate a careful reading of some of Sumner's Essays: [3] "First Steps Towards a Millennium" and "War."

I am further persuaded that our leaders of industry should give greater consideration to the rejection of our munitions by foreign purchasers. Let them consider wherefore the operations of mechanics could have been so unsuccessful in a country which has excelled all others in contribution to the tools of industry. When I read of our pioneer tool builders,[4] I cannot but feel that we should do all in our power to continue to work in the same spirit. To that end I should commend Gantt's "Industrial Leadership" [5] and Hapgood's "Industry and Progress," [6] not alone to the masters of industry, but to the artisans themselves.

The question is, how to get people to read such books, and I have wondered whether you could not effect some method of interesting our citizens in useful reading. I am advised that Mr. Roosevelt's spontaneous letter in regard to the essay Culbertson wrote [7] caused it to be more widely known, and your word would be of far greater import.

Mrs. Hamilton joins in respectful compliments to Mrs. Washington.

I remain, with great respect and esteem,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.

To His Excellency General Washington.

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lips was so enamored of his master-spirited girl that he was going to see Susan Lenox through the whole process without admitting one touch of weakness or deterioration, and if he kept her drunk a good deal of the time, and part of the time under morphine, he was careful to explain that she had a magnificent constitution, and rebounded into normal spirits and activities as soon as she got a good income.

Yet apart from these preposterous exaggerations, natural to a man who had no comedy, Susan Lenox is a story that moved and impressed this reader deeply. It may give a young reader an absurd idea of male voracity, or it may grievously disappoint a person in search of the erotic, otherwise it is a performance of indubitable vigor and valor and salience. When an author is dead and defenseless almost any trash he wrote may be published. It is the great fortune of David Graham Phillips, if the enhancement of one's memory is to be called fortunate, that the one big book he left unpublished was probably the best thing he ever did. It may be rash to say of any man who wrote over twenty novels that the particular one of them in hand surpasses the rest. One ought to read all of David Graham Phillips before offering such an opinion. On the basis of an ordinary acquaintance with his work, however, one is made bold to infer the superiority of Susan Lenox and to feel deeply consoled that the eternally lamentable insane act which killed Phillips did not intrude before he had had this full expression of his generous powers.

F. H.

# The Charm of Distance

*The Emperor of Portugallia, by Selma Lagerlöf. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. $1.25*

SOBER reason would tell one that there was a touch of arrogance in pretending to appreciate a foreign tale. Should not criticism stick to the impressions which our American friends are working up for us out of our current American life? For in these we can feel where the writer's hand has slipped in his delineation of personal traits, or where he has caricatured the spirit of the social milieu, or sentimentalized the ideals. We can appreciate only what we know and it is not the hard-beaten, weird-fancying Swedish peasant life that we know. How can the critic expect to put himself into the heart of this alien feeling and strange confronting of life?

This logic is so convincing that it would subjugate most of us, did not foreign tales like The Emperor of Portugallia come to us regularly to prove the inadequacy of logic. And what they do more for us is to emphasize anew—what the aestheticians are always telling us—how annoyingly familiarity of theme frets away at appreciation. It is just because we are so familiar with the theme that our appreciation of American novels is so rarely free from irritation. The righteous sternness with which we judge is partly due to the constant intrusion of the representation upon our judgment. The strident elements of the life around us make such a din in our ears, we are assailed by so much in expression that a mere elementary taste clamors to "improve," that our critical nerves get a little unhinged. We become too sensitive to the faintest falseness of theme in our story. We resent even the being reminded of the details of American blatancies. We are annoyed that characters are thin and cheap, because we want some writer to open up some rich new aspect of the American soul. And we are annoyed when characters are

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

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*Judge:* "Well, this business of selling direct-by-mail throughout the country is surely very popular with the public."

*Lawyer:* "Yes, but some of my clients say that in the interests of local merchants, the States ought to find some way to check it."

*Judge:* "I don't see why they should check it or how they can do it. Selling merchandise is an interstate business. I can sell and you can buy in the best market wherever it is. What can a State do about it?"

*Lawyer:* "You're probably right, I'll admit. The States can't very well put the 'kibosh' on legitimate interstate business."

*Judge:* "Certainly not. The States cannot hold up arbitrarily any direct-by-mail transaction, such as the payment of life-insurance premiums."

*Lawyer:* "How's that?"

*Judge:* "Policies are written for people, 'direct,' all over the country, and have been for years. The United States Supreme Court has decided unanimously that life-insurance premiums on such policies are exempt from State taxes. The usual license-fees and charges also do not apply. All this helps policyholders."

*Lawyer:* "Oh, you refer to the Postal Life?"

*Judge:* "Yes, that Company hasn't any agents and never has had. The applicant deals direct, personally or by letter. The method is good common sense as well as sanctioned by law."

*Lawyer:* (*laughing*) "Guess you're right. I wrote the Postal once myself just to find out how the Company did business, but never followed it up."




*Judge:* (*laughing*) "I go you one better; I not only wrote them, but took out a policy nine or ten years ago and have carried it ever since."

*Lawyer:* "How's the cost?"

*Judge:* "Lower than in other companies for the same kind of insurance—legal reserve—and besides that they give me a free medical examination each year just so I can keep in trim."

*Lawyer:* "That's pretty good. You live in Idaho and deal with a New York company by mail. Did you ever look the Company up?"

*Judge:* "Only to know that it is chartered and licensed by New York State, whose laws are very strict, but I called on them when I was East. They're now in their new building on Fifth Avenue."

*Lawyer:* "Are they? Believe I'll write them to figure on a policy for me."

*Judge:* "Don't think you could do better. Life insurance without agents is a distinct public service. The point is made, and I think it is a good one, that the Company is subject to the United States Postal Authorities. The Postal simplifies the business, saves you money, safeguards your health and will treat you right in every way. I'd take another policy myself if I hadn't passed the age limit."

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

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noble, because we know that people are not like that. In short, our criticism is often spoiled and not illumined by our acquaintance with the environment. We have so knotted into the themes our emotional complexes that we are no longer able to appreciate the literary art.

Now a foreign tale comes to us untrammelled by our experience. We feel a kind of moral irresponsibility about it. Our appreciation of it has to live by its own unaided artistic wits. The author may shock us, but he runs no risk of hurting our amour-propre of intimate wisdom. Perhaps it is only the foreign novel that we can hope to appreciate. Perhaps it is only a foreign novel, freed from our obsession of representation, that can come to us to be judged as a creative work of art, bringing its own credentials, as all art does and should.

To take delight in Miss Lagerlöf is not, therefore, to perform an act of literary snobbery. It is only to register how, being at her mercy as to the reality of the life she pictures, she charms and holds us. There is no familiarity of theme to fret us, and we can give our whole attention to the art. We do not have to be conscious, as with an American tale, of the gaps between the author's vision and our vision. But this new preoccupation with the art of the tale does not exonerate the foreign writer from truthfulness. She has only the heavier artistic responsibility. At every moment she must be plausible, for plausibility is the highest virtue of art.

I know no writer who makes it easier for us to understand her art. Her themes, strange as they are, always convince, and her sense of form is almost infallible. This latest tale has very much the same weird charm as Jerusalem, but it is of a personal and not a group madness that it tells. The story has to do with the intense longing of the old crofter Jan for his young daughter who has gone out into the world to earn the money that is needed to save their cottage from confiscation. A red silk dress, given to the girl by a passing salesman, proves the beginning of her ruin, and it is not for fifteen years that she comes back, haggard and broken, to her parents. Meanwhile, the old man's imagination, eagerly feeding on the vague pleasantries he hears about her fate, has built the loftiest absurdities for her. His whimsical yearning creates for himself the rôle of Emperor of Portugallia out of her fancied grandeur and he becomes the harmless butt of the countryside. But when the girl does return to carry off her mother to city life in Malmö, the poor despised old Jan, seeing in her spurning of him only the machinations of her enemies, loses his life in a quixotic attempt to rescue her at the pier.

It is a whimsical and moving tale, with touches of grim power and the fantastic superstition of the North. Very grisly is the girl's vigil with the coffin at the pier, while they drag for her father's body. It is not filial piety which keeps her there, but a deadly fear that the unburied man she had wronged would harm her. There is a charming touch where Jan and his wife are carrying the baby to church on Christmas Day. The mine-superintendent, passing in a sleigh, offers to take the little girl in. Brooding Jan protests fiercely, and is later all wonderment—"Why, I thought it was King Herod and Herodias his wife!" Troll and King Herod and the Greek fear of the uncoffined make a mystical background for the sober life of the little Swedish community. There is ever that piquant sense of flickering weirdness behind the orderly civilization with its excellent parson and schoolmaster, its husbandry and wisdom.

Miss Lagerlöf's art keeps her from weaving her own

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sophistication around these simple people. She not only keeps out her own personality, but she somehow renders her people in their own terms without appearing naïve. And we accept them without question on their own terms. It would be well if some of our American woman writers could study this delicate art of sympathetic detachment and learn how to avoid patronizing their characters. Miss Lagerlöf's tone is hard to get, but it is what makes her art so appealing. Madness and poverty and cheapness get touched with a charm that has nothing of the sentimental about it.

This Swedish author is a master in the episodic telling of a story; the fine chiseling of her art makes every line and contour tell. These forty-six incidents through which The Emperor of Portugallia moves carry forward the story in an indirect line. Yet each has its note of significance and that pleasurable turn which is never a "moral" and yet not quite a "point." Now nothing becomes so wearisome as the episode when one feels that the writer is laboring to round off each chapter as pointedly as the last. And nothing is so wearisome as an episodic telling which repeatedly frustrates one's rise of expectation at the end of each incident. The ease of the episodic form is more than balanced by the extreme difficulty of avoiding these two boredoms. Miss Lagerlöf does not labor, but she does delicately satisfy the expectation.

To point out the things which make it easy to appreciate her art is not to imply that they are obtrusive, or that they are not unconscious. One implies only that in the foreignness of her theme it is the art that is to be enjoyed. That art is clear and joyous and refreshing. We can meet it with truer appreciation than we can our neighbors next door.

R. B.

## The State as Tobacconist

*The State as Manufacturer and Trader. By A. W. Madsen. London: J. Fisher Unwin, 7s 6d net.*

THE state socialist who is also a consumer of tobacco will read Mr. Madsen's book with a sense of profound discouragement. It is a competent résumé of the world's experience with the principal commercial industry carried on by the government in any considerable number of countries. The state monopolizes the tobacco trade in France, Italy, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Rumania and Serbia. What of the fate of the tobacco consumer? Most melancholy.

It is only from France, to be sure, that the cry of the consumer is audible. We hear of cigarettes that won't smoke, cigarettes that dissolve into their elements at the touch of a match, ten-centime cigars of which the consumers "complain bitterly"; tobaccos of "restricted sale," for the army, hospitals, etc., into which an undue proportion of ribs, butts and débris have entered; substitutions of cheap tobaccos for the customary grades, to counteract the fiscal effects of rising prices. The administration itself admits that these substitutions "bewilder the smoker and are likely to lead to a check upon consumption." But what can one expect? Some years the fields yield bad tobacco. "The result is that the quality of the products is also inferior. There is no remedy for this; the consumers think they are being exploited by the state, while the truth is, they are the victims of atmospheric circumstances."

The consumer may be victim of circumstances other



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than atmospheric. Conditions in the state factories have at times been so unsatisfactory that the workers have resorted to sabotage. The government in 1914 announced an infallible method of discovering the worker guilty of mischief to the product. Here is the comment of the newspaper Excelsior:

> "Smokers who have complained of finding in their packets of superior cut tobacco or Caporal Ordinary a sock, a glove, a nail, a mouse or other foreign but unsmokable ingredient may now be reassured."

Such is the price the consumer pays. Let us look at the other side, the profit to the state. France, Italy and Austria, countries with low per capita income and widely diffused habits of thrift, recover revenues amounting to $2.10, $1.44 and $1.41 per capita of the general population. The United Kingdom, through taxation, derives a per capita revenue of $1.84, but the United States secures only $1.04 and Germany $.64. The American consumes twice as much tobacco—and twice as good—as the Frenchman and pays half as great a tax. The American's spending power is twice that of the Frenchman. This is of course no argument for a tobacco monopoly, but it does indicate clearly the revenue possibilities remaining unexploited in the tobacco trade.

## An Intensive Novel

*Sussex Gorse, by Sheila Kaye-Smith. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $1.50.*

ONCE more Mr. Knopf has proved his alertness and daring. For outside the enthusiastic heralding of W. L. George Miss Kaye-Smith is little known in this country, and if Sussex Gorse is a criterion, it is easy to see why her American vogue would have to be of slow growth, and why the publisher who introduced her to us would of necessity be taking a risk. The book is stark and grim—as stark and grim as the intensely provincial English country life it reveals. The author attempts no interpretation of this unswerving, heavy-moving existence; no controversy is raised about it. It is simply revealed. The cry for happiness, the longings that would perpetuate the soft glows of tender spring evenings or the transient gaieties of the rustic fair flash forth in the narrative as amiable weakness, as bends or curves which may make supple the long line of life but can at no point really deflect it from its purpose. Miss Kaye-Smith embraces an older, objective tradition, wherein the novelist is merely revelatory and abstains from any criticism or the intrusion of personal moods. When what is revealed is a life so bleak as that which clusters around Boarzell, the result is not likely to be a book which will be popular in a country where only geniuses are allowed the privilege of being pessimistic.

Yet Sussex Gorse ought to be widely read, for it is a novel which, if not great, only escapes being great. Genius can hammer out sparks of insight and suggestion on the flinty dreariness of life by the sheer vigor and truth of presentation. The criterion is how much are characters and locale vivified, not what are the characters and locale chosen. In Sussex Gorse the vivifying is not all-round and complete; often there is a softening when there should be pungency; now and then the outlines of the environment are blurred when the demand is for sharpness and distinctness. But the hero, Reuben Backfield, is no mere impressionistic sketch—it is a full-length portrait. The small and scrawny bit of earth known as Boarzell excites his envy


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and challenges him, even when as a child he is flogged by the constable for daring to trespass upon it. He saves year after year until he finally possesses it. It is barren and stubborn, but in the end it yields to his plough and persistence and wheat grows to mock the ancient furze. In the fight for this land, Backfield destroys his own brother and mother and wife and children, his one brief love for a woman. They come and go in feeble panorama, and extraordinary is the author's power of suggesting the dwindled idiosyncrasies of personality when so ruthlessly exploited by a dominant passion, combined with the picture of how a momentary decision of temperament may change the whole course of individual destiny. Perhaps the highest quality of the book is in this curious fusion of the long and short view of life, this interplay, as of life itself, of the temporary and the permanent. Backfield has no banal regrets. When he surveys his victory, he does not put against his gain of the earth the loss of his own soul. He has satisfied his boyhood ambition and is content. He has won; he can rest peacefully in the bosom of his challenge.

Miss Kaye-Smith does not pretend to a philosophy of life in all this battle of nature and human will. She is true to the objective tradition. But that tradition has never offered any novelist who wanted to be of high rank an escape from the duty of thinking things out and coming to some conclusion about them. It has only meant that what, in the more subjective story shall be explicit, shall in this kind of story be implicit. Hardy, for instance, whose name is invoked for every whittle-author who has a heath in his book but whose real power Miss Kaye-Smith does to an extraordinary extent really share, never attempted to formulate a conscious philosophy. Yet no one can read a single novel of Hardy's without having Hardy's individual feeling for nature made clear. One succumbs to the force and consistency of it. It is an attitude which has been thought through. Miss Kaye-Smith's novel leaves one puzzled. The reader is not sure whether she believes that nature plays tricks upon man or whether man plays tricks on nature. There is a fatal indecision of conviction. Only non-fiction writers can afford to be literally pragmatic in their thinking. The enduring novelist must have full-fledged beliefs, else he has no theatre in which the dramas of life can be produced, and his books are like plays without a stage-setting.

## Contributors

to this issue

GEORGE WEST is a newspaper man who has been associated with the Committee on Industrial Relations.

H. G. WELLS needs no introduction to readers of The New Republic.

HARRISON REEVES was educated at Harvard. He spent last year in France, and was a personal friend of Alan Seeger.

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# The New REPUBLIC

*A Journal of Opinion*

March 10th 1917

The Evolution of

## A National Policy

in relation to

## The Great War

VOL. X. : NO. 123
PART TWO

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# LINCOLN IN 1917

LINCOLN refused absolutely to place himself and his party in a situation of solemnly proclaiming a policy and then of accepting a measure of conciliation which dishonored all its promises and renounced all its objects. He would avoid war if possible; he would do nothing to provoke it; but he would not seek to avoid it by abandoning one inch of the ground assumed by the Republican party as the consequence of almost forty years of southern aggression. It was a moment when difficulties, fears and scruples could not be permitted to interfere with an ultimate decision, when the morale of a great people depended upon resolute and imperturbable fulfilment of declared purposes in action.

Yet although he would not flinch from fighting he had something in him which prevented him from being infected by the psychology of war. War is repugnant to a democracy, not merely because it is wasteful, barbarous and hideous, but because the state of mind of a nation at war suppresses or discourages the application of ideas to business and politics upon which the democratic fulfilment depends. It is the perfect example of that dangerous, costly, headstrong and imperative action which seems to demand, as the condition of its success, the utter subordination of the variety and humor of life to a grim puritanism of immediate achievement. It insists on the undivided service of the material, emotional, intellectual and moral resources of a people. A nation at war is intolerant of dissent or contradiction, of hesitation or patience, of any tendency to mitigate emotion with reflection or supplement action with open-minded research. Lincoln never yielded to this constraint.

In those days, as in these, there were people who believed that because one side was more right than the other, the war had no object except to make the right prevail. By subordinating political to moral considerations, they over-simplified the problem and so increased the difficulty of its solution. Mr. Lincoln was, consequently, sharply criticized for vacillation and hesitation, for allowing his policy to be dictated by expediency and for his refusal to cut all political knots with the sword of a moral imperative. But he knew better than his critics. They were condemning him for his most salutary quality. He was only seeking to grasp the situation as a whole, to keep all of its complicated aspects in his mind at the same time, and to arrange them in the order of their relative importance. Surrounded as he was by the passions and obsessions of a desperate war, he never budged from his ordinary practice of patiently waiting until he possessed all the available facts and then of applying to them the searchlight of cool, disinterested, and purposed thinking.

His peculiar greatness did not consist merely in his kindness and magnanimity of feeling, or in his ultimate stability of purpose, or in his penetrating, surefooted and indefatigable intelligence. It consisted in the extraordinary fact of a successful working combination of all these qualities in one man. He achieved for himself a mutually helpful relation among lively human sympathies, a firm will and a luminous intelligence. He used his intelligence to enlighten his will, and his will to establish the mature decision of his intelligence. His formal judgments were charged with momentum and his actions with sympathy and understanding. Inasmuch as the American nation has inherited the priceless possession of a national hero who succeeded in keeping alive during a war the finest spiritual flowers of a democratic society, a prevailing indifference to his advice and example during the present national emergency would be as shabby a piece of backsliding as could be committed by a pretentiously patriotic people.

February 17, 1917.

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# The Evolution of a National Policy in Relation to the Great War

## FOREWORD

WE are printing herewith a number of articles or extracts from articles dealing with various issues of the great war, which have been printed in The New Republic since its inception. Our object in so doing is simple. The country is now hesitating on the brink of a choice which can scarcely fail to have a decisive effect on its future career. Everything conspires to increase the difficulty of the choice. The issues of the great war are extremely complicated and highly controversial. Insidious and fanatical attempts have been and are being made to pervert their relation to our American national purpose. The traditions of our foreign policy, concentrating as they did the attention of the American nation on the western hemisphere, have prejudiced Americans against considering frankly and fearlessly the scope and limits of their interests in European politics. Finally, any decision whether to go in or to stay out or to occupy some intermediate position will be both costly and risky and will place a severe strain on the national and moral resources of a divided country. In this general situation some of our readers may find useful both a review of the several phases which one group of Americans have passed through in reaching a decision, and a new and more comprehensive statement of what the decision means.

In presenting to our readers the ensuing record, we wish, however, to guard against one misinterpretation. The record, as spread out in the following pages, does not pretend to be exhaustive. The passages have been selected for the purpose of showing how a certain attitude of mind towards the issues of the war has gradually developed into a coherent and decisive policy. During the course of its development we strayed on one or two occasions from the main road and placed somewhat divergent interpretations on special phases of the war. This was particularly true of our comment on some of the early violations of "juridical niceties" by Great Britain. But whatever the variations in emphasis, due to the stress of sudden emergencies and fluctuating sympathies and antipathies, our war editorials have from the start been informed by certain dominant ideas, to which in the following extracts the attention of the reader is called by italicized annotations.

These ideas have been persistently applied to American experience in relation to the war as it unfolded under the pressure of new events; and as a result of this application they have been tested both as to their pertinence and adequacy. In our opinion they have stood the test fairly well and are more vigorous, more useful and more relevant in the present emergency than they have been in the past. They will be summarized in a concluding article of this supplement and one more attempt made to show why they converge towards a decision to resist the attempt of Germany to violate the highway of the world.



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# The End of American Isolation

This is from the first issue: *America involved in the war; it will be affected by the kind of peace that is made; since isolation is ended American intervention should be made to count in favor of an organized peace.*

THE self-complacent isolation of a great people has never received a ruder shock than that which was dealt to the American nation by the outbreak of the European war. We have long been congratulating ourselves on something more than official independence of Europe. We considered ourselves free in a finer and a deeper sense—free from the poison of inherited national antipathies, free from costly and distracting international entanglements, free from a more than incidental reliance on foreign markets for the sale of our products, free to make mistakes with impunity and to gather fruits by merely shaking the tree. We were more nearly self-contained, more completely the master of our own destiny, than any other nation of history. Yet this consummate example of political independence has been subjected to a visitation of fate almost as disconcerting as those which beset wandering tribes. There broke over the country a European war which the American people individually and collectively were powerless to prevent or to mitigate, yet which may have consequences upon the future and policy of the country as profound and far-reaching as our self-made Civil War. Independence in the sense of isolation has proved to be a delusion. It was born of the same conditions and the same misunderstandings as our traditional optimistic fatalism; and it must be thrown into the same accumulating scrapheap of patriotic misconceptions.

* * * * *

No matter who is victorious, the United States will be indirectly compromised by the treaty of peace. If the treaty is one which makes for international stability and justice, this country will have an interest in maintaining it. If the treaty is one which makes militarism even more ominously threatening, this country will have an interest in seeking a better substitute.

* * * * *

In its deepest aspect, then, the European war is a challenge to the United States to justify its independence. The nation can not be independent in the sense of being isolated. It can be independent in the sense of being still more completely the master of its own destiny. The control of its own destiny will not mean, as it has done in the past, merely the renunciation of European entanglements, because entanglements will inevitably ensue from the adoption of the positive and necessary policy of making American influence in Europe count in favor of international peace. Neither will the control of its own destiny by the American nation mean, as it has done in the past, its own control by a triumphant prophecy of prosperity. What it will mean is a clearer understanding of the relation between our democratic national ideal and our international obligations, and such an understanding should bring with it a political and economic organization better able to redeem its obligations both to its own citizens and to a regenerate European system.

NOVEMBER 7, 1914 (Vol. I, No. 1)

# Timid Neutrality

The week following Mr. Roosevelt's first utterance on America's relation to Belgian neutrality: *International peace must secure a sanction of disinterested force; America should act during the war to create a precedent for such action as is contemplated by the league to enforce peace.*

HAD we protested against the assault on international morality when Belgium was invaded, our faith in public law would have been made somewhat real. For unless someone some time is ready to take some chance for the sake of internationalism, it will remain what it is to-day, an object of derision to aggressive nations. Had the United States, as the courted neutral, stood out for the neutrality of Belgium and the rules of The Hague, ruthlessness would have received the severest jolt it ever imagined. We do not think the United States should have gone to war. We alone cannot undertake to police the world. But we might alone, or with the help of the other neutral nations, have used the pressure of our diplomacy, and so laid the foundations of effective world opinion against international cynicism. A precedent would have been established which could react on all the future. The beginnings of world organization would have been tested in fire, and the hope of peace would have taken on at least the shadow of reality.

Against all this it may be said that because we acted so as to preserve the goodwill of Europe, we shall be able to exercise a guiding influence in the settlement of the war. It is an idea which gratifies not only our desire to keep out of trouble, but our vanity and our hope that we shall do great things with small difficulty. The nation is doomed to disappointment. For while the settlement may be made by a peace congress held under the presidency of the United States, the decisions will be determined by the balance of power in which the war results. The nations of Europe will have sacrificed so much that they will settle the issues in accordance with their own strength and position. And when we enter the congress with nothing but a record of comfortable neutrality, an acquiescence in the violated Hague conventions, and an array of vague treaties for a half-conceived future, our voice may well be disregarded. We shall be treated as we deserve to be treated, as a nation of well-meaning people who run no risks, and build their faith upon their simple and uncritical desires.

NOVEMBER 14, 1914 (Vol. I, No. 2)

# Pacifism vs. Passivism

*Peace is a condition which needs to be organized and actively maintained—even by force; international organization does not mean denationalism.*

PACIFISM must, then, be sharply distinguished from passivism. The newer ideal of peace, whether in domestic or foreign policy, has to be actively and intentionally promoted. The chief instruments of an effective peace propaganda must be nations equipped for the accomplishment of their national purpose. The responsibility is theirs. They cannot shift it to an international organization which does not exist, or hand it over to subsidized peace societies. Passivism merely makes it easy for militarism. It repeats in the larger region of international politics the error which the advocates of laissez-faire used to make in domestic poli-



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cies. Passivists are erecting national irresponsibility into a dogma, and seeking to accomplish by moral exhortation a result which requires for its accomplishment the moral exercise of force. The result of the error would be the same in both cases, the triumph of the predatory power of interests. A modern nation which wants the world to live in peace should not be content to keep the peace itself. It must be willing and ready, whenever a clear case can be made out against a disturber of the peace, to join with other nations in taking up arms against the malefactor.

DECEMBER 12, 1914 (Vol. I, No. 6)

# Getting It Both Ways

Concerning violations of neutral rights by both belligerents: *Can neutrality be made discriminating so as to discourage aggression?*

BUT such silence would not mean consent. A sincerely and intelligently pacific country cannot allow recent precedents to remain unchallenged. We fully admit that the belligerents are assuming more terrible risks than has usually been the case in past European wars. We fully admit that the conditions under which war now is being waged are in many essential respects novel, and will demand a new definition of belligerent and neutral rights. But just because war has become more than ever a hazardous and a devastating method of settling international disputes, just because military preponderance on land or sea demands such complete organization and equipment and such costly sacrifices on the part of the belligerent, just for these reasons essentially pacific powers must try to organize peace as the belligerents are organizing war. They must be prepared to make their approval or disapproval a great factor in the calculations of the belligerents. Belgium was invaded because Germany calculated a larger military advantage from violating than from respecting its neutrality. If other neutral powers had been ready to fight for Belgium, German calculations would have had a different result. The only way in which neutral interests can obtain any weight in the counsel of nations commensurate with their real importance is by means of a league organized expressly for their promotion and assertion in time of need.

FEBRUARY 27, 1915 (Vol. II, No. 17)

# Anglo-American Reciprocity

*A crude expression of benevolent neutrality as based on an underlying Anglo-American community of interest.*

BRITISH public opinion, if the London press may be accepted as a criterion, continues actively to resent the stubborn resistance made by the United States in its defense of neutral commerce; but this resentment, however natural, cannot, we believe, permanently endure. When the war is over, candid and liberal Englishmen will admit that a genuine grievance has not deterred this country from treating Great Britain uncommonly well. They will come to understand that the American government and American public opinion have been considerate in the expression of their grievances and have exhibited a real if not a formal partiality for Great Britain. In spite of the protests which the State Department was obliged to make against the use of British sea power, the American attitude, taken as a whole, has made in favor of a better understanding between the two countries and has implied a feeling of mutual and permanent confidence. The ultimate justification for the course that has been followed and its results should be nothing less than an increasingly friendly and loyal coöperation between the two peoples.

These considerations explain the present attitude of the United States towards Great Britain. Our country does not intend to yield, yet it refuses to consider the possibility of fighting. It is treating Great Britain just as one party or class within a nation treats another ruling party or class with whose opinion and policy it disagrees. The differences are not abandoned, and so far as they concern essentials they are not compromised or arbitrated. They are firmly asserted, and the assumption behind their assertion is that as the result of agitation and discussion a just protest against the official policy will prevail. The ruling power is given the credit for being open to conviction and for willingness to conciliate a resolute and reasonable opposition. American public opinion has confidence that in the long run Great Britain will not persist in converting a preponderant naval strength into a practically unregulated power of life and death over the commerce and consequently the security of other nations.

Much has been written about the strong bonds of interest, association, tradition and mutual understanding which unite the two countries, and much of that which has been written is true. The background of association, tradition and understanding enables the two countries to differ radically without incurring by their differences the liability to mutual suspicion and apprehension. Such differences are wholesome, provided they have a real meaning, are frankly expressed and fairly considered. Their expression is necessary to the proper adjustment of British and American policy. In the present instance the difference runs very deep. It was necessary to give it frank and full expression in the interest of the independence and security of the United States. It will continue to be asserted, but it will not be pushed until after the war is over. Its assertion in this way, so far from being an evidence of unfriendliness to Great Britain, is an indication that the United States is willing to risk German ill-feeling and its own essential interests as a pacific trading nation upon the ultimate reasonableness of British policy. It is proof of our confidence that in the long run Great Britain will not stick to a policy which will make impossible a relatively stable, authoritative and equitable system of public law.

APRIL 3, 1915 (Vol. II, No. 22)

# Are American Protests Vain?

*Benevolent neutrality again.*

BEHIND the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain and the United States there are certain realities which it is important to keep in mind. Great Britain will be polite, will administer the blockade as leniently as possible, will treat us with great consideration; but on no essential point will she yield. The United States will be firm, good-tempered, and insistent, but on no point will it force the issue. Great Britain has sea power and will use it; we have the power of economic reprisal, but we shall not use it.

APRIL 10, 1915 (Vol. II, No. 23)

# Dr. Dernburg's Letter

On a letter by Dr. Dernburg, a German propagandist in this country: *British marine absolutism is preferable to German competition: But sea*



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*power in the old sense will pass away in the future. It will have to be internationalized after the war, but it cannot be allowed to pass to Germany during the war. The theory of peace without victory.*

THE Germans, speaking through Dr. Dernburg, dispute British sea power, and they have at least had the wisdom to recognize that the world is not ready to accept German sea power as a substitute. Their proposal to neutralize the oceans and the straits is the germ of the only idea which can save the world from the competitive anarchy arising from the dissolution of England's supremacy.

It is a proposal that England and the United States are bound to consider with the utmost seriousness. They are forced to look ahead and ask themselves whether British sea power can be maintained, whether the cost of maintaining it would not outweigh any benefit from it, and what is to be substituted for supremacy if it is to be relinquished. It is our problem as well as Great Britain's, for there can be no question that the hopes and interests of both countries lie together. It may well be that we can save the world endless pain if we face the problem together, and try to anticipate it. The command of the seas will pass as a result of technical inventions. It can pass as a matter of deliberate will guided by reason, or it can pass with a terrible crash in a world dissolution. Far-seeing Englishmen realize how narrowly they have probably escaped a terrible fall. If there is any foresight in statecraft it will prepare now for the greater crisis which will allow for the passing of sea power.

The end of this war will be the opportunity to begin dealing with what is more important than all the crooked national boundaries of Europe. We shall all need Germany's aid and advice and good will in this supreme world problem. That is why the luxury of revenge cannot be indulged in. Germany may have done all the wrong conceivable, but the nations have still to live with her and to reckon with her. They cannot for their own safety leave in the heart of Europe a festering sore. Magnanimity has become an absolute practical necessity. For the issues which the war has revealed but which it will not settle require all the available good sense of the world for their solution.

APRIL 24, 1915 (Vol. II, No. 25)

# The Difficult Peace

*The theory of peace without victory.*

YET the people who are unreservedly for one side are in no better position. They say they wish a victory; but if one pauses to think of the complexity of the issues involved, the word victory almost ceases to mean anything. Suppose an extreme case. Suppose the German army is beaten to a point where it can no longer take the field. The statesmen of England, France and Russia have then to devise a settlement. But here at once they are confronted with a problem almost as puzzling as if the war had not been fought. They have to find a place for Germany, Austria and Turkey; each has to adjust itself to the interests of the others, and the rewards and indemnities have to be apportioned. There is a series of difficult world problems up for solution which the movement of the armies will affect but will not decide. At the end of the war there will be a different balance of forces, which will make different solutions possible, but for the intricate questions of boundaries, colonies, finance, tariffs, markets, concessions, nationality, creed, home rule, there will be nothing so definite and simple as is implied in the idea of victory. Jess Willard knocked out Jack Johnson. It was a famous victory. But nothing equally decisive in the war is conceivable, even if the armies of the central empires were annihilated. The so-called victors themselves are not a single nation that can be proclaimed champion, but a complex of interests and desires to be adjusted to a new complex of forces.

There are hints of such a program arising not only from England and France, but from Germany as well. The principle of nationality is very much lauded, but it is a principle which is supremely difficult to translate into the reality of southeastern Europe. Nationality is a term which has at least as much capacity for making trouble as for allaying it. It will not be easy to house in Europe at the same time pan-Serbism, pan-Bulgarianism, pan-Hellenism, pan-Rumanianism, pan-Islamism, pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism. It is possible to rectify frontiers, but a new frontier is no guarantee that it will not become a tariff wall across which ambitious little nations shall snarl at one another. There is a good deal of legitimate doubt whether a number of sovereign people, each fighting for its own advancement, is preferable to, let us say, a development of some kind of federal democracy out of the structure of Austria-Hungary.

MAY 1, 1915 (Vol. II, No. 26)

# The Lusitania

On the sinking of the Lusitania: *The tragedy symbolizes Anglo-American interdependence on the seas.*

THE loss of over one hundred American and over one thousand British lives on the Lusitania throws into clear relief one fact of overwhelming importance. It emphasizes above all the existing commercial and political dependence of the United States on Great Britain. If the German submarine campaign should be successful and British sea power be rendered ineffective for the protection of trade routes, the disaster which threatened the British Empire would be in large measure shared by the United States. The existing dependence of this country on British maritime supremacy for its prosperity and even its safety is complete, and under the present critical conditions appalling. American exports and imports are carried almost entirely in British bottoms. American citizens are obliged to reach Europe on ships flying the British flag. The Monroe Doctrine has been allowed to flourish under the benevolent protection of British sea power. The British fleet affords the only real guarantee for the security of the Panama Canal, which means that Great Britain could take it when she pleased. We have drifted into this situation without realizing its risks and its consequences. One great object of the German submarine campaign has been to force American public opinion to realize the implications of American dependence on British maritime supremacy. Germany doubtless wants to induce the United States to issue a new declaration of independence, to build a merchant marine large enough to carry its foreign commerce, and a fleet large enough to protect its merchant marine and the Panama Canal. Such plans may eventually succeed, but they are more likely to fail. They present American public opinion not with a categorical imperative but with a momentous issue. On the one hand the United States can make itself



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independent not only of Great Britain but of Great Britain's enemies, by building vessels of commerce and war in competition with the mistress of the seas. On the other it can reach some kind of an understanding with Great Britain which would enable us to avoid the economic and moral expense of competing with that country. Such an understanding would not mean a mere regularizing of the existing condition of dependence. It would mean an attempt to convert a precarious dependence into a more substantial interdependence—one that would bring with it an effective and equitable distribution of mutual rights and responsibilities, and one that ought to constitute a first step in the direction of the ultimate internationalizing of sea power. Such is the real issue raised by the fatal explosion off the south coast of Ireland, which has united Englishmen and Americans in a common grief and a common indignation, and which may unite them in a common war and conceivably even in a common destiny.

MAY 15, 1915 (Vol. III, No. 28)

# A League of Peace

*On loyalty to a supernational unit.*

THE vast implications of the League of Peace are what make it important. And its real service to mankind may well be that it will establish the first rallying point of a world citizenship.

The development of such a citizenship is one of the great moral and educational problems of this century. It cannot mean a vague cosmopolitanism. It must mean the training of people who have learned to modify their national policies so that these do not make impossible an international allegiance. This war has offered us an example of such citizenship. The Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders who are fighting in Flanders and at the Dardanelles are living and dying for the largest political organization the world has so far known. Their allegiance in the British Empire is to a state which embraces one-quarter of the human race. Never before in history have men been loyal to so great and so diversified a unit. They have literally come from all the ends of the earth to preserve a union of democracies. They have shown by example what any World League most needs to know, that federalism on a grand scale is not an idle dream.

JUNE 26, 1915 (Vol. III, No. 34)

# Why America Exports Arms

*Benevolent neutrality and the munitions question.*

THE government of the United States must continue its profession of technical neutrality, but American public opinion should not deceive itself with the pretense. There are two ways of being technically neutral. One is to sell war supplies to all belligerents. The other is to sell war supplies to none of them. We should prefer the former, and should assume full responsibility for the consequences of the preference, because in this way we can most effectually protest against German preparedness for conquest by war. Germany should be made to understand that the loss of American coöperation is one of the penalties which she must pay for the violation of Belgium. If she had not attacked France through Belgium the demand for an embargo on the exportation of war supplies would, we believe, be irresistible. The government of the United States did not formally protest at the time of the violation, but its citizens protested and have been protesting ever since. International law gives us an opportunity of making that protest effective without going to war ourselves with Germany. We should take advantage of it as a matter of deliberate national policy, because as a pacific democracy we want to bring into existence a world in which inoffensive pacific nations are free from unprovoked attack. And in every unofficial way Germans should be made to understand why American public opinion preferred to give its neutrality an Anglican rather than a Teutonic complexion.

JULY 10, 1915 (Vol. III, No. 36)

# The Freedom of the Seas

*Why America must abandon its old theory of the freedom of the seas; the relation of sea power to a differential neutrality; the relation of a differential neutrality to international security; navalism and militarism; international sea power as the instrument of a league for peace.*

"THE Government of the United States and the Imperial Government . . . have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated without compromise at any cost."

The foregoing passage from the last American note to Germany is strong and clear. The freedom of the seas is a brave phrase. If the American nation is going to "contend" for the good of any cause, it could not select a more fruitful one than the "freedom of the seas." The deliverance of mankind from all kinds of frustration and oppression will in part depend upon the conversion of the "freedom of the seas" from a sounding phrase into a sober and definite political achievement.

Unfortunately, like other sounding phrases it leads itself to divergent interpretations. All three parties to the present controversy have attempted to appropriate it. The Englishmen who discourse learnedly and appreciatively about the British Empire make its very foundations consist of something which they call the "freedom of the seas." The Germans, on the other hand, are proclaiming that the present war, instead of being, as they too quickly assumed in the beginning, a fight of German civilization against Russian barbarism, is in reality a fight against the tyranny which Britannia exercises over the waves. The American government, finally, is "contending" for still another kind of maritime freedom—the freedom to trade and travel on the high seas in time of war, subject only to those regulations which have hitherto been admitted by the common consent of civilized nations to be reasonable and just.

None of these interpretations of the phrase is wholly satisfactory. The freedom of the seas, if it ever becomes a veritable accomplishment, will be something different from British maritime sovereignty, German maritime anarchy, or the complicated compromise between despotism and order which is called international law. If the American government intends to work effectively for maritime freedom, it will have to make the franchise claimed by neutral commerce in time of war mean something more than the meagre collection of rights which neutrals have painfully won from belligerents, and which the belligerents are now combining to extinguish. No less will it have to dissociate



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maritime freedom from mere rebellion against the interference by sea power with commerce during war. What then should it mean?

Ever since the art of navigation was matured and piracy abolished, the seas have been free to the ships of all nations in time of peace; but this freedom has been precarious, because it was liable to interruption in time of war. The position of every nation which depended to a considerable extent for its subsistence upon foreign commerce was rendered insecure because its means of livelihood could be cut off completely by an enemy with a fleet, or partially as the consequence of war among other nations. International law, so far from providing a remedy for this insecurity, expressly sanctioned it. Belligerents had always possessed the general right to put a stop to sea-borne commerce which might be of military help to their enemies. The manner in which this right could be exercised was regulated, but the regulations were ambiguous and did not embody effectively any positive counter principle—such, for instance, as the intrinsic superiority of the occupations of peace to those of war. During hostilities the interests of the nation which controlled the sea were paramount over the interests of the peaceful traders. International law had been written by sea power in the interest of its preponderance.

How are the seas to be really freed? In the past Americans have usually answered this question as the Germans are answering it now. They have contended that a navy during war should be used only to fight other navies or to convoy troops. Commerce of all kinds, including even that in munitions of war, should not be embarrassed by belligerent interference. Such is the obvious and traditional meaning of the freedom of the seas, but because it is obvious and traditional it should not be accepted uncritically. As a matter of fact it would be a fatal mistake for the American nation to contend for any such doctrine of freedom. The phrase does not necessarily imply complete freedom of trading on the seas, any more than freedom of commerce among the states implies the emancipation of domestic commerce from all governmental interference. National commerce has always been regulated in what was supposed to be the national interest. International commerce is equally in need of regulation in international interest. The all-important public interest for the benefit of which it should be regulated is, of course, that of international security and peace.

Unrestricted freedom of trading on the high seas would not contribute to international security and peace. Its effect would be enormously to improve the strategic position of military power on land as compared to military power on sea. By means of such an interpretation of maritime freedom a preponderant land power could make the whole world contribute to its military efficiency and success; and if the whole world agreed, it would be a credulous and a mercenary world. Military power on land is the indispensable instrument of aggressive political purposes. It has always constituted and always will constitute the gravest threat to international peace and the liberty of weaker nations. Sea power, on the other hand, is comparatively inoffensive. Not only can it not be used effectively for aggressive purposes, except in so far as it is supported by an army, but its function in the history of Europe has been that of guarding the weaker nations against attack by the strongest contemporary army. English sea power was used to check the aggression of the Spain of Philip II, and the France of Louis XIV and of Napoleon I. As long as militarism continues to be a serious danger, peaceful neutral nations, by insisting on the emancipation of commerce from interference by sea power, would be adopting a suicidal policy.

Germany flourishes the principle of freedom without control because, as the possessor of the most effective existing army, she would gain enormously from complete freedom of commercial intercourse during war. Neutral trading nations cannot afford to become her accomplices or the accomplices of any other dominant land power. They cannot permit the commerce of the world to enter into an alliance with militarism. International commerce needs an international jurisdiction. The greatest care must and should be exercised to make it serve something more than the national welfare. If adapted to such a service it will be entitled to the right and the power to move freely; but if the spokesmen of commerce permit it to be made the instrument of aggressive militarism, they will be allowing the indispensable medium of international intercourse to be used to prevent any stable international order. Neutrals cannot claim the right to trade with all nations at all times irrespective of the results of such traffic. The assumption of such a position by the United States would mean the sacrifice of public interests for the benefit of a kind of nationalistic commercial privateering. The abettors of the traffic would be mere exploiters. They would deprive trade among nations of any standard of public responsibility.

The exercise of some control over commerce during war cannot be abandoned. It is necessary for the security of maritime and other kinds of freedom during peace. The only question is, how and by whom shall the control be exercised? It is now being exercised by Great Britain because she possesses a preponderant navy. Rather than that the control should be emasculated, Great Britain should be allowed to continue its exercise. But Englishmen must recognize that the world will not submit to the indefinite perpetuation of an exclusively British dominion of the seas. Other nations besides Germany will dispute British control, in case they are not permitted to share its responsibility and costs. If a preponderant navy is to retain its power of life and death over commerce, it can only be as the agent of international police regulation.

In the long run such an essentially international function must be placed under international control. The power attaching to its exercise has enormously increased during the present war, because certain kinds of commerce which were formerly of little benefit to a belligerent have now become of substantial benefit. This power will continue to increase in proportion to the improvement in national economic organization and the expansion of international commerce. It will become too great a power to be restricted to any one nation. It will be too great a burden to be carried by any one nation, unless it should be converted into a source of illegimate profit. Great Britain will need assistance, and as soon as she realizes the need of assistance, the organization of an international maritime sovereignty will become a matter of practical statesmanship. How far this international sea power will have to use a navy as its instrument, how far it can substitute for a navy commercial weapons, such as non-intercourse, and what kind of a legal system will result from international control, are important questions which need not concern us here. The thing to realize is that freedom on the seas, like freedom on land, cannot exist in the absence of control. It must be associated with an international maritime order contrived in the interest of the world's peace.

AUGUST 7, 1915 (Vol. IV, No. 1)



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# Implications of Monroeism

*The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to a league of peace.*

ELSEWHERE in this issue Mr. George Louis Beer makes an interesting argument in favor of a departure in American foreign policy which to the majority of American citizens will seem obnoxious and dangerous. He proposes an intimate association in international politics between Great Britain and the United States. Whatever weight the proposal has is derived from one major consideration. The American nation any more than the nations of Europe cannot escape its share of a general responsibility for the peace of the world; and the only way in which such a responsibility can be sufficiently redeemed is by participation by the United States in European international councils. Mr. Beer proposes a definite association between this country and the European Power with whom we already have a fair understanding, whose interests coincide on the whole with our own, and whose domestic organization and foreign policy might help to make such association serve the pacification of the world. Many results of the war remain dubious, but if it has demonstrated anything it has demonstrated the mutual dependence between the United States and the Power which controls the seas.

Although the proposal may look revolutionary and dangerous to American public opinion, it is in truth less revolutionary than it looks, and probably not as dangerous as our present ambiguous isolation. The American people have never believed in complete national isolation as an agency of peace. They have recognized an obligation to make their foreign policy contribute if not to the peace of the world, at least to that of the western hemisphere. What else has been the real object of the Monroe Doctrine? Behind the blurred meaning of the phrase has always intruded the remote but clearly recognizable ideal of a group of nations inhabiting the two Americas, which would be free from ancient antipathies, from mutual suspicions, from external aggression, and from the exploitation of an autocratic ruling class. The government of the United States has never made any serious attempt to bring into existence this benevolent American international system, but the vision of it has been unmistakably present; and if ever the Doctrine is really challenged by a European or Asiatic Power, it must obviously develop in one of two directions. Either the United States must assume a protectorate over the western hemisphere based upon unquestionable military and naval preponderance, or a Pan-American international system devoted to preserving peace in the western hemisphere must be organized. The isolation which we cherished and which we have been willing to fight for was the isolation of the Americas from Europe, not the isolation of the United States from the world.

What Americans need most to understand is that if they seriously wish to redeem the obligation implicit in the Monroe Doctrine they must extend its scope. If they seriously intend to guard against the invasion of the Americas by European suspicions, antipathies and international aggression, they must themselves carry the fight against these evils into Europe. A secure American international system, no matter how benevolent, cannot remain exclusively American. Its security cannot depend ultimately upon its ability to defend itself against European and Asiatic aggression, because such security would mean an indefinite competition in armaments with foreign Powers. We should merely be organizing insecurity at a tremendous cost, adopting militarism for the sake of protecting ourselves against it. Security in the United States and in America must be primarily a reflection of security in Europe. The whole of America cannot construct a benevolent international organization independent of Europe, any more than one part of it can. The attempted isolation of two continents would be even more disastrously fallacious than the attempted isolation of a single nation.

There should be added the obvious consideration that several European countries already possess dependencies or self-governing dominions in the American hemisphere. These provinces could not be left out of a Pan-American system, but could not be included in it without involving the mother-country. The difficulty is so obvious that American publicists have recently proposed an heroic remedy. They have been insisting that the European nations should be politely but firmly requested to retire from the American continent. It has not been proposed as yet to expel them in case they refuse, but surely their forcible expulsion would be the logical result of an American system whose security depended upon isolation from Europe. As long as they continued to recognize a European allegiance their European political ties would imply obligations incompatible with their geographical Americanism. Take, for instance, the case of Canada during the present war. Canadian soldiers have been sent to France and Belgium in order to kill Germans. Germany would consequently have every military justification in attacking Canada if only her army could land on Canadian soil. Yet if she did attack Canada, American security in so far as it depended on isolation would be fatally compromised, and the army of the United States, whatever it amounted to, would have to be sent to Canadian assistance. Canadians are allowed to kill Germans in Europe, but the Germans cannot be allowed to carry the war into their enemy's countries. This is merely a flagrant instance of the difficulties and absurdities which result from the attempt to secure peace in America without any reference to the forces which are making both for peace and war in Europe.

Any secure Pan-American system must rest upon effective sympathy and support in Europe. If the United States really wishes to secure the Americas against European aggression it must arrange an understanding with the European Power whose assistance would be most serviceable. That Power is plainly the mistress of the seas. An arrangement with Germany, even if in other respects possible or desirable, would involve the enmity of Great Britain and the necessity of building a navy large enough to contest with her the control of the seas. An arrangement with Great Britain would enable the United States to keep its armament within moderate limits, while at the same time providing the utmost possible security for its Pan-American system. In point of fact the Monroe Doctrine has almost from the beginning depended on British goodwill, and no matter what form it assumes in the future, it cannot escape such dependence. It cannot be protected against the dominant sea power except by challenging British maritime supremacy. It cannot effectively be contested except with the consent of the British commonwealth. Thus an alliance with Great Britain would merely formally recognize a situation which has existed for some time and has been emphasized by the circumstances of the war. It would constitute in effect an offer of the support of American resources to Great Britain at a time when British resources were depleted, and in return for a larger measure of national se-



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curity and a persuasive promise of future international pacification.

The New Republic does not endorse a British alliance as an immediately practicable measure of American foreign policy. Even if public opinion were disposed to reach an agreement with England instead of being reluctant or indifferent, the obstacles to be surmounted before a definite treaty could be contrived would be numerous and stubborn. The United States could not enter into an alliance with Great Britain in case Great Britain and her existing Allies at the end of the war continued in combination expressly for the purpose of securing the fruits of a victory over Germany. It could not enter into an alliance with Great Britain until its existing controversy with that country in respect to the control of maritime commerce during war had been adjusted, and a charter of commercial rights satisfactory in some measure to pacific trading nations framed, signed and sealed. Finally, a definition of the scope of the arrangement and the limitation of the liabilities incurred by both parties under it, would involve at the present time enormous and perhaps insuperable difficulties.

But if a formal alliance is not possible in the near future, an increasing measure of mutual understanding is. Such an understanding can gradually be reached provided an enlightened public opinion in the United States seeks to bring it about, and as a means of bringing it about deliberately plans to adjust existing conflicts of policy, to establish routes of agreement, and to clear up the ambiguities of the existing relationship. The initiative should be taken by the agencies of American opinion, not because we would gain more from an understanding than Great Britain would, but because the obstacles to an understanding in this country are more serious than the obstacles in Great Britain. The greatest obstacle is the American tradition of national isolation—the sense that by committing ourselves to European responsibilities we should be surrendering something essential and noble in our heritage of democracy. This tradition is the enemy which must be exposed and exterminated, for unless it is exterminated we shall have misinterpreted the chief lesson of the war and permitted the nation to continue a policy of suicidal exclusiveness. As yet we seem to have learned nothing. The disheartening aspect of the current agitation for military preparedness is that it is animated not by a clear conviction of the international obligations and opportunities of the country, but by a kind of blind suspicion and panic. The proclaimed object of the armament is to defend our national isolation, not to realize a positive policy which will enable us to promote both our own security and the peace of the world. There can be no permanent security unless the pacific nations are welded into an organization sufficiently tough, alert, clear-headed and well equipped to make their joint power count decisively in the balance against an aggressive disturber of the peace. An increasing understanding between Great Britain and the United States would constitute a necessary condition of any League of Peace, and if it could develop into an alliance it might become by virtue of unassailable maritime supremacy the substance and chief support of such a League.

NOVEMBER 20, 1915 (Vol. V, No. 55)

# An Inconclusive Peace

*The theory of peace without victory.*

AN inconclusive ending to the war and a treaty of compromise and adjustment has a much better chance of contributing to the ultimate peace of Europe than has the ruthless subjugation of Germany. The immediate future of civilization in Europe depends upon the ability of the German people to read aright the lesson of the war—the old lesson that aggressive militaristic nationalism does not pay. The lesson will be lost on them if at the end of the war their rulers can exhibit substantial conquests as a proof that it did pay. The lesson will be equally lost on them if they are obliged to accept a treaty of peace based on the certainty of making militarism profitable to their enemies instead of to themselves. They would regard such a treaty as a proof that the Allies were conspiring to humiliate them and to keep them in bondage; and they would remain loyal to their autocratic government, one which was capable of seizing the first opportunity to break out of the bonds. But if they gain nothing of importance by the way as a result of their sacrifices, if they cannot produce even any grievances on which to brood, they may come to see that their enemies are not the foreigners who resisted their aggressive enterprise, but the fellow-countrymen who planned it. Nobody can promise that they will learn the lesson and act upon it, but the expectation that they will opens up the best chance for the immediate future of civilization. The road to such a future runs through revolution both in Germany and Russia, and the revolutions are most likely to take place in case both Germany and Russia do not emerge from the war either decisively victorious or badly beaten.

NOVEMBER 27, 1915 (Vol. V, No. 56)

# The New Isolation

*Pan-Americanism is not possible without an understanding with the British Empire.*

IF we are to arm to safeguard the status quo in this hemisphere, by what twist of thought are we to ignore our relations to the British Empire? Shall we turn our backs on Canada in order to seek some kind of exclusive Americanism on both sides of the equator? A more unreal and unimaginative statesmanship can hardly be conceived. We are the neighbor and natural ally of a Great Power whose interests in this hemisphere coincide in the main with our own. Surely, if our policy is the defense of the status quo, the greatest defense of all would be a tangible understanding with our biggest and best American neighbor.

There is every reason why the United States should cultivate the closest relations with all the countries of this hemisphere. But let us not talk about a Pan-Americanism which excludes the Canadians and ignores the immense rôle played in the past and certain to be played in the future by the Power which commands the sea. Pan-Americanism that passes by the British Empire is a very perilous phrase on which to build an immense increase of armaments.

DECEMBER 11, 1915 (Vol. V, No. 58)

# Aggressive Pacifism

*The seas are the nucleus of international order and constitute a common object of defense. The theory of differential neutrality which is equivalent to the ending of neutrality in the old sense. See President Wilson's statement that the business of neutrality was at an end.*

SINCE the war began, every conceivable attitude towards it has been audibly represented in American public opinion; but among this endless diversity of views we



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may disentangle one as the most popular and typical. Its adherents may or may not have sympathized with one side or the other. They may or may not have passed judgment on the motives and actions of the several fighting nations. But whatever their sympathies or judgments, they did not allow these distractions to influence their opinion as to what American policy should be in relation to the war. The business of the United States as a whole was to be neutral —to be nothing but neutral and to be entirely neutral. The war involved no American interest so important as that of declining to be sucked into its inevitable losses, its cruel sufferings and its malignant hatreds. To these people neutrality was not merely a legal status or a shifty expedient to avoid responsibility, it was itself the prime responsibility owed by the American government to the American people. If it were neglected or undervalued we would be recreant to the salutary national tradition of inoffensive pacific isolation.

The most illuminating discussion and the most damaging exposure of this typical American attitude towards the war is contained in a book recently published by Mr. Norman Angell, entitled, The World's Highway. Mr. Angell is as far as any American can be from wishing to involve the United States in any exclusively European controversy, but he is also far from believing that we have made any contribution to peace merely by staying out of the war, or that we have exhausted American responsibility in relation to it merely by acting on special and exclusively American interests. On the contrary he attributes most of our present perplexities to the practical inefficiency and moral ineptitude of converting neutrality into a dogma. His argument is an exhaustive indictment of neutrality as the only alternative to belligerency. So long as we consider the neutral status, no matter how conscientious and profitable, a sufficient answer to aggressive belligerency, so long will we remain ineffective, insecure, and even insincere friends of peace. A nation which pretends to make its influence in the world count against war cannot remain satisfied with a system of public law which confines non-fighting nations to neutrality. Belligerency is so positive, so insistent and so inexorable, that if neutrality is the only alternative, the world will come to be organized primarily for war rather than peace.

That belligerency is beginning to invade the domain of a merely inoffensive neutrality is sufficiently indicated by the recent change in American public opinion in relation to armaments. In the fall of 1914 the great majority of Americans believed themselves to be sufficiently protected by the screen of inoffensive neutrality against a belligerent world, and they did not rise to the demand for increasing armament. Now they are rising, and their response constitutes an implicit criticism of their traditional faith in neutrality. They have made of neutrality a dogma because, in a choice confined to neutrality and belligerency, they expected to remain neutral. They are now renouncing that expectation. Timidly and with a bad conscience but still irresistibly, they are seeking to preserve their isolation by preparing for war rather than by turning their backs upon it. These preparations may be and are being justified as necessary to national security, but if huge armaments are necessary to security, that is because an inoffensive and comparatively unarmed isolation brings with it insecurity. The American people, whether they realize it or not, have abandoned the tradition that neutral isolation is a sufficient protection against war.

What policy have we substituted for it? To what end are we renouncing our inoffensive neutrality? We claim that it is for self-defense, but if we are to fight, every fighter knows that a merely defensive policy is suicidal. It is as indefensible on political as on military grounds. By arming exclusively to protect American independence, to avoid European entanglements and to preserve our sovereign isolation, we should be domesticating the most dubious aspect of Europeanism and repudiating the most salutary. We should be competing with Europe in battleships and army corps, but not in the attempt at coöperation and mutual understanding. We should be disturbing the Balance of Power without contributing anything to a European concert. The idea is intolerable. There was some sense in an unarmed inoffensive neutrality. There can be none in a neutral isolation which seeks to cure its own anaemia by pumping into its cheeks the crimson flush of belligerent intoxication. Armament is an essentially offensive mechanism, and in the long run must be used for offensive purposes. American armament will be a disastrous crime unless it helps to make American policy aggressively pacific.

Aggressive pacifism is the third alternative which will rescue the United States from the fatal choice between sheer belligerence and neutral isolation. Such pacifism might be impossible if the only medium of communication among the nations of the world was the land, because power based on land tends to be exclusive, jealous, competitive and particularist. But fortunately there is the sea as well as the land. The seas, which once were supposed to divide the peoples of the world one from another, have gradually become the most substantial medium of international intercourse. As a consequence of improvements in navigation, effectual policing and the beginnings of an international order, the seas have become comparatively free. Their freedom has made of them the highway of the world. As Mr. Angell says, the nations which use the highway form a super-national society to the full extent of that use. As travelers on the highway they have common interests in making the traffic secure and remunerative. They have a common obligation to seek a maritime organization which will promote these common interests, and they have a common opportunity to use the concert of the sea as at least a check upon the discord of the land. The United States is a most important member of this international maritime society. Its future lies upon the seas more than that of Germany, and only less than that of the British Empire. American isolation is a delusion because American obligations to the maritime community can never be discharged by neutrality. If we fulfil these obligations, a way of securing peace for ourselves and for the rest of the world opens up which is far more effective and inspiring than that of either merely shirking war or merely preparing for it.

This maritime community can be subjected to a system of control whose ultimate object shall be the pacification of the world. Such control exists at present, but it is a precarious and incomplete control. It is insecure because it is exercised by only one nation, and as an instrument of national rather than international policy. Great Britain is the mistress of the seas. Her organ of control is the British fleet. She has assumed the right to rule all trade over the seas, even trade between neutrals, which may be of possible assistance to her enemies. Although for the present this control is absolute, it will not remain absolute. The exercise of so much power over the welfare and destiny of other nations is an enormously valuable privilege. It cannot be exercised by one nation without provoking an inevitable, dangerous and expensive rivalry. Great Britain has out-



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built her rivals in the past, but she cannot continue to do so indefinitely. She will have to share her power, and by sharing it to make it both more complete and more secure. By offering to share the burden of this power and thus placing it beyond the possibility of challenge, and by insisting in return on an unmistakably pacific definition of its controlling purpose, the United States and other inoffensive neutrals would be adopting an aggressively pacific policy. They would be renouncing the irresponsibility of neutral isolation, and consecrating, if necessary, the terrible responsibility of becoming belligerent.

For a neutral nation like the United States the kind of aggressive pacifism just suggested involves, as compared with neutral isolation, certain severe losses. It involves the total suppression of trade with any belligerent which offends the code of public law. Such suppression may mean ruin to individual merchants, and they are likely to prefer consequently the traditional policy of avoiding the entanglement and of standing out for all accessible trade with any and all belligerents. But in a world which was seeking a practicable method of organizing peace, adherence to this traditional policy would brand the United States as an unscrupulous commercial profiteer. We should remain, as we are now, the accomplice of the belligerent Power which happens to control the sea; and like most accomplices we should be victimized by those we served and hated by those we injured. Our national policy in time of war would be prompted by no higher object than that of manufacturing the misfortunes, the mistakes and the faults of other nations into wages for American labor and profits for American business men.

If we are to adopt the sounder policy of aggressive pacifism, the nation should certainly insure the individual merchants against the losses which the declaration of a trade embargo against an illegitimate belligerent would involve; but the national responsibility for the interests of private foreign traders during war should cease at that point. The persistent attempt to promote such trade, whatever its effect on national welfare, would place us in an invidious position. We should be applying to foreign trade a principle which we no longer applied to domestic trade—the principle that all business was good business and deserved to be let alone. The rest of the nations would resent it. They are resenting it now. Our present unpopularity is the result of the commercial selfishness underlying our policy of neutral isolation. This selfishness may have been excusable during the early days of the industrial revolution, but standards have changed. Stubborn adherence to it, now that the vista of a better way has been opened up, would intensify European resentment. We should become the object of general contempt and cordial dislike, and we should deserve it.

JANUARY 15, 1916 (Vol. V, No. 63)

# The War as We See It

A reply to a letter by Mr. George Santayana: *The theory of benevolent neutrality; American participation in a world concert; peace without victory.*

THE New Republic in its comment on the war has been trying to redistribute the lump in order to find in the European system a place for the United States other than that of a full belligerent. In making the redistribution we have accepted many of the claims and standards of the Allies. German aggression has been declared to be a danger, not merely to the independence of France and the security of the British Empire, but to the peace of Europe and the existence of international order. Our own interests were engaged because a Europe in which Belgium could be so wantonly violated was a Europe in the counsels of which the American nation could not share, and against which it would have to arm for its own protection. We approved the idea of a protest against the violation of Belgium, not because we believed the country was prepared to back up the protest by any exercise of force, but because the recording of American disapproval might have aroused among the Americans of the interior the needed sense of international obligation, and might have resulted at the end of the war in the explicit participation by this country in a new guarantee of Belgian neutrality. As a necessary consequence of such an expression of disapproval, the United States would have been committed to a benevolent attitude towards the Allied cause, but its benevolence would not commit it to the assumption of an unlimited liability for the debts of the Allies. Sometime a method will be devised which permits a nation to exercise military and economic pressure on a belligerent without becoming the unqualified partner of its enemies. But American statesmen of to-day have not the initiative or the ingenuity to devise such a method. They still think and act in terms of political absolutes. They still prescribe war, which is the great melting-pot of desirable discriminations, as an heroic remedial purge for diseases in the heart and head of the international body.

Inasmuch as no official protest was made against the invasion of Belgium, and as the path of legal neutrality was selected, The New Republic has argued in favor of stretching that neutrality in the direction of benevolence towards the Allies. The policy of benevolent neutrality did not require or even permit the surrender of the rights of American citizens under international law, in so far as they were affected by the military and naval policy of the Allies. Their explicit surrender would have been equivalent to a measurable participation in the war, and would have gravely impaired American independence without assuring corresponding benefits. We needed to be somewhat neutral as well as somewhat benevolent in our neutrality. And there was and is a way of doing it. While still asserting the legal rights of American citizens under the law of nations as the clearest existing evidence of that international order for which the Allies claimed to be fighting, the American government could use its own discretion in pushing its protests home. That is what has been done up to date, and that is what, as The New Republic has insisted since the beginning of the controversy, the American government should continue to do until the end.

The New Republic has argued in favor of a benevolently neutral policy towards the Allies on the ground of national interests as well as of international. The relation of the United States to the British Empire differs from its relation with any other Power. Putting aside all considerations based on a common language and legal tradition, which might well be a matter of indifference to Americans of continental ancestry, the two most important facts of American political geography conspire to demand a special arrangement with the British Empire. On our northern frontier is situated a great and growing self-governing commonwealth under the British flag, with which a quarrel would be disastrous. The United States must reach a complete political understanding with Canada or be condemned to a



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perverted domestic development and comparative external impotence. No less important is the special relation which the United States must occupy to the Power which controls the sea. Our isolation has come to an end because the ocean has been made a safe and effective means of communication, rather than an obstacle to it; for that very reason an understanding with the ruler of the seas as to the rule of the sea is indispensable to American security. The location of sea power and the objects for which it is used are involved in every phase of American foreign policy. Eventually we must either compete with the British merchant marine and navy or devise ways and means of cooperation; and manifestly coöperation is the better part. The United States might conceivably enter the European system as the associate of the British Empire, but if it became the enemy of Great Britain it would have to remain outside. In that event its influence would be restricted to the two Americas, and its resources would be wasted in friction with Canada and in building and maintaining a navy sufficient to keep the New World artificially separated from the Old. The policy demanded by the ending of American isolation is an explicit and intimate political association with Great Britain, Canada, and Australasia.

But precisely because The New Republic attaches so much importance to political association between the United States and Great Britain, it has argued against the adoption of a war and peace policy by Great Britain which would force the American advocates of such an association to overcome insuperable obstacles. There is a danger that as a result of the war Great Britain may assume liabilities which will make a partnership with her impracticable. Every American advocate of a closer understanding must expect to argue in favor of the assumption by the United States of many responsibilities from which we are now emancipated, in return for the great advantages accruing from a partnership; but there are some liabilities the assumption of which cannot be considered. If the Allies should attempt as the result of a decisive victory to secure themselves against a renewal of German aggression by destroying " Prussianism "—which can only mean the destruction of effective German national organization—any agitation in the United States for a political partnership with Great Britain would have to be abandoned. The United States will not connive at a treaty of peace which aims to destroy the national organization necessary to German independence. Neither will it purchase a costly interest in a permanent international feud. In putting such a price upon its friendship the United States would only be clinging to those principles which the Allies have claimed as their own. American support has been demanded, and in the case of an influential part of American public opinion has been granted, on the ground that the Allies were fighting for an international object. But if nations are to adjust their policy to principles of international right, Germany and Bulgaria can claim the benefit of those principles as well as Belgium, Serbia and France.

FEBRUARY 26, 1916 (Vol. VI, No. 69)

# The Way of the Neutral

*The submarine in challenging the old sea power will make necessary its ultimate reorganization.*

THUS the advent of the submarine as a commerce destroyer, just because it threatens to bring about anarchy and terrorism on the high seas, can be used to transform the seas in war as well as peace into really international territory—the territory on which a system of international law has been defined and is enforced. As long as sea power can be legally used to serve the exclusive national ambitions of its possessor or to frustrate the legitimate national ambitions of a nation not possessing it, Great Britain cannot expect the coöperation of neutral nations in sustaining and extending the prevailing system of marine law; but such coöperation may well be obtained whenever Great Britain is willing to internationalize both the marine order and the power necessary to enforce it. And if such a system could be organized, the duty of the inoffensive neutral during war might be more costly than it now is, but it certainly would be less equivocal, humiliating and irresponsible. There would no longer be neutrals and belligerents on the high seas during war. There would only be rebels and the force of the international government. Sea power would become the weapon of international disapproval, acting according to predetermined rules similar to those now suggested by the League to Enforce Peace. The neutral nation would thereafter assume some of the cost of wars which might not involve any national interest; but it would be sufficiently compensated. Neutrality would no longer involve the danger of being either the victim or the parasite of the belligerent Powers.

MARCH 18, 1916 (Vol. VI, No. 72)

# An Appeal to the President

After the sinking of the Sussex:

*An attempt to define American participation in the war; the theory that neutrality is obsolescent; that American action should count for a league of peace; the theory of peace without victory.*

SIR: A week ago Thursday night you spoke to members of your party, but you appealed to the whole nation. You stood in the shadow of what the public believed was a break with Germany. You used words then which no man in your position would have used unless they were meant to indicate what was in your mind about the crisis which is upon us. You asked us whether we were ready to go in only when the interests of America are coincident with the interests of mankind. Those are brave words, and if we judge the American people correctly they are ready to go in on these terms. But they will want you to enunciate not only a great aspiration but a great policy. It is to help what little we can towards formulating such a policy that we venture to address you.

To do that it is necessary to analyze America's policy since the war began. We have been officially neutral. We have claimed the protection which international law promises to neutral life and trade. We have claimed the right to export munitions to any belligerent who was physically able to fetch them. We have seen the protection of international law broken down by both groups of fighting Powers, murderously on the part of Germany, quietly and effectively on the part of Great Britain. We have seen the law of nations grossly violated in the case of Belgium, in lesser ways by the Allies. We have seen the smaller neutrals like Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Greece helpless in the great conflict. The neutrals have proved their impotence to protect their rights in the midst of war.

At last one form of outrage upon us has become intolerable. Germany's conduct of submarine warfare over-



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shadows everything else, and you have led us to the breaking point. We are threatening to suspend diplomatic relations. But you must realize better than any one else that this in itself would be an empty gesture unless there were behind it the distinct understanding that another outrage meant action of a kind which would damage Germany. Therefore, with the rupture of relations we are brought to the verge of war. Let us remember what this means. It means that we are abandoning neutrality in order to preserve the recognized rights of a neutral. What possibility is there, Mr. President, that we can by fighting attain the object for which we go to war? To declare war now in the old-fashioned way is to join the Allies. This means first of all that we accept the British Orders in Council as the basis of sea law. We yield at once a very large portion of the neutral rights for which we have been contending.

But there is a deeper consideration. Can we by going to war with Germany obtain the kind of guaranty which we desire? Suppose that in conjunction with the Allies we beat Germany to the ground and are in a position to dictate the terms of peace. What guaranty can we extract from Germany which will prevent for the future such crimes as the sinking of the Lusitania? We can obtain a promise from Germany. Nothing more. But promises we have already had, and the reason we are now in a crisis with Germany is not that she will not promise but that she will not fulfill her promise.

Moreover, if you break with Germany now, if you declare war upon her, on what terms will you resume relations, on what terms will you make peace? How will you know when you have won what you are contending for? When Germany sues for peace, offers apologies and reparation, and makes promises for the future? You have had all these things from Germany, and the fearful fact is that when military necessity is great enough, the promises are worthless. Then, too, if you go into the war, on what basis will you go in? Will you sign the pact of the Allies not to make a separate peace? You could not do that. You would not dare to pledge the future of this country in a compact the purposes of which have never been defined. You can not pledge us to Russia and Italy and Japan. You would not entangle us in the ambitions of Italy for the control of Trieste and the Dalmatian coast, in the ambitions of Russia to obtain Constantinople.

Yet if we declare war, join the Allies, sign their pact, we shall have begun for the purpose of vindicating our right to travel at sea, but we shall end by fighting to change the political control of the Near East. And when it is all over we shall not have the slightest idea whether we have attained the object for which we fought.

This, Mr. President, is a situation which requires a different kind of action, a situation which offers you an unparalleled opportunity for constructive leadership. With all respect we submit the following suggestions:

Neutrality in the old meaning of the term has ceased to be possible. It has no way of defending itself except by abandoning its neutrality. The reason why neutrality is so helpless is that each neutral has tried to protect its specific rights under the law of nations, whereas the true principle is to uphold the law whether your rights are violated or not. Only when all nations are ready to act in behalf of the general rule will that rule come to have any binding force. A common defense of rights is the only way individual rights can be maintained.

What does this mean? It means that we must abolish the old doctrine of neutrality. It means that we no longer intend to be neutral between the violator and his victim. We have learned from this war that one attack on law is followed by another, and that if lawbreaking is permitted at one point the anarchy infects every one. Therefore, we must say that from now on the United States is not neutral. It intends to use its moral power, its economic resources, and in some cases its military force against the aggressor.

How does it define the aggressor? The aggressor is the nation that will not submit its quarrel to international inquiry, that will not suspend action until the world has had a chance to pass judgment upon it, or that pursues its quarrel after the world has decided against it. With such a nation the United States will have no intercourse, against it will be employed the resources of America.

How can this principle be applied in the present crisis? By announcing to Germany that we shall not only break off negotiations but aid her enemies until she agrees to abandon submarine warfare against commerce, until she agrees to evacuate Belgium, France, and Serbia, to indemnify Belgium, and to accept the principle that in the future all nations shall use their resources against the Power which refuses to submit its quarrel to international inquiry. If Germany accepts this program, we shall agree to resume intercourse, and not to furnish special aid to her enemies; we shall agree to become one of the guarantors of Belgium's integrity, and to assist in maintaining the inviolability of buffer states which may be created after the war by refusing to furnish their invaders with supplies of any kind. Furthermore, we shall accord to Germans equal rights with Americans in all American protectorates, and we shall refuse to furnish any kind of aid to any Power which does not apply the open door in its protectorates and non-self-governing territories.

If you adopt some such policy as that, Mr. President, you will have turned this crisis to the service of mankind. You will have done more than any one else has ever done to put a sanction behind the law of nations. You will have transformed what may be a meaningless rupture into a significant event. You will have a thousand times better chance of stopping specific submarine outrages, and at the same time you will have done a very great deal towards organizing the world against the lawbreaker.

The worst that can happen to this plan, Mr. President, is that it can fail. But you will have set mankind thinking, and you will be in a position to use the older and cruder methods of plunging into war without definition of purpose or sight of the goal. But what if it is a success? You will have established the precedent that an injury to one is an injury to all, you will have put the power of the United States behind nations like Belgium which are the wards of mankind, and can exist only in a world where international law is respected. You will have pledged this country to the principle that only in a world where Belgium is safe can the United States be safe. You may lead Germany back into the family of nations, ready to acknowledge that there is a greater law than the law of her interests.

A Germany which accepted the program suggested would be a chastened Germany, a Germany with whom liberal Europe could begin to negotiate. It has been your ideal, and the ideal of the American people, that we might make some contribution to the healing of this disaster. Until now there has been no opportunity. To have intervened would have been to meddle. But here our rights are involved. We have some standing in the conflict. We



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have injuries to redress, we have great power to exert. The opportunity has come. For when you break with Germany you are in a position to state what the break shall mean, and on what terms you will resume intercourse. Make those terms coincide with an international program. Make this crisis count. Here is a way by which you can translate into action the aspiration of your speech on Jefferson Day. There is a way of making the interests of America coincident with the interests of mankind. Here is a program which meets your splendid challenge:

> Are you ready for the test? Have you the courage to go in? Have you the courage to come out according as the balance is disturbed or readjusted for the interests of humanity?

You stand, Mr. President, before a choice such as comes to few men. You are at the crest of opportunity.

APRIL 22, 1916 (Vol. VI, No. 77)

# The Need of a Positive Policy

*The theory of differential neutrality; its consequences and its future.*

HOWEVER one may approach the problem of American foreign policy and with whatever phase of it one may deal—whether the present submarine difficulty with Germany, the relations with the Allies, future sea law, an Anglo-American agreement, the Open Door—one obstinate fact persistently intrudes itself. That fact is the refusal of the American people to face squarely the necessary implications of their undoubted decision that German victory is undesirable and that they will approve no policy likely to promote it. Almost since the beginning of the war they have attempted to combine essential unneutrality with an avoidance of its necessary consequences—which need not of course include military coöperation with Germany's enemies. While the country realizes that it is in opinion and act unneutral in the sense that it is not at all indifferent as to the outcome of the war and intends in no way to lose sight of its partiality in its policy, there is no general realization of the political implications of its decision; of the extent to which the government, in the attempt to be guided by that decision and yet to maintain a diplomatic, legalistic and technical neutrality, is paralyzed in its defense of American and neutral right. Still less is there any realization that the prolongation of this equivocal attitude may cause the national resources of America in the future to become an immense premium upon international anarchy and disorder. The fact of real unneutrality as distinct from the diplomatic fiction, American public opinion sufficiently realizes. What it does not understand is the actual relation of that fact to the country's foreign problems.

Let us see first how it has affected the conduct of the submarine affair.

As early as February, 1915, Germany said in effect that her submarine policy was in reprisal for the English violation of sea law as embodied in the Declaration of London, and that if America would secure from England the observance of that code Germany would abandon her submarine warfare against merchantmen. Now the Declaration of London corresponded broadly to the conception of sea law for which American has always stood. She had, as Professor Clapp and others have pointed out, an instrument ready to her hand—an embargo on munitions, justified by the clause of the 1907 Hague Convention which allows a change of rules as to the export of munitions during a war "in cases where experience shows the necessity of such action in order to safeguard the nation's rights"— for compelling English observance of the Declaration. Had America taken the course of threatening the use of that instrument she would have protected her rights not only as against Germany but as against England. She could have secured, as Professor Clapp points out, a great victory for neutral right, "recovered and established for all time."

And this, if America had been really indifferent as to which side won, is just the course that she would have taken. She did not take it because American public opinion would not have sanctioned a course of action that made for German victory. Once let the American people see that their action is leading in that direction and they would also see that to protect temporary trade rights at the cost of British defeat would be to sacrifice the lesser to the greater. Such was the real reason why proposals like that of Professor Clapp were not adopted.

But the American government in its dealing with Germany was unable to avow the truth. If it had been able to disregard technical neutrality it would have said to Germany: "We are unable to take decisive action against England for the maintenance of the Declaration of London because to do so would be to aid your cause. And we fear that. We fear that its success might be a menace to us. While England's methods threaten neutral trade, yours threaten neutral existence, and we cannot act as though those things were of equal import to us and the world. Give us some assurance that your ultimate international policy does not involve menace and unrest; define, that is, the terms upon which you would be prepared to make peace and live your life in the community of nations in the future; and then, if those terms satisfy us that your cause is at bottom no more aggressive than that of the Allies, we shall return to real neutrality; we shall be in a position to enforce the Declaration of London, to resume normal relations with you, to withdraw our hostility."

But the old political fiction of neutrality has made that impossible. The submarine issue has not been settled, and until we get a more cohesive international order we can never know whether it has been settled or not, either in this or in future wars. America's international position remains at the mercy of accident—the nerves of a frightened or drunken submarine commander who, just at a moment when other issues embitter the situation, sinks an American ship and drowns a hundred or a thousand people. The psychological need for action would cause popular support to go to "the party of action"—bad action, railroading the country into war of unlimited liability and indefinite association with the varying territorial and political ambitions of the Allies.

And when the diplomatic fiction has been completed we get—what? A promise that it won't occur again. If we can hope that the demonstration of America's readiness to fight "at the drop of the hat," a readiness backed it may be in the future by a great American navy, will deter a hard-pressed combatant from using these methods of warfare, how comes it that the very belligerent now in question is unrestrained by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Is the American navy of the future to be successful where these have failed? In the meantime the American failure to take effective action with reference to the maintenance of the Declaration of London involves temporarily at least the



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sacrifice of rights which America has always in the past been ready to defend at the cost of war. American power stands effectively for neither the life nor property of non-combatants in war, for neither neutral right nor neutral existence.

But the story does not end there. Official neutrality compels the American government to imply to Germany that the American government would be ready to sanction the sale of munitions to Germany if she could come and fetch them. This obvious falsehood deprives the just decision of the American people against Germany of any value as a deterrent of future aggression. After this war the Germans will say—and they will say it on the strength of the position now maintained by the American government—" If we could have commanded the sea we could have transferred the economic alliance of America from our enemies to ourselves. The important thing in the future therefore is not to be concerned about respecting international obligations like the Belgian treaty, but to command the sea. If you can do that the national resources of America are at your disposal whether your cause be good or bad, aggressive or defensive. We have the assurance of the American government on that point." The vast national resources of America are to act not as a silent pressure on the side of the good behavior of nations and the respect of treaty right, but on the side of naval rivalry irrespective of right or treaty obligation or the general interest of nations.

To be sure, it will always be open to America to refuse to supply a country in the position of Germany even if it did command the sea. But so long as the prospective combatants *do not know beforehand* what in America's view will constitute good or bad behavior, what she will regard as aggressive and menacing and what defensive, they will always assume that the chances are on the side of their being able to buy the munitions and supplies if they can fetch them. A nation's policy always looks defensive or defensible to itself. No people is able to make a very accurate estimate of foreign opinion of its own conduct. Seventy million Germans, including men of great intellectual equipment, are still marvelling because the world cannot see they are fighting a purely defensive war forced upon them by the unprovoked aggression of jealous and truculent neighbors. Unless there is some definite and unmistakable criterion of what constitutes an unjustifiable war, they or others will always count upon being able, once they command the sea, to command also that economic alliance of neutrals that at present goes with it.

Suppose that twenty years ago America, desiring to attach to international law some great interest which would tend to make its observance obviously to the interests of the nations, had said: " Any nation proceeding to hostilities against another without first having submitted its difference at least to inquiry, or any nation invading a neutralized state, or any nation failing to put into operation in its protectorates the principle of the Open Door will not be able to secure American supplies, munitions or credit for its war, whether it obtains command of the sea or not."

If we could imagine such a policy adopted even by the United States alone, every prospective belligerent would desire to observe the rule and to put itself right with America by so doing, whether it expected to command the sea or not. If it expected to command the sea it would observe the rule in order to take full advantage of its power, and secure the economic alliance of America to its cause; and if it did not expect to command the sea, it would equally desire to observe the rule in order to deprive its enemy of most of the advantages of such command; in other words, to have America do what the Germans so keenly desire her now to do: embargo the export of supplies and munitions. Thus, to all belligerents—prospective commanders of the sea or not—would there be the strong motive to observe the rules laid down; a behavior which would prevent most wars and give international organization and machinery a chance. There would be set up a strong tendency to international arrangement; it would have behind it the push of a great material advantage: America's economic alliance, and its refusal to the enemy. Respect for the rights of others, and of some means of determining those rights, would for the first time in history be a definite and visible military asset. America's enormous resources would then be acting as a silent and potential power for international order.

MAY 20, 1916 (Vol. VII, No. 81)

# Mr. Wilson's Great Utterance

*On Mr. Wilson's adoption of the idea that America should participate in a league of peace.*

MR. WILSON has chosen a good moment to make his historic statement—and it may justly be regarded as the first practical step towards peace. When America is talked of as peacemaker, Europeans have naturally asked what we have to contribute for that work. While we clung to isolation we had nothing to offer, but now we have committed ourselves to upholding the peace of Europe. We have said to the nations: " You may count on us to employ our power to curb any nation which attempts to destroy the peace you organize." Mr. Wilson has introduced a new factor, and a decisive one, into the calculations of European governments. Think what it means. To England it means our aid as against an aggressor and an end to the fear that the British commonwealth can be challenged and destroyed. To France it means that in a war of defense she would be guaranteed by the joint power of Britain and America. To Belgium it means that she becomes the ward not only of these competing nations, but also of a Power which cannot be accused of any selfish designs upon her. The future violator of Belgium would face at once the united arms of western civilization. To Germany it means security in return for the abandonment of aggression. It offers her the choice between arming again to meet all Europe and finding real safety in a league of the Western World. Let that alternative once be offered to the German people, and if radical and social democratic Germany does not make the decent choice, it is because Germany is incapable of learning anything. You can fool and frighten a people into aggression once, but when the price is as terrible as the price has been, you cannot do it again if there is a plain alternative in sight.

JUNE 3, 1916 (Vol. VII, No. 83)

# America to Europe, August, 1916

The second anniversary of the war: *American participation in a league of peace depends on a liberal settlement of the war.*

AMERICA'S action is contingent upon European policy. That is to say, the amount of responsibility America can be made to assume will depend on America's



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judgment of the good faith, the liberalism and the ambitions of the major belligerents. It is a tremendous task to arouse the United States from its isolation, and it will not be achieved unless the American people can be convinced that they are exchanging their historic policy for a policy of greater promise.

To Englishmen especially we feel that we have a right to speak frankly, and to tell them what we fear. They must not be deceived by the attitude of Americans living in England, or by upper-class feeling in the big cities of the United States. There is a school of American opinion which is more pro-Ally than the Allies, as full of futile hate against Germany as the Morning Post or the National Review. There are Americans who have always looked upon the British Tory as the apex of the social pyramid. But though noisy and prominent they are utterly unrepresentative, and their political power in a matter like this is very small. Two other factions in our population need to be considered, the organized Irish and Germans. The Dublin executions have done more to drive America back to isolation than any other event since the war began. It will be a long time before official America will be able to come to open agreement with any alliance of which Britain is the dominant partner. As for the Americans of German descent, their pro-Germanism has been a good deal exaggerated because of the action of leaders whom they have not repudiated. In our judgment they would not prove an insuperable obstacle to American participation in European affairs, provided that the status quo America was called upon to guarantee were not vindictive to Germany.

JULY 29, 1916 (Vol. VII, No. 91)

# International Security

*Peace without victory in relation to American participation in a league of peace.*

ALTHOUGH possible terms of peace are being busily specified and discussed in the British and German press, all of the belligerents continue to be the victims of a common blindness which condemns the discussion to futility. They all claim to be fighting an essentially defensive war; they all propose annexations of territory supposed to be necessary to their own future safety; but none of them apparently considers how far their proposals to provide security for themselves deny security to their enemies. All of them, that is, are still thinking in terms of an exclusive and jealous national sovereignty, which forbids them to treat others as they would like to be treated themselves. None of them has learned the manifest and ultimate lesson of the war—the lesson that just as individual security is inseparable from social security so national security is inseparable from international security.

This myopia is shared by everyone except an infinitesimally small minority in all the belligerent countries. One would expect the Leo Maxses of England to be utterly divided from the von Tirpitzes of Germany, but a gulf almost equally impassable separates such comparatively moderate Englishmen as Viscount Grey from such comparatively moderate Germans as von Bethmann-Hollweg. The British Foreign Secretary, in a recent speech whose specific subject was international organization, warned Americans who might be interested in seeking a substantial foundation for international order, to keep off the premises throughout the duration of the war and the negotiations for peace. The Allies could not afford to consider international values until after they had emasculated Germany. Neither is the German Chancellor more reassuring. The treaty of peace which the more moderate party in Germany is known to favor, provides for a withdrawal from France and Belgium, but it also provides for the control by Germany of the route to Constantinople, and the addition to the military resources which the Central Powers possessed at the beginning of the war, of Turkey, Bulgaria, and part of Serbia. To an Englishman or Frenchman the Chancellor's terms would look merely like a confirmation and an aggravation of the German menace, to escape which they are fighting at such a terrible cost. Yet they are impatient of any suggested method of escape except that of cutting off Germans and Austrians and Hungarians from effective influence on the political and economic future of the Balkans and beyond. Turkey and the Slavic parts of Austria-Hungary are to be shared among the Allies, and the Germans and Hungarians are to be separated from the Black and the Mediterranean Seas by an impregnable military and political barrier.

As long as the moderates of the major belligerent countries propose such terms as these, they no less than their more extreme fellow-countrymen are helping to bring about two ruinous results. They are consenting to the kind of war which must be fought to a bitter and an indefinitely remote end, irrespective of the appalling sacrifices which will have to be made of treasure, human suffering and life, and accumulated social credit. They are equally laying the foundation for a treaty of peace which would merely perpetuate and redistribute in a more intensified form the anarchy and the insecurity in which the war itself originated. If the war is to be fought until one or both parties are exhausted or vanquished, and if the treaty of peace is to ignore the need of common security and provide only for the security of the victors, the international Jacobins, like the Leo Maxses and von Tirpitzes, rather than the Greys and the von Bethmann-Hollwegs, are showing superior penetration into the disastrous meaning of the struggle. In so far as the security of Germany or France depends in the future upon the emasculation of their enemies, it is assuredly the duty of the French and the German governments in the event of victory to protect their own people by making the emasculation complete and irretrievable. This would mean in the case of Germany the retention of Belgium and the French iron district; in the case of the Allies the seizure of the German fleet, the breaking down of her national organization, the curtailment of her future armament, the wholesale annexation of territory and the guaranteeing of these results by the indefinite military occupation of large parts of the country.

We are aware how deeply Englishmen and Frenchmen resent the classification of their own nations with Germany. Germany, they say, is plainly the aggressor in the present war and German military power and political ambitions have constituted the active menace to the peace of the world and the safety of other nations. But admitting a measure of truth in these claims, as we are willing to do, there is a crushing retort to the proposed policy of making German aggressive intentions the excuse for promoting French and British safety by isolating and bottling up the German nation. In any contest for power, a result always counts for very much more than an intention. Even if France and Great Britain were drawn into the war for defensive reasons, they are coöperating with other nations, such as Russia, Italy and Rumania, who are frankly fighting to make certain territorial gains at the expense of the Central Powers and Turkey. The net consequences of their coöperation will be precisely the same as if they had all actually



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conspired to despoil Turkey and Austria-Hungary and to reduce Germany to comparative political impotence. It is this implacable result which will sink into the hearts of the German people, which will confirm all that they have been told about the unscrupulous cupidity of their enemies, which will paralyze the future movement of German liberalism and which will justify the German nation in the resolution to recover by means of patient and sleepless cunning what they may have yielded to an overwhelming preponderance of numbers and force.

Assuming that Germany will be mutilated but not broken by the treaty of peace, the government could undertake the work of rehabilitation with as good a chance of ultimate success as France had in 1872. There would still be 85,000,000 of Germans and Hungarians so situated in the center of Europe as to be vulnerable to a combination of surrounding enemies, but because of their central position, powerful for military purposes beyond their numbers. They would have on their eastern frontier the huge threatening mass of the Russian Empire, increased by the smaller Slavic states and economically invigorated by the possession of Constantinople. The Germans could not hope to attack Russia with any chance of success, both because of Russia's enormous increase of power as the result of the war, and because such an attack would certainly be resisted by France and Great Britain. But they could plan to detach Russia from the Alliance and to secure her connivance in an ultimate attack on France and Great Britain. In so far as Russia could be bought off, German safety would be at least for the time being assured and German energy would be released for industrial, commercial and naval expansion. Moreover, the Germans could offer Russia strong inducements to consider such a bargain. They could tempt her with a treaty guaranteeing her in the possession of all the fruits of the war, a more favorable market for the sale of her wheat, livestock and raw materials, and a benevolent attitude towards the projects of future annexation which would inevitably be cherished as the result of such a successful career of conquest. A realignment of this kind, if it could be brought about, would constitute the gravest menace to domestic liberalism and international peace conceivable in the modern world. The mere dread of it would rob the western Powers of the sense of security which they propose to derive from the partial emasculation of Germany, and even if Russia remained faithful to the present Alliance, she could always force France and Great Britain to agree to her aggressive projects by playing upon their apprehensions of the consequences of a Russo-German understanding.

The lesson is plain. If France and Great Britain consent to the partial or the complete emasculation of Germany and the corresponding aggrandizement of Russia, they are making themselves dangerously dependent on Russian forbearance. They cannot afford to weaken Germany unless they are prepared to trust their own future security and that of Continental Europe to Russian good will. As a consequence of weakening Germany they would be making Russia more necessary to them and themselves less necessary to Russia. If they are honestly seeking security for the future rather than national aggrandizement, they will have to obtain it by the adoption of a very different method. Entire security is for the present an unattainable result, but even the partial security which is attainable cannot be enjoyed by a few without being enjoyed by all. It can be achieved only by an international organization, capable of concentrating a decisive array of economic and naval force behind the rules which guarantee public safety. If the Allies wish to soothe the not unnatural apprehensions of the German people and prevent the treaty of peace, like all past treaties of peace, from becoming the instigator of future wars, they must build their own security not on an increase of their military strength compared to that of Germany, but upon the attempt to bring the neutral world into the balance against Germany—in case Germany repeats her offense. This they can best do by incorporating the principles underlying the League to Enforce Peace in the proposed settlement of the war. The ignoring of these principles in the treaty of peace will result in the alienation of the neutrals, in the embitterment of the Central Powers, and the attaching of a fatal suspicion to any subsequent effort to form the needed international organization. A league to enforce such a peace would be an association for the underwriting of an unsound security, for the distribution of a poor risk among innocent outsiders. The United States is willing to join a European peace association provided the security is good; but it will hardly consent to buying an interest in the most dangerous international feud in the history of the world.

NOVEMBER 11, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 106)

# Germany and the League of Peace

*Germany indispensable to a league of peace*

IN order to convert the league to enforce peace into a fruitful experiment in international organization the accession of Germany is as desirable for one set of reasons as the accession of the United States is for another. The strategic situation of the Germans in the very center of Europe makes them of necessity either the most serviceable bulwark of international security or its most dangerous enemy. In the long run they would certainly succeed in dividing and destroying any league which ignored German interests and the need of German participation. Allied with Russia they would be impregnable and could easily overrun the continent of Europe. Allied with the western Powers, the Alliance could make liberalism triumphant in Europe and prevent possible Russian insurgency from becoming dangerous. The concert of Europe could become a growing and a sufficiently stable organization without either Russia or France, because these two countries if isolated might be powerless. But it would be a futile organization without both Germany and Great Britain. The cost of isolating Germany is great enough to strain any alliance which undertakes it as a permanent policy; and Great Britain commands the highway of the world. Germany is indispensable to the league of peace and the fact of her indispensability should persuade the Allied governments to force nothing into the settlement after the war which would prevent her participation in a peace league. By so doing they will be taking the first decisive step to substitute the principle of a Concert of Europe in place of a Balance. No doubt the increase of German military power has upset the balance as it did formerly exist; but in so far as the upset involves a danger, the danger should be guarded against by enlisting the assistance of neutrals rather than by emasculating Germany. It has become literally true, as it was not in the days of Canning, that the New World can be called in to redress the balance in the Old. Europe has the opportunity, if it only will, to move in the direction of a concert. The United States can be called in to redress a balance against the Allies. It cannot fairly be called in to confirm a balance which has been manufactured against Germany.

NOVEMBER 18, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 107)



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# Moving Toward Peace

In view of the possibility that America might be drawn into the war: *The need for definition of purposes by the belligerents.*

THE need of Americans for a more exact definition of the objects of the belligerent governments is second only to that of the Europeans. We have not as yet been sucked into the war; but our government has been involved in ugly controversies with both the Allies and the Central Powers which compromise the interests or the safety of American citizens. These controversies have been accumulating since the beginning of the war, and as long as it lasts they are literally insoluble. Any action taken by the American government to vindicate American rights may have an important, if not a decisive, effect upon the success or failure of the hostile Powers and consequently upon the terms of peace. By insisting that the German submarines in the operations against merchant ships conform to the law of visit and search, the United States has already embarrassed the Germans in the prosecution of the war. By failing to insist upon respect for the trading rights of American citizens under international law the United States has already aided the Allies in the prosecution of the war. But this policy of benevolent neutrality is only a makeshift and will be broken by the stress of many more months of increasingly unscrupulous hostilities. The American government will either have to abandon any idea of protecting the interest and safety of its citizens, or it will have to make the means of protection more effective. The first of these alternatives would be obnoxious to every American who wants to see his country count for something in the affairs of the world. The second would inevitably involve some measure of belligerent liability. But if we may well be forced to fight, and if by fighting we contribute to the success of one of the two groups of belligerents, we have every reason to inquire what the actual results of the success accomplished by our aid are likely to be, and whether these results will contribute to those objects of national policy, in the interests of which we have assumed the risks and the costs of war.

Some positive action by President Wilson in favor of peace is consequently called for by the plain and pressing necessities of American national policy. A peace conference will enable him to avoid the threatened or the actual use of any weapons of retaliation against Great Britain, and will diminish or postpone the danger of a break with Germany over the submarine attack on commerce. If his intervention were to result in some kind of a settlement, he would, of course, be finding a solution for the more immediate difficulties of American foreign policy as an incidental result of having done something to stop the most destructive and bloodiest war in history. If, as is more likely, the first conference did not result in the restoration of peace, its discussions and the participation in them by the United States would have at least thrown up some of the materials out of which peace for the belligerents and either peace or war for the American nation must eventually be built. Every American interest and right compromised by the war needs for its vindication substantial national guaranties for a system of international law. A conference, by defining the terms on which the belligerents would make peace, would furnish our government with the means of deciding in what way and to what extent its participation in the war could be used to promote, not the national interests of the existing belligerents but the common interest in a more secure national order. The New Republic is unable to understand how else this knowledge could be obtained and how in its default the American government could enter the war with any assurance of accomplishing the declared objects of its national policy.

NOVEMBER 25, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 108)

# British-American Irritation

*On the importance of British-American understanding.*

AMERICANS have been able to love France as they do, to see the best in France, because the relationship of the two nations is fundamentally disinterested. But the attitude of Britons and Americans is determined in the last analysis by a dim sense that each means to the other so much of good and evil. Our destinies cross. We are inextricably entangled one with another, we know and the British know that the most terrible consequences are involved in our relationship. The feeling for France is the free friendship men give to those whom they meet only in their leisure. With the British we have to-day the discordant intimacy of business partners and family ties. We know that we cannot live apart, we have not yet learned to live together. We are close up to each other, bound in a common destiny, painfully aware of each other's faults, and a little shrill about announcing them.

The task of sanity is to recognize this and hold it in the front of all discussion. So involved are British-American relations that it is impossible to maintain them as they are. We must go forward to alliance or to enmity. Now and in the years immediately ahead this fearful decision will be made, and on it, more than any other decision will depend the happiness of the western world. We are living out now the process of that decision, and all the existing irritation is a symptom of it. To find the bases of understanding is the supreme British-American task.

DECEMBER 9, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 110)

# Peace Without Victory

On the German Chancellor's offer of peace negotiations: *The new rôle of Britain and America in relation to the balance of power. America as a stabilizer is the basis of a league of peace.*

BUT the existence of Central Europe destroys completely the British theory of continental politics. The theory said roughly that there was to be a balance of power on the continent with Britain hovering over it and prepared to redress it by decisive intervention. It was a rôle that permitted British diplomacy to exert a maximum effect with a minimum of force. To-day Britain finds herself engaged with all her resources, one among a large aggregate of allies, and the result is deadlock. Subtract Britain, and the German group would be irresistible. The continental balance of power is gone, at least until Russia becomes a modern state. Britain is no longer the interventionist who emerges from isolation to set things in balance. She is now an integral part of the continental system, a *part* of the balance of power, instead of its guardian. The rôle which was Britain's is passing to America, and President Wilson's offer to join a league of peace is really a recognition of the fact that the United States can guarantee the equilibrium and thus maintain at least a temporary security in the world.

DECEMBER 23, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 112)



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# The Note as Americanism

On President Wilson's note to the belligerents, date December 18, 1916, asking them to define their objects in the war.

IN truth, President Wilson's note takes a long step towards the formulation of something which unhyphenated Americans have been groping after since the beginning of the war. It is a move in the direction of a positive national policy, which in so far as it can be made to prevail, will create for the American democracy a living and serviceable relation to the ultimate issues raised by the European war. And this policy, although aggressive and national, is not exclusive. It is aggressive only in the manifest interest of international order and security. It is national in the sense that it brings certain national ideals a little nearer to realization. No matter how resentfully it is received in the beginning, it will in the end win the understanding and support of democrats and liberals throughout the world. They will welcome it for what it is—one of the most courageous and intelligent attempts made by any government to bring into existence the kind of international community which may provide for democracy and liberalism a more gracious climate and a more fertile soil.

The European war aroused thoughtful Americans from a condition of dangerous ignorance and inertia. It has compelled them to consider the problem of readjusting the traditional relation occupied by their country to Europe. In the past the chief object of our European policy has been to avoid European complications. We even proclaimed ourselves willing to fight, if necessary, in order to prevent the two Americas from being treated as an arena for the exercise of European nationalistic aggression. We were, moreover, justified in assuming this attitude. The Monroe Doctrine embodied the essential aspect of American foreign policy. We were right in separating the American political system from that of Europe, not because Americans possessed any superiority in manners or morals, but because our geographical situation emancipated us from the necessity of participating in the perils and distractions of the European international system. We were under no necessity of forming any part of a European balance of power or of associating ourselves with its responsibilities. But this attitude, justified as it formerly was, has had the foundation knocked out from under it by a radical alteration in the mere physical facts of our relationship to Europe. The geographical isolation was impaired by improved processes of communication. The two Americas were brought so near to Europe and united to it by so many bonds of intercourse that political separation became unnatural and costly. Pan-Americanism would be obliged eventually either to make terms with the European balance of power or guarantee its own continued isolation by armaments comparable to those of Europe.

This dilemma has been brought to the surface by the war. Since August, 1914, the United States has been obliged continually to protest against the behavior of the European belligerents. The traditional fabric of international law, upon which the American government had depended for the safeguarding of its citizens during war, was wrenched to pieces. Dangerous controversies with European Powers ensued, and as a consequence of these contentions, the nation was persuaded to increase its armaments and to make vigorous preparation for an impending war. These preparations were at first explained as a measure of self-defense; but what we were really defending was not our territorial inviolability but, as public opinion soon began to realize, our traditional Pan-American foreign policy; and the question was immediately asked, how far it was profitable to arm for such a purpose. The relations between the mutually exclusive American and European political systems would have to be determined by some kind of law, and it was precisely the existence and sanction of any law of nations which was being made precarious by the war in Europe. A Pan-American system of inoffensive nations could not preserve its own peculiar advantages in case the rest of the world was divided into groups of hostile Powers who were unscrupulously subordinating the law of nations to their own interests as actual or future belligerents. An American system, as the first condition of its own security, would have to use its influence on behalf of any promising attempt to organize security in Europe.

The dispatch of Mr. Wilson's note would be an impertinent interference by the American government in the business of other nations were it not for one fact of overwhelming importance. For the first time in the history of the country, an American official document has made European business American business by offering to abandon the isolation of the past and form a responsible part of a European international system. The note expressly declares that the American people "stand ready and even eager to coöperate" in the protection of weaker nations against violence "with every influence and resource at their command." For this reason it may well count as one of the outstanding documents in the history of the political relations between America and Europe. It is an explicit offer to use the new world, not as Canning said, to redress the balance in the old, but for the better purpose of lending to the European balance the influence and power of a disinterested outsider and by so doing to convert an unstable equilibrium of conflicting forces into a concert. The offer may fail in its intended effect, but Europeans, and least of all Englishmen and Frenchmen, do ill to receive it churlishly and resentfully. Surely they must recognize that a mere victory over Germany which did nothing to reform the balance of power as a system of international relationship would not serve to bring into existence a new and better Europe. They must recognize that without American help the difficulty of bringing a new Europe into existence looks insuperable. Should they reject that help and treat Mr. Wilson's note as a well intentioned but intolerable interference with their immediate business they will be alienating American sympathy and support, and confirming the American nation in its old suspicions of Europe and its old practice of irresponsible neutrality and isolation.

DECEMBER 30, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 113)

# Beneath the Outcry

Also on the President's note of December 18, 1916.

THE resentment in tory circles everywhere is the anger at a man who has unloosed forces which will in the end unseat the war parties. They are quite right when they say he has struck a blow at the morale of the nations. But it would be no less true to say that he has sounded a call which will restore the morale of liberalism.

There would be no justification whatever for this intervention if he had not at the same time offered to share the responsibility. It is because America is ready to pledge itself for the popular objects of this war that the action is justified. No one in Europe who is honestly fighting simply for



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security and a measure of justice can in the end regard this offer of ours as anything but friendly and hopeful. For what it says to Europe is this: we will guarantee with our resources and our lives the objects of the western democracies, but before we do that those objects must be distinguished from the objects of the imperialists. The note is a declaration of our alliance with the liberals of Europe.

And in that light they are beginning to understand it. Everywhere the division of liberal and tory has begun. A world-wide debate which no censorship can repress is in progress, and during that debate we shall witness the gradual isolation of those who are inspired merely by narrow class and national purposes. The most terrible danger of the war has probably been scotched. That danger was that the peace would be made by reactionaries on the ruins of Europe, and that it would be a peace which was the prelude to a diplomatic and commercial war. So long as the decision rested entirely in the hands of the belligerents the democracies were forced to believe that safety could be secured only by the destruction of the enemy's power. And since that was the only means of safety, they were compelled to submit to the growing dictation of the war parties. The entrance of a fresh and powerful neutral, honestly disinterested but not uninterested, has destroyed that necessity. Once the necessity is destroyed the leadership of the war parties is no longer necessary, and liberalism can again become expressive. The offer of our aid plus the request for definition is a fatal blow at the ascendancy of the European reactionaries. Because of it the moderates will make the peace.

That is why the first exclamations need not disturb us, nor cause us to swerve. They were exactly what was expected, and they will not dominate. The logic of the situation is so powerfully on the side of the President that the complexion of the talk will inevitably change. The movement which he has initiated cannot fail to grow, and everywhere it will assume sooner or later the form of a struggle between the progressives and the extremists. That is a bitter struggle in which to take part. It will require a tenacity of purpose which cannot be balked by outcry and misrepresentation. The purpose will not fail if the magnitude of the event is understood in America, if our opinion refuses to be diverted by the inevitable antagonism which a bold and liberating move arouses in conventional and timid minds. Those who have cried for a leadership expressive of American idealism and interest have it now. Many will not recognize it at first, but in the end they must.

DECEMBER 30, 1916 (Vol. IX, No. 113)

# America Speaks

On the President's address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.

EVERYONE who stops to visualize the machinery of the approaching peace congress is appalled at the intricacy of the negotiations which it will require. Nine Allies on one side, four on the other, a score of vitally interested neutrals, life, prosperity, liberty and security on four continents and the seven seas are involved. For the first time in history the negotiation is to be conducted not by a few men with autocratic powers but by envoys who must consider popular opinion. Obviously such a settlement cannot be made suddenly, without preparation, and without a world-wide background of ideas. The war came, it seemed, without warning; peace cannot come that way. It must come after a gradual lifting of the fog of war, after an uncovering and illumination in which some common understanding is created.

We have all of us to be educated through international discussion for the approaching peace. On December 18th the President, using the prestige of his office, gave great impulse to the discussion. He asked the warring powers to lay down their formulae of settlement and suggested that the United States would enter a league of nations for the organization of security. After a few days of misunderstanding, because he had used an unclear phrase, the note began to have its effect. The Central Powers answered curtly, and immediately lost whatever psychological advantage they had gained by the Chancellor's offer of peace. Their proposal of a blind negotiation, their dismissal of security as a secondary object, convinced the outer world that the offer was either insincere, or that they wanted merely German peace, or that their own public opinion was in such bad condition that it could not be dealt with openly. The nine Allies by their reply won a great advantage. They specifically put the organization of security first, made territorial claims contingent upon it, and proposed a formula which was ambiguous enough to permit of wide negotiation. Mr. Balfour in his supplementary note reëmphasized the point.

Now in accepting the idea of a league, the nine Allies not only made it necessary for Germany to make another move, they made it necessary for the United States to move again. They asked quite rightly what there was behind the President's offer of American aid. To be sure it was a plank in the Democratic platform and the Democrats won at the polls. The idea had been endorsed by Mr. Hughes, by Mr. Taft, and formerly by Mr. Roosevelt. It had wide non-partisan support. Still the peoples of Europe, faced by the immediate brutal fact of German aggression, knowing the traditional isolation of this country, were entitled to much greater assurance of American support.

It is this support which the President is now arousing. His address to the Senate on Monday is primarily a summons to the American nation to share the responsibilities of the peace. Mr. Wilson is asking his people to prepare themselves for the work which the world has begun to expect of them. It is the beginning of a popular campaign in this country designed to make it certain that when the time comes for a settlement of the war, America will be firm as to its purposes, unified in their support, and conscious of the responsibility. Mr. Wilson knows that he cannot ask the European Powers to clear up the ambiguity of their aims without at the same time clearing up the ambiguity of our own. Not only abroad but here too the fog must be cleared away. He had sent a note to Europe asking for a definition of objects. On Monday he addressed the Senate and began to define ours.

No one supposes that the work of definition is accomplished now or could be accomplished in one note or one address. The fog has lifted only a little; only a few big landmarks are as yet visible. Just as the reply of the Allies was merely a loose statement of principle, so is the President's address. But in essence it comes very close to the prime objects which the Allies have announced. We are as clear as the Allies; we both are clearer and more unanimous than the Germans. Not only has the President recognized Russia's claim to passage of the Dardanelles and Poland's claim to autonomy, he has set America against any attempt to annex occupied territory, and has recognized the justice of liberating peoples held in bondage. It is difficult to see



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how he could have gone further in accepting as American policy the liberal purposes of the Allied nations.

On one point he seems to us not altogether sound. The passage referring to the freedom of the seas appears to contradict the idea of a league to enforce peace. In an organized world freedom of the seas would certainly not exist for the aggressor. In fact the greatest weapon of the league would be the power to isolate and coerce the law-breaker. It would aim at an absolute blockade of the outlawed Power. In time of peace freedom of the seas would of course have to exist, and it may be that the President was thinking of this. He may have meant that maritime discrimination should be prevented. Nevertheless there is a real possibility of confusion in the form of his statement. It does seem to imply a kind of Manchester laissez-faire of the seas, an unworkable and inconsistent idea. What is needed is an organization of the seas which will produce freedom in time of peace and complete blockade and siege against the aggressor in time of war.

The moment is not yet here when it is possible to conclude dogmatically upon all the difficult questions involved in the settlement. The discussion of the next few months will be concerned with them. For the moment the President is bent on creating an atmosphere of negotiation. In this effort he has had to say one thing which was not easy to say. He had to tell the world that America could not share in a settlement which was dictated by the victor to the vanquished. He had to say that only a peace negotiated in a spirit of give and take could be stable enough to justify America in assuming the risks he was proposing. In making that point he used a phrase which will hurt deeply many whose support is required. He said that it must be a peace without victory.

It was an idea that had to be expressed, costly as it may be. So long as the people of the world believe that a lasting peace can be secured by dictation rather than by negotiation the world will be where it always has been, at the mercy of a teetering balance of power. Peace has never been secured in Europe by that method and never will be, and the Allied spokesmen have generally recognized this. They have told us that their object was to prevent Germany from winning anything by her aggression. They wanted her to go home with a sense of futility. They wanted to show that war does not pay, that nothing can be accomplished by it. The war will not end, and President Wilson, we take it, would not wish it to end, till that demonstration is complete. If the Germans think they are offering peace now because their armies are victorious, then the war will have to go on till the military situation changes.

But how long is it to go on after that? Is it to go on till the Allies can dictate a peace to a prostrate enemy? Are they to take the position that no peace is possible unless they have won an absolute decision in the field? Perhaps, but in that case Europe is likely to be so embittered with its sacrifices that any larger plan of security must fail. If Europe fights on in the belief that security can be had only by victory, then the foundation of a league will be shattered. It is likely to be the old peace which never lasted because it put all its faith in military power and ignored international organization.

The President has said that obviously we could not prevent Europeans from following this theory. The matter is in their hands. But if they did follow it, if they set their hearts on that rather than on a concert of power, America would not leave its isolation. A world organized on the creed of victory is a world in which America must arm to the teeth and pursue a purely national policy. Americans in the mass do not want to live in such a world, and they are preparing to do what they can to make it unnecessary.

Happily they have found a leader who can express that feeling nobly and eloquently, a man who knows his countrymen well enough to state the tremendous alternative before them. Organized security or armed isolation—that is the choice we have to make. The better choice takes courage, means risks and heavy responsibility. But the man would not be fit to live who failed to try it after the agony of these years. This thing must not be repeated if human power can prevent it. Our vitality, our strength and our potentialities are too great for the mere pursuit of our own interests. All that is valuable in our tradition cries out that we must not sit still in grudging isolation.

The President cannot succeed without the hearty support of the American people. With it he may succeed, and in that success he will have elevated the pride of American citizenship. It will be something to boast of that we have lived in a time when the world called us into partnership, and we went gladly, went remembering what we had always professed, and pledged ourselves to it in a larger theatre. At least it shall not be said that we were too selfish and too timid to attempt it, or that the sources of American idealism have run dry.

JANUARY 27, 1917 (Vol. IX, No. 117)

# Justification

After the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany. *The Anglo-American-German controversy on the seas.*

BEFORE and during the war the Germans have challenged the British police power on the seas and the rules according to which it operated. They protested against it under its old form, when its scope was restricted by certain explicit neutral rights. They are protesting against it still more vigorously in its contemporary form, when the British placed an absolute embargo on all neutral trade with Germany. According to the new precedents the police power of the seas has become absolute, and its absolute character has provoked the most dangerous opposition which it has ever encountered. Let no one underestimate the gravity of the danger to which the invention of the submarine has exposed the British maritime dominion. The pending attack will probably fail, but the submarine as an invention is still in its infancy. Eventually it will become a far more formidable weapon, which any nation fighting for its life, as the Germans now believe themselves to be, would be likely to use as the Germans are now using it. Sooner or later the submarine will become so much improved that a sufficient number of them, operating without restriction, will be able to challenge and perhaps overthrow the empire of the seas in so far as it rests on battleships; and when that time comes the situation of neutrals and of a dominant sea power during war will become as precarious as that of a military power which does not control the seas. Maritime absolutism will have engendered maritime anarchy. A reign of terror will result. Neutral nations will not be able to trade at all. The seas will cease during war to be the world's highway, and will become in part at least a new and worse kind of no-man's land, like the convulsed and obscene bits of soil which now divide the front line trenches.

The answer to this dilemma is, of course, plain. It is the answer which the American nation is now making. The



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most professionally neutral of the great Powers is throwing neutrality into the discard. When we are forced to choose between maritime absolutism and maritime anarchy, we choose for the moment the absolutism, particularly when we have better reason to trust the representative of maritime absolutism than we have the representative of maritime anarchy. For the American nation there can be no real choice between taking the British side in such a controversy and taking the German. But if we do take the British side, we have the more rather than the less reason for recognizing what there is of truth and justice in the German protest, anarchical though it be. The absolutism, unless it is checked, will continue to breed anarchy. So it will become preëminently the business of the United States to see that it is properly checked and ordered. The Germans are right in one respect. The sovereignty of the sea, carrying with it as it does the power of life and death over nations, should not be used in the interest of exclusive national purposes. In so far as it is used in this way, Germany has a genuine grievance, in the increasing provocation of which it would be ruinous for the United States to share. As The New Republic said on May 27th, 1916: "Sea power must not be deprived of its right to destroy commerce, because if it were deprived of the right, the most effective weapon of resistance against aggressive militarism would be fatally weakened; but the power must be exercised only under conditions and on behalf of policies which can obtain official international approval."

Fortunately President Wilson has already begun the work of creating the mechanism whereby conflicting national interests can be adjusted and a body of international right defined, accepted and applied. And, in so far as this body of right is created, maritime absolutism will be robbed of its curse. The league of nations which he has been discussing will rest upon sea power and upon that control over the highway of the world which sea power must necessarily exercise. The sea must belong to all the nations, in war no less than in peace. It constiutes the common human inheritance and domain. Germany cannot be permitted to terrorize international territory, and rather than permit a reign of terror the United States, which is born of maritime freedom and order, has every justification for fighting. But the only authentic sovereign of the international domain is an organized community of nations. If the community of nations does not exist, it must be created for the purpose of assuming and exercising the mastery of the sea. On no other condition is anything like permanent pacification possible, and it should be only in the interest of ultimate pacification that the American people are drawn into the war. The President has already made this truth clear and emphatic to the world. Because we may enter the war, our interest in the organization of peace has been intensified rather than attenuated. Under Mr. Wilson's leadership it has become our national policy, and our participation in the war, if it takes place, will furnish us with a better opportunity than ever of trying it out.

FEBRUARY 10, 1917 (Vol. X, No. 119)

# The Defense of the Atlantic World

The ultimate interests at stake.

WE argued last week that it was dangerous and misleading to believe that the United States was taking up arms as the champion of neutral rights under international law. It is no less misleading to believe that we are taking up arms in defense of our own rights alone. If America enters the war on any such flimsy basis as that, it will fight a sterile war, and peace will leave us without the least assurance that we have accomplished anything. The fact is that the Germans have understood America's position in the war far better than we ourselves have understood it, and if we are to deal with them effectively, if we are to fight them well, it is of the first importance that we should understand the business as they feel it. It is a bad general who does not imagine himself in the enemy's place. It is a weak nation that would dribble into war not knowing why, or how, or whither.

All along the Germans have seen two great truths: first, that British command of the sea has become absolute, and has abolished the neutral rights which interfere with it; second, that America's policy has been to protest feebly and without effect against Britain while Germany has been held by threat of war from using the submarine fully to relieve the pressure. The Germans have pointed out quite accurately that the result of this policy has been to close the road to Germany and hold open the road to Britain and France. The German highway we have allowed the Allies to bar, the Allied highway we were ready to keep open at the risk of war. We have not merely been committed theoretically to selling munitions and supplies to any one who can come and fetch them. We have in fact permitted the Allies to cut off Germany, we have been in fact prepared for war to deliver munitions and foodstuffs to the Allies. Stripped of all its technicalities this is the issue, and the Germans have not been slow to recognize it.

A number of things have obscured the issue. The first and most spectacular is that no American lives have been lost by the action of the Allies, and consequently their illegalities have never seemed monstrous to most of us. Nevertheless inhumanity is not the real difference. No American lives would have been lost had we acquiesced in Germany's policy as we have in Britain's. American lives would almost certainly have been lost had we refused to agree to Great Britain's "blockade" as we have to Germany's "war-zone" decree. If Britain said we must put into a certain port we have put into it, if Britain said we must not use certain areas of the North Sea we have not used them, if Britain said we could do only a certain amount of trade with Holland, that is all the trade we have done. Nor is there any reason for regarding the submarine war as more deadly than the blockade of Germany. It is well to remember that the German people are suffering anguish as a result of it, that their children's vitality is being sapped, that there is an alarming increase of tuberculosis within the German Empire. The blockade and the submarine are both terrible weapons, and the blockade is the more effective of the two. In choosing between them we are not choosing between legality and illegality, nor even perhaps in the last analysis between cruelty and mercy.

No one can say that this statement of the case does not give Germany her due. It errs if anything in giving her the extreme benefit of every doubt. But when her case has been made with all allowances we are more than ever sure that this nation does right in accepting the blockade and defying the submarine. It does right because the war against Britain, France and Belgium is a war against the civilization of which we are a part. To be "fair" in such a war would be a betrayal. We would not help Germany to victory. We cannot stand idle as long as there is the least chance of her winning one. If Germany's cause were



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the better one, this policy would be outrageous as the Germans believe it is. It is because we cannot permit a German triumph that we have accepted the closure of the seas to Germany and the opening of them to the Allies. That is the true justification of our policy, and the only one which will bear criticism.

It has been obscured for us also by a number of things here at home. We are an inveterately legalistic people, and have veiled our real intentions behind a mass of technicalities. The reason for this legalism just now is to be found in something besides our intellectual habits. We have wanted to assist the Allies and hamper Germany, but we have wanted also to keep out of war. Our government therefore has been driven to stretch technicalities to the breaking point. We have clothed the most unneutral purposes in the language of neutrality. But we have never had any right to expect that we could go on forever without facing the consequences. Having started on the road of assistance to the Allies we have to follow it through. So when we talk about American honor being involved we mean just this: that since we have created an unneutral policy we cannot now abandon it because it is dangerous. Our honor is involved only because in the last thirty months we have made a choice which requires us to keep open the seas that lead to the western Allies. Had our judgment of the issues of the war been favorable to Germany, we would with honor have followed a different policy. Had Britain, for example, been the aggressor, and the violator of Belgium, we could with perfect honor have broken the blockade and acquiesced in the submarine war.

This basic truth has been clouded for us by something more than our legalism. The radical pro-Allies especially along the eastern seaboard have raised the absurd legend that the policy of the administration was either pro-German or at least neutral in effect. Fastening all their attention on the dramatic patience of the President, they often seemed to forget entirely the drastic effects of his inactivity in regard to the blockade. They never seemed able to realize that the decision not to break the encirclement of Germany is one of the great strategic facts of the war. It may indeed be the most decisive victory the Allies have won, and it has earned for us the dangerous hostility of the German people.

Only by a clear grasp of the situation and its gigantic consequences can we steer our course now or in the future. We have chosen to render the Allies definite assistance, negatively by allowing them to close the seas to Germany, positively by insisting that the seas be kept open to them. They must be kept open. This means that to frighten ships away is as much an overt act as to sink them. It means that to sink Norwegian and Dutch ships is as intolerable as to sink American ships. It means that our fundamental interest in this crisis is not a complicated system of rights but a definite and practical and tangible end. The world's highway shall not be closed to the western Allies if America has power to prevent it.

We do not hesitate to say that this should be American policy even though submarines were capable of successful, humane "cruiser warfare." We do not hesitate to say—we have believed it and said it since the beginning of the war—that if the Allied fleet were in danger of destruction, if Germany had a chance of securing command of the seas, our navy ought to be joined to the British in order to prevent it. The safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight.

Why? Because on the two shores of the Atlantic ocean there has grown up a profound web of interest which joins together the western world. Britain, France, Italy, even Spain, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian nations, and Pan-America are in the main one community in their deepest needs and their deepest purposes. They have a common interest in the ocean which unites them. They are to-day more inextricably bound together than most even as yet realize. But if that community were destroyed we should know what we had lost. We should understand then the meaning of the unfortified Canadian frontier, of the common protection given Latin-America by the British and American fleets.

It is the crime of Germany that she is trying to make hideous the highways by which the Atlantic Powers live. That is what has raised us against her in this war. Had she stood on the defensive against France and Britain, had she limited the war to the Balkans and the eastern front where it originated, and clearly thrown in her lot with the western nations, she would have had their neutrality and probably their sympathy. But when she carried the war to the Atlantic by violating Belgium, by invading France, by striking against Britain, and by attempting to disrupt us, neutrality of spirit or action was out of the question. And now that she is seeking to cut the vital highways of our world we can no longer stand by. We cannot betray the Atlantic community by submitting. If not civilization, at least our civilization is at stake.

A victory on the high seas would be a triumph of that class which aims to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader ultimately of a German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic world. It would be utter folly not to fight now to make its hopes a failure by showing that in the face of such a threat the western community is a unit.

It would be a great mistake to suppose, however, that we are dealing with a single-minded Germany. We wage war on Germany as long as she commits her destiny to those who would separate her from the western world. By rights Germany should be a powerful and loyal member of the Atlantic world, and she will be if this war is effectively fought and wisely ended. Our aim must be not to conquer Germany as Rome conquered Carthage, but to win Germany as Lincoln strove to win the South, to win her for union with our civilization by the discrediting of those classes who alone are our enemies. It is no paradox and no sentimentality to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her but to force her and lure her back to the civilization in which she belongs. She is a rebel nation as long as she wages offensive war against the western world.

We do not believe that the bulk of the German people or even the better part of her civilian leaders honestly hope to overthrow us. They are gambling we believe on the prospect of an early peace. But if by any chance the submarine should succeed, the party of von Tirpitz would be invincible. We cannot therefore take any chances of allowing the campaign to succeed. It must be made to fail in two ways: by demonstrating that the sea can be kept open, and by enlisting our strength on the side of the Allies. That would be a German failure indeed because it would be clear then that the assault on the West had merely doubled the power of the West.

These, we believe, are the main causes why we are being drawn into the war, the main reasons why we should enter it, and the main objects we should pursue. There could be no greater error than that voiced by Senator Borah when he said, "It ought to be distinctly understood that we



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are interested alone in protecting our neutral rights as a neutral nation, and that what we have done and all that we may do is for that purpose and no other." A few moments' reflection will show that the issue never has been one of neutral rights, that to fight for them alone would be to isolate ourselves from our natural Allies and leave us exposed after the war, and finally that no form of action can be devised which will vindicate all neutral rights, or even those which Germany alone has violated. If we put the matter on the basis of neutral rights we shall never know whether we have vindicated them or not, and our participation in the war would be as futile as a duel of honor.

What we must fight for is the common interest of the western world, for the integrity of the Atlantic Powers. We must recognize that we are in fact one great community and act as a member of it. Our entrance into it would weight it immeasurably in favor of liberalism and make the organization of a league for peace an immediately practical object of statesmanship. By showing that we are ready now, as well as in the theoretical future, to defend the western world, the corner stone of federation would be laid. We would not and could not fight to exclude Germany from that league. We would not and could not fight for a bad settlement. The real danger to a decent peace has always been that the western nations would become so dependent on Russia and Japan that they must pay any price for their loyalty. That danger is almost certainly obviated by our participation. For when the peace conference begins some time toward the end of 1917, as it most certainly will, the final arbitrament between liberalism and reaction will be made by the relative power of each. If the liberal forces have the most strength left it is they who will decide the reorganization of the world.

FEBRUARY 17, 1917 (Vol. X, No. 120)

# If the Submarine Succeeds

*American interest in the Atlantic Highway to the Allies.*

THE submarine warfare is a failure, we are being assured. The British navy is said to have the menace in hand. All this is very reassuring, though it is early to abandon ourselves completely to feelings of security. But suppose that the submarine proves as effective as the Germans must have anticipated when they proclaimed a policy which strained relations with us to breaking. Suppose that England has actually been isolated, reduced to a condition where starvation is imminent, forced to subscribe to such a peace as an all-victorious Germany may dictate. What would this mean to us? It is only by meeting this question frankly that we shall be able to determine whether in suppressing the submarine England is fighting merely her own battle, or our battle as well. Only so can we determine whether we are justified in standing idly by, more or less sympathetic spectators, while England struggles to provision herself, or whether it is our national business to see that England is provisioned. Our reading of the neutrality law, ever since the war began, has been partial to England. We have acquiesced in the British blockade; we have evinced a readiness to go all lengths to curb the submarine. We have foregone the right we claimed to send bread to Germany. We have insisted on our right to send munitions to England. We have made hundreds of millions of war profits by this procedure. Was this our motive? Or do we recognize that England's fight is in a fundamental sense our fight? We shall be forced to recognize this once we entertain the hypothesis of England really beaten.

With England actually in the grip of starvation, there could be no talk of a peace on the basis of the status quo ante. Vae Victis will be the cry of the Germans as it might well be that of their enemies, if Germany were crushed. The British belief that there can be no peace in the world until the German military power is sapped is not a whit more deeply rooted than the German belief that there can not be a lasting peace until the British financial power and naval supremacy are overthrown. If Germany could dictate a peace to England, its first article would be aimed at the British navy. Its second article would be aimed at the British colonial empire, upon which the financial might of England is in no small measure dependent.

It may be protested that all the Germans want is Mesopotamia and the freedom of the seas. But the Germans expected to be accorded a paramount position in Mesopotamia if the war ended in a draw. The Germans are not a people to underestimate the value of colonies and of a ring of coaling stations encircling the world. These England, starving, could be made to yield: would Germany refrain from demanding them? As for freedom of the seas, Germany enjoys it in time of peace. Can Germany trust to a mere treaty to assure herself freedom of the seas in time of war? We know the German view of the binding quality of treaties that may run counter to the national interest. Germany will feel assured of the freedom of the seas when England no longer has the physical means to dispute the right. England, defeated, would pay the price in ships.

What a completely successful submarine campaign would mean to the United States is sufficiently clear. We should be compelled to face an epoch of redistribution of the colonial dominions of the world. The British, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Belgian flags would gradually give way to the German. Colonial dominion is a perquisite of sea power; or at least, exists only by tolerance of sea power. The Dutch in the East Indies, the Belgians in the Congo, the French in Cochin China, ourselves in the Philippines, have no other security than the existing adjustment of forces under British naval hegemony. Convey the hegemony to Germany, and all the elements of our calculations are disturbed.

German victory would not merely mean a disturbance of relations throughout the seven seas. It would mean a change in those relations to the prejudice of our interests and those of the world as a whole. The old colonizing nations have gone far on the way to a liberal conception of their colonial obligations. In time of peace England reserves no differential advantage to her nationals. All the world trades freely in the British crown colonies. Germany is a new colonizing state and generations would be required to overcome the disposition she has already manifested to exploit colonies in her own exclusive interest. With Germany established in the position of mistress of the seas, our trade would encounter closed doors on every hand. Our shipping would be handicapped by manipulation of bunker coal supplies. And finally, what of our pretension to maintain freedom from imperial domination in the territories to our south? The sooner we should cancel the Monroe Doctrine the safer for us.

The passing of the power of England would be calamitous to the American national interest. It is as much our concern that England should not be beaten into surrender as it was England's concern that Belgium should not be brutally trampled under. We have provisioned and muni-



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tioned England—at a profit. Whatever our motives may have lacked we did, in so far, aid in resisting Germany's design against England.

Now the design has become more desperate and menacing. England, by redoubling her efforts, may defeat it completely. What is our national duty in the premises? To keep our ships at home until the British have cleared the seas, that we may trade again, with a profit? Or to proceed with all the force we can command, at whatever cost may be necessary, to defend our national interest in the existing adjustment of sea power and colonial dominion? Certainly, if there is the least chance of Germany's success in her submarine campaign, vastly more is at stake for us than was at stake for Germany when she decided to back up Austria in her Balkan quarrel. More is at stake for us than was at stake for England when she threw in her lot with France and Russia in defense of Belgium. We may be blind to this relation between our interest and that of England. The Entente Allies are not blind to it; nor, for that matter, is Germany. We may remain passive and save ourselves the anxieties of a state bordering on war, if not actually assuming the form of war. If we do we shall have gained, in the world's councils, the position of a state too stupid to perceive even its own vital interests or too lethargic to make an effort to conserve them.

FEBRUARY 24, 1917 (Vol. X, No. 121)

# Where the Threads Converge

In the foregoing series of extracts we have traced the origin and the growth of what we take to be a genuinely national policy for the American people in respect to the European war. It only remains to try and add something to the record by pulling it together and by exhibiting still more definitely and sharply the application of the whole policy to the present crisis. In order to do so, we shall have to begin with a restatement of what the record contained up to the end of January, 1917.

(1) The germ of every subsequent phase assumed by the foregoing policy in the several stages of its growth was contained in the announcement in our first issue of the futility of allowing American behavior towards the European nations to be dictated by the inflexible dogma of isolation. Isolation meant a negative and irresponsible policy towards Europe, limited merely to the assertion of American rights under international law, and indifferent or blind to those fundamental political interests which the American democracy shares with the democracies of Europe. Its rejection meant the search for a new and a positive policy which would recognize the actual facts of the relations between the United States and the several European Powers and which would at the same time remain true to the American tradition of avoiding entangling alliances, of keeping out of the struggle for a European balance of power and of seeking the organization of a stable and equitable international order.

(2) The circumstances of the war offered immediate and most significant opportunities for converting the foregoing attitude towards American foreign affairs into a specific policy. The violation of a small state like Belgium, which both for historical and geographical reasons constituted the purest product of European internationalism, raised a European question which was also American. Inasmuch as an inoffensive democracy could not survive in a world in which Belgiums are violated, the government of the United States should have protested against the violation and have allowed its subsequent policy with respect to the belligerents to be influenced by a determination to prevent the offender from profiting by the offense.

(3) Subsequently when Great Britain adopted commerce-destroying measures of doubtful legality the treatment by the American government of these interferences with neutral trade was profoundly influenced by German behavior at the outbreak of the war. Ordinarily the United States would have vigorously resisted the British extension of belligerent rights at sea, for we had consistently sought and tried to make the sea international territory; but in this instance its resistance was paralyzed by the impossibility of adopting any action which would have assisted the violator of Belgium or seriously embarrassed the allies of that state. Although the American government was obliged to call the attention of the British government to the extent of its encroachments on the trading rights of American citizens during war, because we were still technically neutral, there was never any real question of forcing Great Britain to pay serious attention to these assertions of American rights under international law.

(4) As soon, however, as the Germans began to use the submarines as commerce-destroyers, a controversy was started which required a different solution. Our submission to British encroachment on neutral rights and our resistance to those of Germany are usually justified on the ground of a difference between the effects of the two kinds of lawlessness. One injured property and the other killed American citizens. But that is not the essential difference. In reality the United States was so dependent for its security on the British navy and for its own prosperity on the British merchant marine and on trade with Great Britain that it was bound to oppose this dangerous attempt to challenge British control of the seas. We were obliged by our own vital interests either to emasculate or to resist the German submarine campaign. Hence the sinking of the Lusitania was interpreted as a prophecy of the ultimate necessity of Anglo-American coöperation. The combination of acquiescence in British innovations and resistance to those of Germany was defended as a sound policy of differential or benevolent neutrality.

(5) The decision, however, to sustain Great Britain in an economic siege of Germany and to resist Germany in the use of her only weapon of retaliation, involved the United States in a compromising situation. The aggrandizement of power which Great Britain was assuming with American consent was that of life and death over nations. It was the police power of the world. So far as it was being used to prevent German aggression from succeeding, American public opinion had every reason to acquiesce, but there was danger of its use for other and less justifiable purposes. It was capable of being converted into an instrument of aggression. Germany was the chief offender in bringing on the war, but for years the policy of Germany's continental enemies had been provocative. They had deliberately pursued certain exclusive national ambitions at the risk of bringing on the present calamity. As soon as the war broke they saw an opportunity of redistributing for their benefit the continental balance of power by territorial changes, some of which were defensible, but many of which were not. Every American tradition and aspiration in foreign politics prohibited the United States from consenting to be the accomplice of such plans of nationalistic aggression. In so far as the nation was becoming a party to the extension of British maritime control, it was in honor bound to adopt any available means of making the



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power to destroy commerce the servant of an effective organization of public security and justice. The seas would be internationalized by internationalizing the instrument of British maritime authority.

(6) The most promising plan of international organization is that of a League to Enforce Peace. As compared with other plans designed to accomplish a similar end, it has the merit of proposing a coöperative nationalism, resting primarily on economic and naval power and deriving its vitality from the intensification of national responsibility. It does not ask nations to submit to the imposition of justice; it asks them to plan and if necessary to pay in order that justice may prevail. President Wilson's initiative in seeking to make American participation in a league of peace the major principle of American foreign policy, relieved the American practice of discriminating in favor of British maritime absolutism of its manifest weakness. It committed the American nation to the promotion of principles of international right which would tend to protect all nations, great and small, against aggression. His initiative may be of the utmost use to Germany during the pending war—in so far as Germany is actually on the defensive. President Wilson has sought to have the treaty of peace transformed into an organization for international security. In this way he associated the ambiguous and somewhat furtive policy of the United States, since the war began, with the aspirations underlying the American tradition in foreign policy. Participation by the United States in European politics in the way and to the extent proposed by Mr. Wilson would help to give to the world after the war a climate congenial to liberalism and democracy. Not only would it not involve the United States in an entangling alliance, but in so far as the proposed league was a success, it would tend to emancipate the European Powers from the necessity of involving themselves in engagements which forced the comparatively disinterested and liberal powers to be the accomplice of the ambitions of their more aggressive associates. The only alternative to such alliances is on a practicable plan of general coöperation, and Mr. Wilson's initiative made such a plan of general cooperation possible, provided one general condition were fulfilled. The treaty of peace must not embody the triumph of exclusive national ambitions and must not be based on an attempt to redistribute for anybody's benefit the balance of power. It must be attained by that kind of mutual accommodation which can only be brought about in the event of a peace without victory.

The result of applying the foregoing conception of America's relation to the war to the emergency brought about by the declaration of an unlimited German submarine campaign was clearly stated long before the emergency arose. Last spring we suggested in An Appeal to the President the defects of the existing policy of benevolent neutrality and the desirability of adopting a franker and bolder course—one which would renounce the hypocrisy and ambiguity of a simulated impartiality and which as the result of an overt offer of assistance to the Allies would better enable the United States to use its influence in favor of the organization of a more enduring peace. We argued that Germany should be informed without equivocation of the real meaning and issue of the American attitude. The United States could not rigorously enforce neutral rights against Great Britain until the German cause had ceased to be a menace to all international order and safety, until, that is, Germany agreed to the evacuation of Belgium, France and Serbia and to coöperate with other civilized states in the maintenance of international order based on the common defense of international right. We offered this suggestion in part, because we anticipated what has since taken place. It was written that Germany would never submit even to a small percentage of defeat without trying out an unlimited submarine war against British commerce. Whenever she issued such a challenge the American nation would be forced to abandon neutrality and make itself more responsible for the results of its declared preference.

Even apart from the submarine campaign, the agreement in favor of the frank and thoroughgoing course is stronger than it was last spring. Since then the President has associated American policy much more explicitly with the attempt to organize international security. He has asked the belligerent governments to state in what way and to what extent they propose to insist on terms of peace which will contribute to this all-important object. He was unable to obtain any satisfaction from Germany. The German government refused to make promises as to the evacuation of occupied territory and postponed all discussion of the organization of international security until some years after the treaty of peace was signed. The Allied governments were, on the other hand, much more satisfactory in their assurances. They declared their allegiance to the general plan of curing the defects of international organization, which had so much to do with the origin of the present war, by a league to enforce peace, and they sketched the principles which they wished to see incorporated in such an organization. There remained a lurking ambiguity in the statement of their case. They showed no consciousness of a discrepancy between their declared loyalty to the idea of coöperative international organization and the obligations imposed by their present network of alliances. Such alliances are always in danger of being converted by the results of military success from a defensive league into a conspiracy for nationalist aggression. The United States could never be a party to such a conspiracy, and rather than become so must always preserve full liberty to withdraw. Peace without victory still remains necessary. But the answer of the Allies to Mr. Wilson's invitation supplied a spacious platform for future coöperation and discussion, whereas the German answer offered nothing of the kind. The way in which the German Foreign Office handled the whole incident established its insincerity in making overtures for peace and its reluctance or its inability to do anything to reassure a world which by the overwhelming evidence of far-reaching and sinister plans of conquest had inevitably been rendered apprehensive and suspicious.

The declaration of an unrestricted submarine campaign upon neutral commerce constituted the real German answer to the President's initiative in favor of a peace based on the organization of international security. After having aroused the apprehension of most of the people of Europe the Germans decided, under the influence of the inexorable but illuminating logic of their aggressive purposes, to threaten the security of the only powerful nation which might have been brought to understand and to sympathize with them in their own very real international predicament. By so doing they fully expected to bring this country into the war against them, and there is every reason why the American Government should gratify their expectations. The unrestricted submarine campaign against neutral commerce supplies it with a case for going in and an opportunity for using the instrument of war



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to promote the political purposes, whose value for civilization is no less incontestable and complete than those of the North at the outbreak of our own Civil conflict.

The submarine campaign renews the threat to the security of the western democratic Powers which seemed to have been extinguished when the German army was defeated at the Marne and checked at Ypres. It places the Germans once more on the aggressive. It has the disadvantage of an argument which seeks to prove too much. If it is successful it will win the war and allow Germany to impose practically any terms she pleases upon her enemies. The progress of the campaign during February establishes a manifest danger of ultimate success. What we are witnessing is really a race between the gradual attrition of German military resources and that of British commercial maritime resources. At present there is no telling which will be first to give out; but this we do know. In all probability American assistance, right in kind and generous in amount, will be sufficient to avert the possible calamity of German success. This country can provide the United Kingdom, if not with early succor, at all events with ultimate insurance. By the aid of American shipbuilders the mercantile tonnage available for the Atlantic carrying trade can be substantially increased. By an improved organization of our resources in provisions and munitions we can assure food to Great Britain and free British labor for more ship-building. By furnishing the Allies with credit for purchases in this country we can enable them to draw even more freely than in the past upon the mechanical equipment, the natural resources and the labor of the American people. In a war of attrition, both on land and sea, the contributions which the United States can make to one side or the other would be decisive.

There is little to be lost and much to be gained by placing behind the measure of maritime assistance which must in any event be granted to the Allies a corresponding measure of moral reënforcement. The adoption permanently of a policy of armed neutrality will not merely hamper us in rendering material assistance, but it will keep us morally aloof from the western Powers with whom we are actually making common cause and who will naturally and in the end fiercely resent our affectation of moral isolation. If we fail to go in and take our share of the common risks, the common sacrifices and the common responsibility, the liberal western nations and the British self-governing dominions whose interests and purposes are in general akin to our own, will cease to have any confidence in the willingness of the American people to break down the barriers of a selfish and exclusive nationalism. They will distrust our political intelligence and good faith. We have already earned the hostility of Germany; we are in danger of earning the contempt of the Allies. These feelings will endure because the Germans will never forget the intentional injury we have wrought upon their chances of success, and the Allies will never forgive a refusal to convert a furtive preference into an open and cordial material and moral coöperation.

What is now hanging in the balance is the present and future ability of the American nation to serve, as it undoubtedly aspires to serve, the cause of international order and justice. Our behavior during the next few months will decide whether or not a league of peace is to grow out of the present war and whether or not the United States will play an important part in its deliberation, policy and administration. In so far as the submarine campaign is successful the chances of the organization of such a league any time in the near future shrink into insignificance. The submarines are substituting anarchy and riot for law and order in the international domain. They are subordinating the sea power which can be made the common property of all the nations to land power, over which the rule of exclusive and jealous national sovereignty must continue to prevail. They tend to destroy the existence of all effective authority over the world's highway, over that part of the earth's surface which, just because it is used exclusively as a medium of communication, must be securely governed and in the end governed for the joint benefit of all the nations. To be sure the existing government is not, as it should be, co-national, but such as it is it must be preserved so that it can be handed over intact and vigorous to a peace league. The entrance of the United States into the war as a measure of resistance to the submarine attack will help both to preserve sea power intact and to internationalize its exercise. It will tend to make the United States jointly responsible with Great Britain for maritime order. It is the one act which is likely to persuade Great Britain to internationalize the control over commerce, placed in her hand, by her naval power. By going to her assistance at the present time we will offer the most unimpeachable proof that she will not have to rely on her own navy and mercantile marine for her future safety.

There is another reason for American participation of no less importance. The peace league differs from other projects of international organization chiefly in one respect. Its mechanism is political rather than legal. It requires for its vitality the incorporation of its principle in the policy of nations and the readiness on their part to take any action required by its success. It must be *willed* into existence not by individuals but by great political powers whose people understand that their own future safety as well as that of their smaller brethren has come to depend on effective coöperation. By entering the war as an act of resistance to the German submarine attack the United States will be performing the indispensable act of faith which is needed to give reality to the peace league and to effective American participation in its organization and policy.

The chief executive and official spokesman of the American nation has solemnly proclaimed to Europe the eager desire of the American government to bring such a league into existence. He has explicitly declared that a satisfactory settlement of the present war, one which was promising enough to be subsequently guaranteed by the United States, depended upon the incorporation into the settlement of the principle of coöperative nationalism. It was a useful declaration to make; but even those Frenchmen and Englishmen who believed it to be true suffered from a grave handicap in urging their governments to heed the advice. The nation whose chief spokesman was giving the advice and laying down the conditions of future coöperation was not, so the sceptics said, itself doing anything to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. It was not effectively contributing to the result, which it was trying to bring about, by its official homilies. This was not wholly true. The benevolence of American neutrality has been of huge assistance to the Allies. But we were using a safe, profitable and hypocritical policy which did not constitute a sufficient evidence of American good faith. In order to provide the French and English advocates of a settlement based upon coöperative nationalism, with an answer to the sceptics who believed neither in a peace



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league nor in the reality of American coöperation, it is necessary to go further. If there is any good reason why the United States could not be neutral in another world war, there are equally good reasons why it should not remain neutral in this, and these reasons become overwhelming and decisive just as soon as the submarine campaign compromises the future of all nations whose security depend on their maritime communications.

Many Americans, among them people whose influence upon the domestic life of the country is almost wholly beneficial, are reluctant to take part in the war because they are afraid to incur the cost and the risks of such an irrevocable and momentous choice. By so entering the American nation will, in their opinion, be sacrificing its own peculiar virtue instead of adding something to the common stock of international good behavior. It will be turning over its domestic policy to the ultimate control of reactionaries and it will be using its resources in treasure and human life for the benefit of Russian and Italian nationalist aggression. There is no way of proving these apprehensions to be groundless; but groundless they will prove to be if the United States enters the war exclusively for the purpose of carrying into effect the principles embodied in President Wilson's address to the Senate. Our liability would be limited by those principles. It is not European reactionaries and militarists who want American participation in the war on these terms. It is European liberals. They know the difficulty of obtaining an equitable settlement without American assistance; and they are now waiting and trusting that such assistance will be forthcoming. "With the entry of America," says the London Nation in its issues of February 10th, "the balance sets definitely to the side of democracy, and we may look forward to a re-knitting, in time and after a long period of exacerbation, of the broken ties of civilized living. Henceforward western democracy is safe and its ideas must definitely permeate the central and the eastern European world." According to the same journal, which has fought so long and so gallantly for the application of liberal ideas to foreign policy, American entry into the war will go far to bring into existence that "ordered world of the future" which must be the next great achievement of civilization.

As to the reaction of war and of military expenditure and preparation upon American domestic life, let them that fear the consequences of going to war even for a good cause consider the alternative. The American nation has already earned the hostility of Germany. If it adopts in the present emergency a lukewarm policy which proclaims a grievance and admits sympathy with the enemies of Germany but which fails to assume the risks, the costs and the responsibilities of the common cause, it will earn and deserve the contempt of the Allied peoples. It will be morally and politically isolated in a world which its own act has rendered more than ever predatory; and as a consequence of its isolation, it will become alarmed as never before. In its fear it will arm until its territory is spotted with camps and its shores bristle with guns and battleships, and its armament will be dictated by a spirit and employed for a purpose which will be most injurious, perhaps even fatal to American liberalism. Preparedness will be justified by the necessity of defending Americans in their right to live their own life without foreign interference, but it would be powerless to protect the American people against the consequences of their own negligence. As The New Republic has insistently urged, a foreign policy based upon a sound understanding of our relations to other countries in both hemispheres is the first line of defense, and if that line is lacking every succeeding line will have to be doubled in size. Without any conscious policy but one of protecting our legal rights and keeping out of trouble we would drift into an actual practice of nationalist aggression. These results would follow because the United States would be by its own act friendless, exposed, dissatisfied with itself, and morbidly apprehensive. It would suffer, temporarily, at least, from moral disintegration. At the critical moment it would have proved false to its own better aspirations and to the cause of western democracy and liberalism, and, before it was done, it would pay dearly for its own lack of vision and faith.

# America's Part in the War

*The action necessary.*

NO one who read the German note has any right to doubt that Germany means to go as far as she dares to, that she can be stopped only by a show of force. On Wednesday evening, the thirty-first of January, Germany announced that she would deal in ultimates. No pacifist, who is not a non-resistant, could desire anything but an immediate reply to Germany in the language which she understands. Any attempt to argue the German government out of its decision would have been taken as an invitation to go on with the program. In the last two years there have been times when it was worth while to pocket pride and debate, because Germany was a house divided against itself. But that time has passed, and the President has acted as the hard facts demanded.

We are now in a twilight zone between peace and war. How long we shall stay in it no human being in America knows. It is nevertheless perfectly clear that the period of suspense must be devoted to increasing the pressure on Germany. The only course of action now is to assume that there will be war, and to make it as evident as possible to Germany that it will be effective war. Our task, therefore, is to block out the main lines of American participation, for effectiveness consists in adapting strategy to politics and action to strategy. A confusion of purpose would disable us.

America is not being drawn into the war as the upholder of an obsolete system of maritime law. We are ranging ourselves on the side of western sea power in its struggle to resist continental land power. We are not punishing a lawbreaker, because both Britain and Germany have violated the laws of the sea. We are becoming the open ally of Britain and France because at the beginning of the war we decided that they were fighting in the main for the kind of world in which we wished to live. And if we wage war now, we shall not do it because we are lawyers upholding a precedent, but because our own existence and the world's order depend on the defeat of that anarchy which the Germans misname the "freedom of the seas." We shall uphold the dominion of the ocean highway as men upheld the Union in 1861, not because the power exercised by Great Britain is perfect, but because the alternative is intolerable. We shall uphold it knowing that it needs reform and that it must not in the future be used purely for imperial ends. By contributing something to save it from possible destruction we shall have a right to speak about its reform. Sea power internationalized is the nucleus of the league for peace.



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Since this is the purpose and cause which brings us into the war our first task would be to assist the Allies in policing the highway. What technical means are to be used is for naval experts in both countries to decide. Some form of joint control over shipping will have to be devised at once. But our work would not stop there. While the war is on, we shall wish to count as heavily as possible against Germany, and any form of economic assistance we can give to her effective enemies we shall and ought to give. So far as money and munitions go we must take our stand with all the European Allies, and act in the spirit of an ally. This means that we supply what they need, not what it may please us to give. The Allies have an organization in active operation, and it would be our business to put American resources behind it. There must be no hoarding of guns over here, no interference with their supplies. It goes without saying that we shall coöperate and not compete with them.

The sending of an American army is another matter. The decision on this point cannot be made offhand. If we place an army in France, it may mean that we are to take a part in the territorial adjustments of Europe. It is doubtful whether Europe wishes us to take any part. It is doubtful whether it is to the interest of America to take a part. The guiding principle here was laid down in the President's address to the Senate. We are not anxious to share in the settlement of Europe, but we are deeply concerned in the kind of settlement which is made. If it contains the seeds of another war we want no part in it; but we want our influence to count against sowing the seeds of another war. Therefore if the Allies wish us to put an army in the field we can do so only when they have defined their terms so specifically that we are assured of a just settlement.

This does not mean that we would not allow Americans to fight with the Allied armies. It would probably be feasible if the war is prolonged to send volunteers to France, have them trained there as American units, and allow them to be embodied in the French or the British army. We should want no independent American commanders. These would merely be American regiments to testify to our friendship without involving us as a nation in the detailed diplomacy of Europe.

In the meantime, however, it will be necessary to train a large force on American soil. The chances are all against its ever being used in Europe, but it ought to exist as a reserve and a precaution. How to raise such an army without disorganizing industry is the problem. It seems to us very undesirable at this time to open a recruiting campaign for volunteers. Recruiting in the present condition of the labor market would be almost impossible without a campaign of manufactured hatred which would distract the nation. Reluctantly, therefore, we suggest the adoption of compulsory training for certain age classes. Such a law is not feasible, however, without certain large exemptions and safeguards. The first of them should be the provision that the men trained would not be compelled to fight in Europe. That is to say, training would be compulsory, the service would be voluntary. Men engaged in necessary industries should also be exempted, and sincere exemption provided for the conscientious objector. Even with all these provisos, if the government called two or three classes to the colors a very decent reserve would be created within a year. For the training of this army the government might consider summoning home some of the thirty thousand Americans said to be fighting now with the Allied armies.

These appear to be the main lines of preparation called for by the break with Germany. To carry them out a series of diplomatic, naval, military and economic conferences with the Allies should be instituted. Now while things are still in the balance is the time to negotiate with them not only about actual aid but about political purposes. Certain things would be established now which would immensely clarify the future. An interdict on trade with Germany would wipe off our legal dispute with the Allies. A formal recognition by them of the purposes which inspire Pan-Americanism would simplify and secure this hemisphere. A demand upon Germany that she recognize the Monroe Doctrine as a basis of peace would carry into effect a part of the program announced by the President in his address. An agreement by the Allies to abandon the principles of the Paris conference should be considered, so that this war shall not end in a hostile peace. Such an agreement would probably weaken the German extremists more than a dozen army corps.

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